Could the next Labor majority exceed 1997?

[Filuwaúrdjan]

When leads get over a certain size, FPTP goes nuts and the exact distribution of seats becomes very erratic and unpredictable. If Labour were to have a lead in excess of 15pts (which they have never managed before) then almost anything would be at least possible. Of course that remains a big 'if'.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

As for Cleggmania, it did have some element of "Oh, Jeremy Corbyn!",...

Including, quite literally, many of the same people.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

(in 1997 they weren't getting North Korean like margins in some urban progressive areas like they are now).

What on Earth are you talking about? Labour majorities in constituencies vaguely matching that description were generally extremely large in 1997 as well. What was unusual about 2019 is that they remained so despite everything else, but then they'll certainly swing a lot less next time around; much as the swings to Labour were weak in the South Wales Valleys constituencies in 1997 as they'd already hit landslide conditions in them under local boy Kinnock.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Anyway, the two reasons to be sceptical of a larger Labour majority than 1997 are a) the fact that, no matter what happens, Labour will not be winning every single seat but one in Central and urban Scotland, and b) Labour has shown no sign of appealing particularly to typical middle class voters in 'Middle England' in any actual elections. They do not need either to win a majority or even to win a large majority, but they would do in order to top 1997.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

How are you actually defining this?

Some of their Midlands results last month surely weren't bad in this regard.

They were impressive in what we might think of as upper working/lower middle class sort of areas, and that's very good for Labour for so many reasons (and, incidentally, isn't it interesting that the sort of people who are especially common in such places are unusually likely to be involved themselves or have family members involved in pay disputes with the government, one way or another?), but I wouldn't categorize those as 'ordinary middle class in Middle England', if you follow. Though there were a few wards here and there that match that description where Labour did win, but you always get a few random results, as you know. Now the LibDems and the Greens on the other hand...

[Filuwaúrdjan]

But even beyond May (or Corbyn), the message might have been that the Labour *brand* wasn't as toxic, from a modern-day natural-governing-party perspective, as imagined.  And that non-toxicity's playing out in the form of Sir Keir.

The whole 'Labour isn't Labour' thing that was pretty deafening in certain circles throughout 2019 it came up so often has turned out to be something of a blessing in disguise, as it meant the Party brand itself was shielded from association with a deeply unpopular leadership.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

The lanslides of 1931 and 1945, which represent the largest national swings in British political history, elected Clement Attlee and Stanley Baldwin - two of the most mild-mannered PMs of the past century.

I wouldn't describe Baldwin as mild-mannered exactly, but he wasn't charismatic in a conventional sense. His general vibe was more of a headmaster who was quite happy to use the cane at short and perhaps arbitrary notice.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Neither of the two most charismatic postwar leaders of major political parties (Gaitskell and Kinnock) won an election. In Gaitskell's case it is probable that he would have done the second time around had he lived, but in general this is proof enough that charisma is not a decisive factor in British elections. It may even have been a net negative for Kinnock.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Best part was that he cocked up the delivery so badly that 'and he's turning up the volume' ended up as a diminuendo.