1964 Election in the South: The Southern White Vote?

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

I just read nearly all of Kevin Phillip's "Emerging Republican Majority", which I had not yet had the chance to read.

In describing the 1964 election, Phillip's states that because Goldwater made a mad dash for the Dixiecrats, which were basically black belt fiscal conservatives who had long formed the dominant core of the Democratic Party in the South due to not only black but poor white disenfranchisement, that Mountain based Republicans, long the sole holdout for the party in the region rebelled and Goldwater lost a crap ton of votes, counties and turnout in heavily Republican places like East Tennessee/Western NC, that a normal Republican would not have lost.

The core base of what Phillips describes as "Dixiecrat" is basically a racist, fiscally conservative middle class southerner in the Deep South. They resided in the black belt or in the cities and were very race and class conscious. They formed the core of Thurmond's base in 1948 and represented the bulk of Goldwater's Southern Support in the 1964, while poorer whites in less diverse areas of the Deep South remained largely loyal to the Democrats of the New and Fair Deals because of class (some rebelled in 1964, but many stayed loyal until 1968 when they formed the core base that voted for Wallace, by which point a lot of the upscale white areas that voted for Thurmond and Goldwater were Republican enough that they voted for Nixon allowing him to win TN, VA etc when the Mountain vote normalized).

To the point of the racial and class consciousness at work, the black belt whites were the most loyal in 1928, while it was the poor up country whites joining with people of similar economic standing in the mountains to vote for Hoover, because of anti-catholic bigotry. I was not aware of this dichotomy between the dissent in 1928 versus 1948, before reading this book, but it makes sense since the presence of the black population, ingrained hostility towards what was seen as "the party of blacks".  In 1928 that was clearly the Republican Party still, while 1948 with twenty years of post-war Civil War whites dying off (an element Phillips doesn't consider) and both parties unreliable on the race issue, led to the first dissent by upper class whites from the Democrats since the days of the Whigs, when said group formed the contingent of "state's rights Whigs". Meanwhile the Southerners who benefited from the New Deal, poor upcountry whites who rebelled over Catholicism in 1928 (less so in 1960 surprisingly), became the base of the New Democrats in the South and largely stuck with them, or returned to them with Jimmy Carter and many with Bill Clinton (after which many of them had died or were dying off rapidly) .

While strides were made, the black belt whites of the outer south remained Democratic much longer, largely because they were ingrained in partisan warfare with Mountain Republicans who often got 30% or more of the statewide vote compared to the Deep South were Republicans were not a threat. Meanwhile, Mountain Republicans being ingrained in partisan warfare with bourgeoisie black belt whites (who had long dominated the dominant Democratic State Party establishments by this point) loathed the idea of a Republican fawning over said group and rebelled or stayed home. Mountain Republicans were also more isolationist and thus didn't fancy Goldwater's foreign policy either. Goldwater also suffered greatly with many voters because of his positions on Social Security (Florida) and Agriculture (it is aid that his farm policies decided NC).

That is why Goldwater collapsed in the Outer South and won the deep south where pre-VRA, those higher end Dixiecrats were still the dominant voting base. Goldwater cut too narrow of a conservative base in the South, while a "normal Republican for the time", who wasn't viewed as a hawk and wasn't seen as thirsting too much for Plantation Owners and didn't seem to threaten Social Security and Agricultural policies, would thus be able to unite a white conservative majority and dominate the South, which basically describes Richard Nixon and the people today call the  "1968 Southern Strategy".

Ironically the book refers to Goldwater's campaign as "the Southern Strategy" and stresses its short comings and need to be rejected while still moving in the direction of "conservatism".

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

Mississippi is much more poorer and while disenfranchisement was at its highest, the state's poorer whites were still more powerful as witnessed by that success of Theodore Bilbo and his war with the Pat Harrison and others, who represented more of that upscale Black belt demographic.

The reason for the uniformity of the white vote in Mississippi, compared to some other state is because this state more than any other witnessed polarization along racial lines. While some outer South states were indeed more tolerant of blacks and black voting (relatively speaking), the deeper south and the higher the African American population percentage was, the more militantly racist and repressive both the conservative and populist wings of the Democratic part were. Mississippi took all of this to the absolute extreme to the point that Goldwater basically won both economic groups without exception, hence the 87% and Mississippi had the highest rate of disenfranchisement.

This thought process is not new, for instance the same logic applied pre-Civil War. The larger the African-American percentage, the greater the demand for expansion of slavery into the territories and the greater the repression of speech, press and assembly, out of fear of a slave revolt.
 

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

I still don't understand how Johnson only got 13% in Mississippi.  Any Democrat is guaranteed a floor of around 42% without winning more than 10% of whites.

Blacks were essentially disenfranchised in MS (and for the most part in AL) until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (and even then it wasn't until the late 1970s that Blacks voted at near normal rates). Johnson probably won around 10% of the White vote, ranging from the 34.5% he won in Itawamba County (which was just 6.8% Black) to < 5% in many Black belt counties were Blacks were disenfranchised. In Jefferson County for example Johnson won 5% and 4 years later, Humphrey won 63%.

The Charts from "The Emerging Republican Majority":

Mississippi                   % of Pop 1960        % of Reg Voters 1964
Jefferson Country           68%                           0%
Clairborne                       70%                           1%
Holmes                           65%                            0%

By State (1964)
Alabama    23%
Arkansas   49.3%
Florida       63.7%
Georgia     44%
Louisiana   32%
Mississippi   7%
NC              46.8%
SC              38.8%
TN              69.4%
TX              57.7%
VA              45.7%

I would say African-Americans were critical to LBJ in every state he won save for states were the population was too small to account for the margin of victory.

The best way to think about the black belt counties is that of a wealthy white elite dominating counties. You have counties with maybe 50,000 blacks of voting age, 30,000 whites of voting age casting only 5,000 white votes. Levels of disenfranchisement that reached 80% to 90% of all voters.

That is how Republicans could win the PV during the Solid South era. SC would go 90% Dem, but cast very few votes relative to its population, so it could be countered by a few extra percent in PA, NY and ILL.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

I still don't understand how Johnson only got 13% in Mississippi.  Any Democrat is guaranteed a floor of around 42% without winning more than 10% of whites.

Blacks were essentially disenfranchised in MS (and for the most part in AL) until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (and even then it wasn't until the late 1970s that Blacks voted at near normal rates). Johnson probably won around 10% of the White vote, ranging from the 34.5% he won in Itawamba County (which was just 6.8% Black) to < 5% in many Black belt counties were Blacks were disenfranchised. In Jefferson County for example Johnson won 5% and 4 years later, Humphrey won 63%.

The Charts from "The Emerging Republican Majority":

Mississippi                   % of Pop 1960        % of Reg Voters 1964
Jefferson Country           68%                           0%
Clairborne                       70%                           1%
Holmes                           65%                            0%

By State (1964)
Alabama    23%
Arkansas   49.3%
Florida       63.7%
Georgia     44%
Louisiana   32%
Mississippi   7%
NC              46.8%
SC              38.8%
TN              69.4%
TX              57.7%
VA              45.7%

I would say African-Americans were critical to LBJ in every state he won save for states were the population was too small to account for the margin of victory.

The best way to think about the black belt counties is that of a wealthy white elite dominating counties. You have counties with maybe 50,000 blacks of voting age, 30,000 whites of voting age casting only 5,000 white votes. Levels of disenfranchisement that reached 80% to 90% of all voters.

That is how Republicans could win the PV during the Solid South era. SC would go 90% Dem, but cast very few votes relative to its population, so it could be countered by a few extra percent in PA, NY and ILL.

Are these numbers the percentages of the white vote Johnson received in those states?

African-American voter registration