Communist Party of China Congress, 2017

[Foucaulf]

The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China ("CCP") is taking place on October 18th, 2017. In my opinion, this is one of the most important political events of the year (certainly at the level of the French or German elections), as during this five-year Congress the CCP's leadership gets reshuffled, and along with it the country's offices of state.

Five years after his ascendence to CCP leader at the 18th National Congress, Xi Jinping has entrenched his authority with greater speed than most have expected, and how much he will consolidate that power through leadership changes this year is still a mystery.

So much of his first five years have been spent on his anti-corruption campaign targeting top Communist officials, along with a creeping return of surveillance over public life, that observers have to ask: has all that Xi done actually gave him more power, and how will a party leadership where he personally intervened in change their attitudes in the next five years?

I'll try to explain what's going on in this opaque, but very important, leadership transition in the following posts.

I: THE CCP LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

The CCP, despite all its ups and downs in the past 90-ish years, is still a Leninist party. Its members control all levels of government along with many major businesses/state enterprises, refrain from public dissent and look to the Central Leadership for guidance.

While internal party elections do exist, it is unrealistic for someone to reach to the top just on experience and a good message. Reaching the top requires experience, connections and also luck as you ascend up the ranks step by step through every Congress for up to 2-3 decades.

In theory, the highest constitutional body of the CCP is the Central Committee (党中央) responsible for electing the Party General Secretary (Xi) and also electing the Politburo (政治局), which is responsible for day-to-day party decisions in the year between Central Committee meetings. In reality, Chinese elite politics revolve around appointment to the Politburo (25 members) and the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC/政治局常委会, currently 7 members). The General Secretary is considered to be "first among equals" among the Politburo or the Standing Committee.

While Politburo members all receive major party and state positions, it is the Standing Committee that meets frequently and acts like a "Cabinet" for the nation. Elections to these two bodies are not competitive, but are instead the outcome of a horserace between current leaders and retired "Party Elders," still commanding loyalty from behind the scenes.

To clarify, this has not always been how the CCP leadership worked. (This part is historical context, so skip to part II if uninterested)

Mao Zedong held the position of Chairman of the Central Committee, and up to his death progressively monopolized power in himself while persecuting his past comrades.

After Mao's death and the culling of his remaining senior supporters, Deng Xiaoping did reinstate the Standing Committee as the highest party organ, but did not chair it as General Secretary. Deng's transition out of formal party leadership was also defined by the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, leading to an explicit purge of the reformist Zhao Ziyang from the Standing Committee.

It was only in 1992 that the current form of China's leadership transition took place. Deng and his fellow leaders who had fought with Mao were crippled by age, but had decided among themselves a promising set of leaders for the next 20 years.

The consensus pick to be the next Party Leader was Jiang Zemin, Party Secretary of Shanghai and whose swifter suppression of the 1989 student protests in Shanghai contrasted with Beijing leadership. One party elder, Song Ping, also lobbied for his young protege, Tibet Secretary Hu Jintao and General Secretary, 2002-2012.

While Jiang was named General Secretary right after Zhao's purge, it took him two Congresses in 1992 and 1997 to solidify his control and offer a model of leadership transition:

• The first was to elevate his confidant from Shanghai, Zhu Rongji, into the position of PRC Premier, presiding over the formal Chinese government and squeezing out the Tiananmen crackdown architect Li Peng in the process;
• The second was for Jiang to be declared as the "Core" of his generation of Party leaders as Mao and Deng were in the past, while entrenching his ideological doctrine in the party constitution;
• The third, and maybe the most consequential, was Jiang elevating other friends from his Shanghai years into the Politburo, working either on major national portfolios under Zhu's government or reassigning them to lead major areas like Beijing, Shandong or Guangdong.
  That way, upon his scheduled transfer of power in 2002 to Hu, Jiang led a network of leaders that can continue to influence the Party through a chain of patronage relationships.

It is also important to mention that a requirement for leadership of the Party, following Deng, is also control of the CCP Central Military Commission. After two transitions of leadership - Jiang's delayed transition to Hu Jintao, a year after his resignation from other offices, and Hu's prompt transition to Xi - China's military leadership is now also part of the horserace.

The criteria for how generals are chosen into leadership are opaque compared to how party leaders are chosen, but it's safe to assume promotion dynamics in the military means patronage relations among the top generals will lag the dominant relations in the party elite.

II. THE RULES OF LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION

The actual proceedings of the PSC is shrouded in mystery, and the selection process isn't much clearer:

• One extreme is to say every leadership transition is a battle between party elders (Jiang, Hu) and the current leader (Xi) to maintain warm bodies for them on the PSC and the Politburo, leading to a fragmented, incompetent leadership;
• Another extreme is to say there are strong rules governing the transition process respected by all and nudging the leaders to consensus candidates for top leadership and factional balance elsewhere.

The truth is somewhere in the middle, where some rules are believed to exist in leadership but their permanence is uncertain. If Xi is supposed to be the most powerful leader since Deng (more on this later), the 19th Congress is a test to see how many of these rules he can skirt around to consolidate his power. Below is a list of possible "rules" the players in this contest abide, in decreasing order of plausibility:

• Importance of connections/"Guanxi". This is barely a "rule" as it is a fact about Chinese society, but to reiterate: since the Chinese leadership is a horserace between party elders, any contender for the top needs to be one or two degrees of separation from a previous party leader.
  Connections are either made from being a direct subordinate of a future leader (like those under Jiang in Shanghai, Hu when he led the Communist Youth League or Xi in the province of Zhejiang), through family connections (when both are children of party officials) or as secretaries/"mishu."
• Level-by-level promotion. I mentioned three levels of Party leadership at the start of the post; I am not aware of any party official joining the Politburo who was not already in the Central Committee. Since 1992, only 4 party officials joined the Standing Committee without already in the Politburo. Three of them were civilians (and military can no longer join the PSC), and all three ended up either as General Secretary or Premier of China.
• Varied Resume. From Jiang onwards, national party leaders have increasingly been rotated around to new positions every Congress as they climb the ranks. PSC nominees in the last 2-3 Congresses have had a mix of leadership in a poor Chinese province, a rich Chinese province or a job in central government/party affairs. This also means politicians who survive running certain particular poor provinces or make it to running a major city like Beijing or Shanghai are guaranteed some place in the Politburo (more on this later).
• "Seven Up, Eight Down." This rule, rumored to have been declared precedent by Jiang as he left office, mandates retirement for any official at the Politburo level up for reelection older than 68. (If someone is elected at 67, they serve the full five-year term until 72.) Every Politburo member since 2002 has followed this rule, which has made it appear "hard." However official confirmation of this does not exist, and it may be waived for Wang Qishan, Xi's "right-hand man" in the last five years.

In addition, there are special rules pertaining to only the PSC:

• Correspondence to offices of state. While the Party Constitution requires the General Secretary to chair the PSC, precedent has also meant that every member of the PSC is also named to a major party or state position. Hence the second and third-ranked members either chair the main legislature, the National People's Congress, or serve as Premier of China; one of them is always heads the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, i.e. the "Corruption Czar;" two of them always serve as vice-chairs of the CMC; and so forth.
• Future Paramount Leader in Standing Committee. At least in the term before they lead both the party and the CMC, the next "Paramount Leader" of China has been part of the PSC. The current Premier, Li Keqiang, was also placed into the PSC right before ascension.
• Factional balance. This is a vague term because it is not clear what factions there even are in Chinese politics, but most generally no leader of China has had many allies placed in his first PSC, and none succeeded in having a majority of their confidants seated on his second PSC. Even more generally, incumbent leaders tend to wait to exert their influence on the Politburo during their rule and hope their allies get seated at the highest level after retirement.
• Priority by Seniority. Suggested by some China watchers, this is a more restrictive version of "Factional balance:" not only can any one current or former leader place so many of his people in the Politburo or PSC, but they also have to be the oldest among their cliques. By this rule, Hu Jintao ally and high-flying former Guangdong Secretary Wang Yang will miss promotion for the second time in a row, due to him being 67 still in 2022. That said, leaks to the press suggests he will be promoted anyway...

[Foucaulf]

III: XI'S POLITICAL MOVES, 2012-17

Let's start from the beginning: What was Xi Jinping's political position as he ascended to General Secretary of the CCP in 2012?

Xi has an immediate pedigree as the son of Xi Zhongxun (1913-2002), who like Deng Xiaoping fought alongside Mao in the Chinese Civil War. The elder Xi, after his return from Mao's purges, was one of what Hong Kong commentators call the "Eight Elders," retired officials who dictated the Party behind the scenes during the 1980s-90s.

As his father was rehabilitated by the time he reached adulthood, Xi first served as secretary under the Minister of Defense, then continued to exceed expectations leading counties and cities in Hebei (a "poor," heavy industry province), Fujian, then Zhejiang (a "rich" province).

What was behind his big break in 2007, skipping the Politburo to jump straight into the PSC, is speculated as follows: Hoping to fend off allies of Hu in the 2012 leadership succession, Jiang's camp made a tacit alliance with party leader descendants like Xi - the "princelings" - to maintain a more conservative, anti-liberal ruling agenda. In particular, close Jiang confidant and 2002 PSC member Zeng Qinhong lobbied on behalf of Xi as a princeling devoted to party tradition.

This alliance between Jiang's camp and "princelings" would then take most of the PSC seats in 2012, leaving at most two seats for people in Hu's camp: Premier Li Keqiang and maybe propaganda czar Liu Yunshan.

The idea is then that Xi reached the top without natural allies around him and because he was competent without questioning party orthodoxy. What really happened afterwards was shocking: Xi used traditional party themes as he launched a crackdown on senior party officials, leading speculation that he was remaking the party in his image and becoming the next Mao.

Xi's major political acts, in my order of decreasing importance (but they're all important!), is as follows:

• The anti-corruption campaign. It is obvious that ordinary Chinese hate corruption among party officials, but it is also obvious that the horserace nature of party politics require bribes and kickbacks, later embezzled by top officials. Xi, along with "Corruption Czar" Wang Qishan, launched investigations into party officials at all levels, an unprecedented event.
  The campaign was intended to target "tigers" at the top as well as "lilies" at the local level. The biggest tigers were the "big four:" Top-ranked general Xu Caihou, Jiangxi Province party chief Su Rong, General Office Director Ling Jihua and ex-PSC "security czar" Zhou Yongkang. Even if none of them were serving Politburo members, their careers either reached the Politburo level or higher earlier.
  Their life sentences could be seen as throwing down the gauntlet to their patrons; Ling is known to have been a top Hu aide, while Xu and Zhou have some connection to Jiang.
  Much more action went on among the "middle management" level, dealing with high-level provincial officials, senior bureaucrats, state-owned corporation leaders and military commanders. Not only did Xi gain public approval for his actions, but he also pushed the anti-corruption campaign as the central issue facing the Party.
  
• Restructuring of the military. Civilian control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been key to entrenching the power of leaders like Mao or Deng, but Xi not only staffed military leadership with his loyalists but also made his strength known all the way to the bottom. "Military reform" is one of Xi's public policy planks, and under the name of modernization he pioneered a total restructuring of the party-military bureaucratic structure.
  One China watcher predicts 5/6ths of all top military leadership elected at the 19th Congress will be new faces, including allies of Xi in the corruption campaign. This is against a backdrop of militarization in Chinese media, with supposed technical advances like the first Chinese aircraft carriers dominating the news.
• A new cult of personality. This is something common Chinese and Western press can easily notice. Xi made some major speeches on his ideological outlook early on (e.g. the "Chinese Dream" and the "Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People"), but the legwork is in making this official doctrine absorbed by all party officials. Extensions of this agenda has led to greater internet censorship (though how much of this is just PSC consensus is unknown), rewriting of university curricula, public outpourings of support from local party leaders and expanding censorship on printed and television media.
  The result of this pressure is party branches falling over themselves to declare Xi as a "core leader" in party history, a title not thrusted by the rank-and-file onto a leader since Deng Xiaoping.
• A Presidential Administration. Every top Chinese leader has tried to circumvent rule by consensus through usage of the "small group" system, study committees for top leadership. These groups are sorted by subject matter (unlike the PSC's overarching reach), has leadership from the Central Committee and institutions outside of the Party (headed by Party members,) and their attached offices organize clusters of bureaucrats working on the details of broad policy proposals.
  A theme of Xi's administration has been to publicize his chairing of these small groups more, as well as reshuffling them to create new ones with less institutional memory.
  Xi does personally head permanent committees like the "Group for Financial and Economic Affairs," which is the core institution proposing Chinese economic policy. He also heads newer, esoteric small groups like the "Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms," one for "Reforms" in the military and one for "Information Security." Unlike the permanent committees, these new groups' work is heavily publicized and used as a model for provincial governments. This is on top of dormant institutions like the Party National Security Council, or Xi's personal advisors.
  What is the point of all this? The best guess is that Xi has tried to circumvent Li Keqiang, who unlike the last two Chinese premiers is not an ally of Li's. Though Li is nearly guaranteed to continue in top leadership after the 19th Congress, the point is that Xi is at least attempting to create his own network of officials and bureaucrats who report directly to him or his friends on the future Politburo.
  

The above is the context for how to interpret what happens at the 19th Congress. There are two related questions:

• How will Xi consolidate his power through formal party institutions? This includes enshrining his personal philosophy into the Party Constitution, stacking his allies into the PSC and the Politburo and prioritizing the party's future goals in his Congress keynote address.
• How will Xi circumvent formal party institutions for his own gain? This is what we may suspect is happening if there is some dramatic change to the PSC's size, if Xi makes major changes to the institutional regulations in the Party Constitution, if his allies stack the small groups even if they are not at Politburo or PSC level, and so forth.

The reality will probably not follow some of the rumors of Xi taking dictatorial power, like naming himself to a term-unlimited "Chairman of the Central Committee," unheard of since Mao. The biggest piece of evidence against this is one of the craftier strategies of Xi's: under threat of corruption investigations, provincial leaders and bureaucrats have been replaced with some of his confidants, allowing a quicker stacking of the Politburo than someone like Xi, quickly thrust into top leadership, should have been able to do.

It is less controversial and maybe expected for Xi to stack the leadership pipelines with his people, especially with at least 11/25 and maybe more than half of the Politburo resigning this year. For that reason the PSC is not the biggest show on the calendar this time.

[Foucaulf]

IV: FACTIONS IN PARTY LEADERSHIP

As I said two posts ago, "it is not clear what factions there even are in Chinese politics." Everything in this part is unofficial and came out of years of speculation in Hong Kong/Taiwanese/Japanese/Western outlets. The general idea is that factions reflect patronage/tutelage relationships above ideological similarities, and several politicians try to move between factions just so they can get the promotion.

Below is the finest division of elite Party factions that I can think of (h/t Chinese Wikipedia):

The "Shanghai Clique."
Otherwise called the "Jiang faction," this refers to the spate of officials working under Jiang Zemin over his political career, culminating in the Shanghai Party Office, as well as those officials' disciples. Jiang's closest allies, now all retired, include Zeng Qinghong (Head of Party Secretariat, 1997-2007, PSC 2002-2007), Wu Bangguo ("chief legislator" & PSC member, 2002-2012), Jia Qinglin (former Beijing Party Secretary, #4 in the PSC 2002-2012) and Huang Ju (Vice Premier and PSC member, 2002-2007)
Later members include Li Changchun ("Propaganda Czar", 2002-2012), Meng Jianzhu ("Security Czar" 2012-2017), Zhou Yongkang ("Security Czar" 2007-2012, purged 2014) and Chen Liangyu (Shanghai Party Secretary 2002-2006, purged 2006).
Their dominance within the Hu Jintao administration in the 2000s have seriously eroded due to aging and corruption investigations into its younger members.

The "Tuanpai"/"Youth League Faction."
Generic name for Party leaders with former history in the Communist Youth League ("CCYL"), first used in the eighties. The most recent generation of Tuanpai leaders are also called the "Hu faction," since Hu Jintao was a leader in the organization in the 80s and survived the purges of its more liberal faction.
As Jiang-allied politicians dominated elite Chinese politics during most of Hu's term and Xi's first term, many top members in this faction are at the Politburo level or Ministerial level in the Chinese government. The major post-Hu leader in this group is Li Keqiang, Premier of China 2012- (but see Xi's circumvention of him discussed earlier). Leaders from Li's generation include Li Yuanchao (Vice-President of China, 2012 -), Wang Yang and Liu Yandong (Vice-Premiers 2012-, Politburo 2007- ), all of whose lack of PSC promotion made some Atlas posters at the time very angry.
The younger cohort of leaders in this group include Hu Chunhua (Guangdong Party Secretary, Politburo 2012-), Zhou Qiang (PRC Chief Justice 2013-, Central Committee), Sun Chunlan (PRC United Work Front chair, Politburo 2012-) and Liu Qibao (chair of the Propaganda Department in the Central Committee, Politburo 2012-)
There are numerous other leaders who reached senior management in the CCYL but should no longer be counted first as Tuanpai. One example is Liu Yunshan ("Propaganda Czar" and PSC, 2012-), a vice-provincial secretary in the CCYL but whose hardline censorship views place him with the more conservative Jiang faction.
After Xi's demotion of certain CCYL leaders and critical speeches toward the organization during his first term, the influence of the modern CCYL has diminished, closing another avenue to top leadership for those lacking the connections that children of party elders have.

The Reformists.
Most Chinese analysts do not talk about a "reformist" wing as a well-defined entity with clout. Rather, Party leaders looking kindly to more democratic participation and market reforms get talked up in the West if they're in senior leadership. The most obvious reformists in Chinese history were the General Secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and they were purged for their trouble.
The most recent "reformist" leader was 2007-2012 Premier Wen Jiabao, serving concurrently with Hu and who was the much more public face of the administration; he mixed in populist initiatives with calls for reform of the political system. Part of this is also Wen not being in either the Hu or Jiang factions, but rather connected to former premier Zhu Rongji.
Other members include Hu Deping, son of Hu Yaobang, retired Central Committee member and possible Xi confidant; Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao; and maybe current "Corruption Czar" Wang Qishan - most of his professional career involved the banking sector, and he was also a vice-premier to Zhu Rongji like Wen.

The "Princelings."
This term can be applied to any descendant of a CCP official, in reference to them benefitting from increasing nepotism and wealth concentration in a society where the rich are all associated with the Party in some way.
In the context of elite politics, the Princelings are descendants of party officials at the vice-provincial level or higher, or descendants of generals or leaders of major state-owned enterprises. Of the leaders mentioned so far, the following are Princelings: Xi Jinping, Jiang Zemin (nephew of a pre-1949 Party official), Zeng Qinghong (son), Li Yuanchao (son), Liu Yandong (daughter) and Hu Deping. Moreover, Wang Qishan is the son-in-law of former PSC member Yao Yilin.
As part of the "Jiang-Princeling coalition" that crowded out the Tuanpai in 2012, this group also contains sitting PSC member Yu Zhengsheng (#4 - son of former Tianjin Chief Huang Jing and related to many more party elites).
It also contains sitting Chinese Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan (son of the former head of the Central Machine-Building Ministry), and disgraced former Politburo member Bo Xilai (Chongqing Party Secretary), son of Bo Yibo, one of the "Eight Elders."

The "Zhejiang Clique."
As Xi continued his public displays of power, speculation grew of how many of his own allies he can place into top leadership. Unlike Jiang or Hu, Xi has ruled over four provinces and have deep connections to other princelings, which allows him a great amount of flexibility in choosing his confidants.
Particular attention has been placed on those working in the Zhejiang Province Party Office when Xi led it in 2002-2007, analogous to the "Shanghai Clique." Notable members of this group include Cai Qi (current Beijing Party Secretary, likely Politburo 2017-), Li Qiang (Party Secretary of Jiangsu Province, one of the richest in the country), Bayanqolu (Mongolian Party Secretary of Jilin Province) and Chen Min'er (Party Secretary of Chongqing, formerly of Guizhou Province; more about him later...)

The "Oil Clique."
The existence of the "Oil Clique" was officially propagated after the corruption case on ex-PSC member Zhou Yongkang concluded. A major stepping stone to Zhou's career was his time at the state-owned oil company CNPC, eventually becoming its chairman.
The connection to leadership here is that former Jiang confidante Zeng Qinghong also served in CNPC leadership and had a tendency to promote people within that organization. Furthermore, the sitting PSC member Zhang Gaoli is usually just referred to as a pro-Jiang leader, but specifically he also worked in CNPC in the 1980s.
This clique is no longer effective following the continued investigations into the company after Zhou's sentence - why would it be officially revealed if not to serve as a lesson to the secret cliques out there?

Xi's Brain Trust.
With the publicizing of Xi-chaired small groups halfway through Xi's first term, the General Secretary's aides have also received more public scrutiny. A major adviser of Xi's is Wang Huning (Director, Central Policy Research Office), a "chief secretary" to Jiang, Hu and Xi, devising their propaganda campaigns.
While Wang has been more elevated recently in the past, he is not one of Xi's closest senior aides. One longtime confidant is current Politburo member Li Zhanshu. Another is his senior economics aide and likely future Politburo member Liu He, and Zhejiang co-worker and now top-level military administrator Zhong Shaojun.

Miscellaneous.
With all that said, when people talk about the "Jiang Faction" or "Xi Faction" in the abstract, the above categories are still not comprehensive. For example, current "chief legislator" Zhang Dejiang is part of the Jiang camp after he aided Jiang on his first North Korea trip. Zhao Leji, the director of the CCP Organizations Department, is in charge of all low-level personnel decisions and is said to be loyal to Xi.
The Jiang faction also included top military officials that rose to the top by Xi's administration, only to be shot down during the anti-corruption campaign. Xi has treated a top ally in the military well - Air Force General Xu Qiliang is positioned to become the senior vice-chairman of the CMC, becoming Xi's right-hand man in the PLA.

Just a guess, a bunch of Commies are gonna swap positions

Beats countries like Japan and India where it's a bunch of old ex-felons swapping positions Imo - at least I'm not spamming you like Jaichind does talking about those countries.

[Foucaulf]

V: FACTIONAL STABILITY

Can we predict whether these factions form a stable "bipartisan" system in elite Chinese politics, preventing a dictator like Mao in the process? One answer in the affirmative comes from liberal Chinese writer Wang Lixiong and what I call his "generations theory." Here's my interpretation of it:

Deng, when thinking of his succession, named two successors with competent allies to the highest level, set the rule of a decennial transfer of power but also ensured the immediate successor have to share power with people outside of his circle in his generation of leadership. This design led to a scenario where both successors are in equilibrium: their best strategy is to wait for any current-ruling successor to move first in stacking leadership, and once that person finished moving he stack as many remaining positions as he can.

Successor A cannot stack during his leadership because both party elders and Successor B will remember this and plot payback in the future. Successor A has to stack a decent amount as he leaves, because Successor B is not credible and can always try to take A out as quickly as possible. Successor A cannot stagger the stacking into the future due to age constraints making his aging allies incapable of the workload.

A natural consequence is that one of Successor A's last moves is to name the successor to Successor B, having exhausted all other allies due to age constraints. Since quantity is of the essence in the equilibrium, ideological concerns are also second order.

As expected, Jiang stacked the leadership when Hu was in charge and then nominated Xi as a consensus candidate (according to rumors). Jiang did ally with Princelings as a last hurrah, but Hu waited knowing he can stack more people in the 19th Congress.

The problem that the author Wang also admits is that Xi has disrupted the equilibrium: Xi used the anti-corruption campaign to at least raise the threat of stacking leadership with his people while he is still in charge, rather than waiting until 2022. Now elders may panic and try to either take down Xi's people or force another successor out of nowhere to compete with Xi's choice, causing bloodshed either way.

Another theory of factional stability comes from Brookings analyst Cheng Li, who I linked to above and who has defended the theory since 2005. In this view, Chinese politics will stabilize into two coalitions with genuinely different policy priorities and professional histories: an "elitist coalition" made up of Princelings and winners from China's economic liberalization, and a "populist coalition" representing local politicians and the lower classes.

Assuming Chinese leaders value national stability and growth, given the precariousness of any single-party system, both party elite and rank-and-file will divide evenly between the coalitions, debating their merits internally.

The problem again is that Xi seems to have disturbed this coalition system by creating an agenda - the anti-corruption campaign - which seems to transcend the coalition divide as party cadres are being force fed the content. His pool of confidants and advisers may also relieve him of the need for counsel from senior, "partisan" leaders elsewhere.


VI: STANDING COMMITTEE ODDS

If the Standing Committee remains at seven members, five of the following ten possible contestants will make the leap to the top.

More explosive rumors suggested the committee could be reduced to five members, a move last seen in 1987. One Hong Kong newspaper suggested the Standing Committee will be eliminated entirely, in a gross caricature of Xi's "imperial power". (TBD)

• Wang Qishan. Faction: "Princeling"/Pro-Xi.
  Whether Wang will stay on the PSC for another term is a huge burning question for politics watchers. He is 69 this year, which means he breaks the "7 up 8 down" rule. However, Xi's friendship with Wang is said to have lasted over 40 years, and Wang's formal role as "Corruption Czar" made him pivotal to Xi's corruption crackdown, making him a feared and loathed figure.
  If there were no rules, Xi would demand Wang even becomes Premier (#2 in the PSC) so he can preside over economic and financial policy. That seems like a stretch given recent reporting, but Wang could still serve as #3 on the PSC as "Chief Legislator."
  With no consistent reporting on whether he lives or goes, I have no prediction either.
• Li Zhanshu. Faction: "Shaanxi Clique"/Pro-Xi.
  Rumors have it that Li forged a bond with Xi since the 80s, when both worked in Hebei Province; Li's later work as Shaanxi Party Secretary and Xi's family origins in that province led to the nickname "Shaanxi Clique."
  No matter what happens to Wang, Li, functioning as Xi's "chief of staff" through the CCP General Office, seems certain to be promoted and take over Wang's anti-corruption portfolio. As he turns 67 this year, he will also not overstay his welcome.
• Chen Min'er. Faction: "Zhejiang Clique"/Pro-Xi.
  Of all of Xi's Zhejiang underlings, the General Secretary has pulled out the stops for Chen: he was appointed to senior leadership in Guizhou province right as Li Zhanshu joined top leadership. Ffive years later Chen was appointed to head the extremely influential and volatile Chongqing Provincial Party, still lingering with the stench of Bo Xilai's regime.
  Forging such a strong CV for the 57-year old suggests Xi is grooming him as his candidate for General Secretary or Premier after him. He will enter the Politburo just off of the Chongqing leadership, and his chances of entering the PSC are likely. He would then be #5 in the PSC and lead the Party Secretariat, just like Xi did.
• Wang Yang. Faction: Tuanpai/Pro-Hu.
  The charismatic and decisive former Guangdong Party Secretary, who made splashes for economic liberalization efforts in that role, missed promotion in 2012 and has taken a much less public role working at the Centre. But, just like in 2012, his administrative skill and lack of any known corruption would make him likely to get a promotion.
  If he and Xi can reconcile on their ostensibly political reformist and conservative views, respectively, Wang can easily take a senior administrative role through small groups as the #3 or #4 PSC member. If Xi breaks norms and does not name the future Premier to the PSC, Wang could also be first Vice-Premier.
• Hu Chunhua. Faction: Tuanpai/Pro-Hu.
  This 54-year old "clone of Hu Jintao" was speculated to be a future leader contender since 2012. Hu seems to have negotiated an immaculate CV for him, spanning Tibet, Hebei and Guangdong. The question for the young Hu is whether he has sworn enough fealty to Xi to be considered for at least a Premier position, or if given Xi's growing influence he'll be left out of the PSC altogether. I'd rate his chances as likely, but worse than Wang's. If he is on schedule to be Premier, he would be #7 in the PSC, serving as first Vice-Premier of China.
• Sun Zhengcai (Purged). Faction: Pro-Jiang/Zeng?
  In 2012, Sun and Hu were expected to only compete for the General Secretary and Premier positions between them, following the rules of factional stability. In one last political scandal in July 2017, Sun was arrested for corruption after being scolded for not cleaning up Chongqing politics; Sun's replacement by Chen also raised alarm bells among China watchers. Really, Sun serves as a cautionary tale.
• Zhao Leji. Faction: "Shaanxi Clique"/Pro-Xi.
  With roots in Shaanxi, Zhao may have already gotten his ticket to the Politburo in 2012 due to his performance as Shaanxi Party Secretary. His time to shine was playing second fiddle in examining non-senior CCP politicians in the anti-corruption campaign, and Xi's approval of him has been signaled by his appointment on Xi's new "Central Reforms Small Group."
  If Xi wanted a majority on the PSC, he is likely to appoint Zhao; but is he capable of doing so, and will he rather have a PSC willing to work with him all-around rather than breaking precedent with the majority? For those reasons, Zhao's promotion is unlikely.
• Han Zheng. Faction: "Shanghai Clique"/Pro-Jiang, pro-Xi.
  As current Shanghai Party Secretary, Han was lucky to have worked in Shanghai but surviving Hu's anti-corruption drive against senior officials there in 2006. On one hand, if he joins the PSC he can serve as a "swing vote" for any pro-Jiang elders out there, diluting Xi's influence. On the other, his administrative skills have been questioned with continuing reports of corruption in the city.
  I would rate his chances as as likely as Hu Chunhua, but this doesn't really mean anything.
• Wang Huning. Faction: "Brain Trust"/???
  Wang served as adviser and propagandist to Jiang, Hu and Xi, so in theory he could advance to the PSC and serve as "Propaganda Czar" or some inner-party role in the #4 position. This theory doesn't make any sense to me, though: why would Xi waste fighting a spot on Wang when he could just be leading small groups?
  Maybe Wang, like Han, is chosen as a hard worker with no committed loyalties, but I rate his chances as unlikely.
• Li Yuanchao. Faction: Reformist/Pro-Hu.
  If the seniority rule were true, Li would be a shoo-in for the PSC, suitable for either the #3 or #4 position like Wang Yang. The problem remains that his surprising exclusion from the PSC in 2012 suggested there were forces conspiring against a "reformist" like him, an act followed up a year later with corruption allegations that didn't go anywhere.
  The problem is that Li is more subdued and more tainted than Wang at this point. Unless Hu's faction can get a majority of members on the PSC, Li is unlikely to make it in - and, if that were the case, Li entering the PSC wouldn't be the big shocker.

Excluding the purged Sun, we can do a bean count as follows:

Pro-Xi: 4
Pro-Hu: 3
Pro-Jiang, pro-Xi: 1
Neutral, but loyal to Xi: 1

Right away you can see that a PSC that has only 2 Pro-Xi and 2 Pro-Hu people on top of Xi and Premier Li, plus one of the divided loyalty candidates, would reflect "factional balance." If seniority is binding, then Li Yuanchao will also leap over Wang Yang - but no leaks out there have considered this possibility.

[Foucaulf]

VI: STANDING COMMITTEE ODDS (CONTD.)

A norm-breaking committee, like Jaichind wrote, either involves 3 Pro-Xi people alongside Xi, keeping Wang Qishan in the PSC, or both. A precedent-breaking committee would either have 5+ Pro-Xi people or Xi straight-up changes the number of people on the PSC.

Because I'm a sucker for schematics, I'll make a text graphic of possible configurations for the PSC, ranked in order of how much it signals power given to Xi. Changes between a configuration and the one above it are in bold (the order matters!).

Least power given to Xi
^
|
⊢ Xi, Li K., Wang Y., Han, Hu, Li Y., Wang H.
⊢ Xi, Li K., Wang Y., Han, Hu, Li Z., Wang H.
| (This is kind of a Hu Jintao scenario, where like Hu Xi has 1.5 allies.)
⊢-------- Line of Plausibility
⊢ Xi, Li K., Wang Y., Han, Hu, Li Z., Chen
| (Circulated on the Chinese expat network Mingjing, e.g. in this video.)
⊢ Xi, Li K., Li Y., Han, Hu, Li Z., Chen
| (Proposed by proponents of the seniority rule, like Andrei Lungu at the Diplomat)
⊢ Xi, Li K., Wang Y., Han, Chen, Li Z., Hu:
| (This is the list that the Yomiuri Shimbun claimed to have on Aug. 25;
| would suggest Chen succeeds Xi as Party Leader.)
⊢ Xi, Li K., Wang Y., Wang H., Chen, Li Z., Hu:
| (This is the baseline scenario for Henry Paulson's China think tank, posted here.)
⊢ Xi, Li K., Wang Q., Han, Hu, Li Z., Wang H.:
| (A scenario where Xi keeps Wang Qishan but pays the price of factional balance.
| Wang Huning could be replaced by a sitting PSC member also permitted to overstay.)
⊢ Xi, Li K., Wang Q., Wang Y., Chen, Li Z., Hu:
| (The first real norm-breaking committee, also mentioned by Paulson's think tank.)
⊢-------- Line of Plausibility
⊢ Xi, Li K., Wang Q., Zhao, Chen, Li Z., Hu:
| (The PSC-packing scenario.)
⊢ Any scenario where the number of PSC members changes.
| (A 5-member PSC would probably signal Xi at the apex of his power.)
|
v
Most power given to Xi

[Foucaulf]

Okay, so I think I'm now done with just the intro effort post to this whole mess. Now to focus on specific stories. Btw Beet is referring to a rumor surrounding a secret meeting between former relative senior adviser to Kim Jong-Un, Jang Song-Thaek, and Hu Jintao on the North Korean succession, the news of which was leaked and led to Jiang's execution.

Up to now, my posts as well as Jaichind's suggested that the only question surrounding whether Wang Qishan stays in leadership was whether Xi has the political capital to do so. That was not strictly true. The situation with Wang has been very, very complicated since this year with the Guo Wengui scandal.

Tl;dr (I'll dedicate a whole separate post to this, honestly), Guo Wengui is a Chinese real estate tycoon who, after his corruption was exposed, fled to America and now claims he will leak secrets about top leadership in retribution. From the beginning to now, Guo's chief target has been Wang Qishan. Guo argues that Wang himself has siphoned loads of wealth to his family living in America, in which case he is one of the most corrupt officials during his own anti-corruption campaign.

This is not the first time such explosive allegations were leaked out (see Wen Jiabao's family corruption in 2012), but Guo is charismatic and persistent. You won't find any trace of this online, but gossip around his "evidence" is everywhere among educated Chinese.

This causes a tremendous dilemma for Xi. To keep Wang means he needs to displace CCP precedent, maybe giving up more of his desired picks in exchange. But, if Wang retires, Guo's allegations have already had so much traction that any entrepreneurial party leader will want to stab Wang's back to make a mark. God forbid Xi already has the economy, North Korea and India to fret over.

What is there to be done? One avenue, now mentioned in the South China Morning Post, is that Xi will "carve out a new position" for Wang over the next five years.

The actual mechanism has been floating around online for awhile now: since 2016, official news have proposed a "National Commission for Supervision" to be created by 2018. Not only will this new Commission supersede the extralegal investigations of the CCDI and may be more immune from intra-party turnover, but Wang has an out through appointment to lead the Commission for Supervision. Xi will then also have his confidant Li Zhanshu leading the transfer of power from the CCDI to the Commission.

Today was also the 8th Plenary Session of the CCDI, which was unusually short and unusually staged right before the Party Congress. Part of this event was to give a reason for Wang to make a public appearance and have Xi back him up - though state media didn't actually run any snippets from Wang's speech. Who knows if this move worked, then?

[Foucaulf]

I'm not sure why I'm still up at this ungodly hour, but I've caught this genuinely important report from Reuters on Wang Qishan (again):

You must be logged in to read this quote.

The fact that they have sources actively suggesting Wang head the NSC (a committee rolled out with pomp and fanfare but then went silent) or as vice chairman is either explosive, BS or suggests deliberate misinformation trying to feed an agenda, i.e. if Wang does retire it humiliates Xi not living up to expectations.

The point about the National Supervisory Commission (that I mentioned last post) is interesting - so maybe Li Zhanshu will get appointed straightaway to head that anyways.


Sometime tomorrow I'll also take time to discuss another late-night bombshell: Guo Wengui, tycoon born again as whistleblower and Wang Qishan's "mortal enemy," meeting with Steve Bannon:



Considering Bannon made a random Chinese trip just to meet Wang Qishan himself, this is a really bizarre situation I'm still thinking through, and I doubt enough people have noticed.

[Foucaulf]

I've been rather swamped with work/tests, but for those of you keeping track the 19th Party Congress officially started today. You may be even able to watch it here! Or read Bloomberg's live blog of the speech, in English, after the fact.

Xi Jinping is delivering his opening address, which I noted is the first moment to introduce his own ideological contribution to the CCP Constitution. We're an hour in but that has not happened, with Xi meandering over policy accomplishments and challenges. From Bloomberg:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

[Foucaulf]

EDIT: The speech is over! It took "3 hours, 20 minutes" according to the state broadcaster CCTV. "Meandering" is right: you probably need to read the Bloomberg live blog to even know the major sticking points from it.

In terms of Xi Jinping's ideology, it is clearly not something as grandiloquent and dictatorial as "Xi Jinping thought." The official name, to be enshrined later, is "Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era." (新时代中国特色社会主义思想)

What's my take on this speech and ideology, being an amateur but one that listened to it for a good two hours? First of all, there's nothing radical in it in the sense of radical liberalization or democratization, so don't get your hopes up.

We can compare Xi's stated priorities with the ideology of Jiang and Hu enshrined in the Constitution, respectively. The punchline of Jiang's "Three Represents" is the idea of broadening the party base to include entrepreneurs, intellectuals and the growing middle class. The punchline of Hu's "Scientific development" or "Harmonious Society" was sort of the necessity of ensuring balanced growth and limiting inequality in Chinese society.

Xi's priorities for the party are different. The undertone of Hu's governance, maybe, was to have more welfare. What Xi is focusing on instead is regulation; environmental regulation, financial regulation, state-owned corporation reform etc. There were a few parts in the speech dedicated to developing an unemployment insurance system e.g. but the parts about regulating the housing market/bubble were much more prominent.

Furthermore, it's been known that Xi has made foreign policy and the military a major theme of his leadership. Hence in this "15-year plan" from 2020 to 2035 declared in Xi's speech, military modernization gets a whole section. So does efforts to fight separatism and policies towards Hong Kong and Taiwan - making Xi sound way more active on these intractable foreign policy issues than those before him.

But, if you only care about the political signaling of this speech, there really wasn't any. No new ground was broken in this speech relative to the themes Xi has been hammering for a while; there's just more pomp and circumstance to it. Check back later this week.

[Foucaulf]

If you've been following some of the press coverage after Xi's speech, you have probably realized my initial take on the speech has sorely underestimated its importance. See this article for the consensus position:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

While still not official until the end of the Congress, state media, every sitting PSC member, and Xi's PLA ally Xu Qiliang have all called the new ideology "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想）

Just to hammer the point home more here: the last Chinese leader to have an ideology named after himself in the Party Constitution was Deng Xiaoping. The creator of the term "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" was Deng Xiaoping, and Xi's ideology claims to one-up that term. Xi's speech also proposed a new "principal contradiction" for Chinese society - in reference to Deng Xiaoping's famous proposal of his "principal contradiction" in the 80s.

So the CCP really, really wants you to believe that Xi is the strongest party leader since Deng Xiaoping. Is he really? Odds are good that he is.

The big lingering question in elite politics for the next five years is now: if Xi is as powerful as Deng when Xi leaves office, will Xi use his influence behind the scenes (as Deng did) or stay on for a third term past 2022? Given Xi's speech plotted out a "fifteen-year plan" from 2020-2035, he clearly wants some say in party affairs up to that period.

This segues into some more PSC gossip today. Remember Hu Chunhua? Today hasn't been great for him; he made a very obvious snub, addressing the Guangdong Party delegation in Beijing and not mentioning "Xi Jinping thought" at all. Now there's a report in the South China Morning Post that he is unlikely to make the PSC.

This isn't to say that the knives are now out for Hu after the Congress, but there is real humiliation if Hu doesn't get promoted while some kiss-ass like Tianjin Secretary Li Hongzhong gets promoted to the Politburo.

If we also take the latest "leaks" regarding the PSC seriously, this is the most likely PSC committee at the moment:

Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang - Incumbent.
Li Zhanshu, No. 3 - "Chief Legislator"
(head of the National People's Congress Standing Committee.)
Han Zheng - No. 4, head of People's Political Consultative Conference.
Wang Huning - No. 5, likely "Propaganda Czar."
Zhao Leji - No. 6, CCDI chief, "Corruption Czar."
Wang Yang - No. 7, executive vice premier.

This would teeter at the edge of "norm breaking," but even though it's stacked with people loyal to Xi it's not completely nepotistic. If Wang H. and Zhao stay on at the expense of Wang Qishan and Chen Min'er respectively, the former are more consensus candidates than the latter.

[Foucaulf]

In terms of official procedure, Friday marked the second meeting of the 19th Party Congress Presidium, a collection of incumbent and retired party leaders. Their official role was to approve the proposed changes to the CCP Constitution and the list of candidates to major party organs for representatives to vote on. That's what they did, shockingly.

In terms of what's behind the scenes, I've found the following:

- The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong's newspaper of record, published on Sunday morning China time their predictions for the PSC (based on "sources," naturally). Since I based my new PSC list on the last page off of partial leaks from the SCMP, my order is identical to theirs today.


- When it comes to the candidate approval process for the Central Committee and Politburo, veteran China watchers have focused up to now on increasing democratization and competition - the growing ratio of candidates to available seats. With Xi's moves at this Congress, this is no longer the central issue.

Rumors reported by the HK tabloid paper Apple Daily, linking back to Chinese expat media figure Ho Pin (more about him here), claim the candidate selection process for the 19th Central Committee was not centered on "factional horse trading" at all. Instead the first step was questioning candidates about "Loyalty to the Party Centre with Xi Jinping as its Core."

Central Committee candidates were grilled by Zhao Leji (Head of the Party Organization Department, key player in Xi's anti-corruption campaign focused on middle-ranked officials). PSC candidates were personally interviewed by Xi. Only candidates who passed these tests were submitted for approval to the Presidium this week. (If this is the truth, then not surprising Zhao was slated to join the PSC the whole time!)


- This is not really "behind the scenes," but top financial regulator Liu Shiyu upped the stakes Thursday by accusing the corrupt high-ranking officials Xi took care of of launching a coup. This includes former Chongqing head Sun Zhengcai, relieved this July, and the "big four" arrested on corruption in 2014. Look, party officials do not say things like these off the cuff - so why now?


- In more amusing news, CIA Director Mike Pompeo claims he has "old-school guys who used to do Kremlin work" analyzing elite Chinese politics during the Congress. Let's hope they do a better job than someone who just reads expat Chinese twitter.

[Foucaulf]

(Crossposted from AAD)

Huge WSJ bombshell that dropped this evening about Guo Wengui and the Chinese manhunt for him. It claims the negotiations over his extradition or asylum has been going for multiple months. This is the most important single piece of reporting about Chinese politics during this month.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Naturally the damn thing is paywalled, but you should try your hardest to read the whole thing somehow...

Tl;dr context: since early October, Guo has tried to get out his claims that Chinese agents were after him. This resulted in one foiled press conference at the Hudson Institute, followed by another later. Right after his presser major publications like the NYT or WSJ did not publish the story, even though they were clearly on the Guo beat, judging from past articles written as well as leaked taped convos between NYT journalists and Guo.

The journalists who did react quickly to the presser were found on right-wing media (Breitbart, of all places, has a China beat with writers like John Hayward). Another one who's been public about his beat is Washington Examiner reporter Bill Gertz, who has experience on this previously in NatSec reporting. It was Gertz who arranged the dinners between Guo and Steve Bannon, followed by Guo praising Bannon as a "genius" on his twitter.

At the moment Guo started a self-imposed twitter leave of absence during the Congress, which became involuntary as his twitter was blocked for a week. That doesn't matter anymore, as he clearly has been working with WSJ on this story (critically, providing interrogation tapes).

Since the article shows the discussion over Guo took place in the White House as early as June, this really strengthens the case that Bannon is actively intervening in this dispute. He would have gone and met with Wang Qishan last September to get dirt about the Chinese position on treating Guo, and Wang may or may not have anticipated this. Since Trump's knowledge of this situation is clearly minimal, as shown in the article, I bet Bannon wants to keep his connections among Chinese expats in order to better attack the country that stands in the way of his nationalist ideology, then try to influence Trump to actually do something.


What is the strategic value of dropping this story now, literally less than 48 hours before the Politburo Standing Committee is set to be announced? I don't know if there is one, but let me propose one: by making the Chinese government's failed attempts to get Guo public, this is like a public kneecapping of Xi and his anti-corruption campaign. If Trump is pushed by the media coverage to actually guarantee asylum for Guo, the kneecapping is even worse! If one person got away, what's stopping others from trying - or using Xi's weaponry against him in a counter-campaign?

[Foucaulf]

Took me a bit to realize that the Party Congress is closing tomorrow (the nomination of the Politburo and the PSC is technically a plenum of the Central Committee), so I have to rush out some analysis of the Politburo before it's too late.

(I'll be editing this post regularly tonight, so stay tuned...)

Let's first count the number of Politburo members slated to leave. No one has questioned ten of them retiring: everyone on the PSC not named Xi, Li or Wang Qishan, two vice-premiers under Li, CMC vice chairman Fan Qinglong, Internal Security Chief Meng Jianzhu, legislator Li Jianguo and former Beijing Party Secretary Guo Jinlong.

In addition Sun Zhengcai was purged in July and Wang Qishan's retention on the PSC is increasingly viewed unlikely by the usual rumor channels; that makes twelve. It is possible that the two non-Xi affiliated Politburo members at age 67 will also be pushed to retire: Sun Chunlan (one of two women in the Politburo) and Li Yuanchao. Hence we're looking at 11-14 retirements, out of 25 seats.

Does Xi have enough minimally qualified confidants to fill all those spots? I think so. Let's divide that pool of candidates into groups:

Signalled Allies. These are the people that should enter the Politburo because Xi reshuffled Party Secretary positions in key provinces/the four "direct-controlled municipalities" for them during his first term. They are Cai Qi (Beijing Secretary), Chen Min'er (Chongqing Secretary), Li Qiang (Jiangsu Secretary), perhaps Li Xi (Liaoning Secretary).

Brain Trust. We've already covered Li Zhanshu and Wang Huning, who belong in this group and are favorites to enter the PSC. Also in this group are Xi's economic adviser Liu He; Ding Xuexiang, right-hand man to Li Z. in the CCP General office; Xi's "scribe" He Yiting (vice-president of the Central Party School); and CCDI deputy Li Shulei.

Everyone else. Two people who is close to Xi working at the Party Centre are Chen Xi, deputy to Zhao Leji at the Organizations Department, and Huang Kunming, who knew Xi since his days in Fujian province and now is a senior official in the Propaganda Department.

Some of Xi's younger allies elevated into key positions include Ying Yong (Mayor of Shanghai, 2017-), Ma Xingrui (Provincial Chief of Guangdong and "Party Secretary Designate," 2017-), maybe Bayanqolu (Jilin Party Secretary, worked in propaganda in Zhejiang under Xi).

We also need to add someone in the PLA loyal to Xi to take the vacancy on the CMC. That's 14 candidates by my count!




Does that mean Xi will pack the Politburo to his heart's content? Clearly not; especially outside of positions related to Party Affairs, there is a line of succession built into the Politburo positions before Xi came to power.

At this time, this infographic of Politburo responsibilities from Harvard's Fairbank Center is extremely helpful. To describe it verbally, it highlights names outside of the current Politburo to look out for:

- Key Party Secretaries: Li Hongzhong and Chen Quanguo, Party Secretaries for Tianjin and Xinjiang respectively. The catch is that Li has very publicly displayed his fealty to Xi, especially after getting Tianjin in a reshuffle, but the two are really from Jiang and Hu's camps respectively. In particular, Chen is close with Premier Li Keqiang.

- Yang Jing is the youngest Secretary on the Party Secretariat, a key organ within the Party, and also reportedly close to Li Keqiang. In a somewhat similar situation is Zhou Qiang, a young Tuanpai leader who missed out on the Politburo in 2012 to some surprise and then served as Chief Justice. But who knows what will happen to these two; to this day, we have no idea if Zhou Qiang is even on the list of delegates to the Congress.

Along those lines is also a Hu Jintao protege, the 60-year old Shen Yueyue, one of the rare females in top leadership.

- Both Guo Shengkun and Cao Jianming are part of the judicial-security complex said to be stacked with allies of Zeng Qinghong and Zhou Yongkang. Guo, in particular, should get a pass to succeed Meng Jianzhu as the "internal security czar," having been Meng's deputy in this office. If he doesn't, it would be quite a shock.

- Then there are the provincial secretaries who have survived Xi's reshuffles: Fujian Secretary You Quan and Sichuan Secretary Wang Dongming. Also count in this group promoted Tibet Secretary Wu Yingjie.

I count ten people in this list of other top officials not part of Xi's circle, though a fair share of them will gladly profess loyalty to Xi to save their skin.

I had to compile this list pretty hastily, but consider it a watching guide for when the Politburo lineup first comes out. And let's be clear - the Politburo could also expand beyond 25 people, so Xi can quite literally stack his people in top leadership. That said, the most members the Politburo could ever said to have had was 28 people from the 12th Congress, so there is real precedent against this speculation.

[Foucaulf]

Let me prepare a watch guide for the next 24 hours anyway, as the Congress closing ceremonies are taking place right now:

The biggest question (and sorry if I have underemphasized this): will Xi Jinping get a "named ideology" in the CCP Constitution, on par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping? If he does, then all the other crazy questions people have wondered - whether he stays for a third term, takes up Mao's Party Chairman position, stacks the PSC and Politburo with allies, start purging party elders - become valid.

If he does, then you can then ask all those questions I brought up above.

Next question: how will Xi's revamped military leadership after this Congress look like? This is a much more difficult question for Western press to answer given the lack of public paper trails for those in the PLA, so take your time with this.

After that: is Xi really going to not include a potential successor in the PSC? The "consensus list" first kicked off by SCMP, NYT and others do not include either Hu Chunhua or Chen Min'er. Now, if Xi doesn't get a named ideology, you can assume a lack of a successor in the PSC is due to party consensus and someone will be elevated in a mid-Congress reshuffle (Deng Xiaoping did this).

After that: where exactly is Wang Qishan going again? Reports are converging that he will retire from the PSC, but the prospect of him joining that National Supervisory Commission I mentioned is also fading. The rumors converge on him joining the mysterious National Security Commission that Xi pioneered (maybe along with Li Zhanshu?). We won't know this for a few weeks after either.

After that: what happens to all the retired party leaders, or any of the non-Xi Politburo candidates that miss the cut? With Xi's anti-corruption campaign still going, you can never know for sure.

[Foucaulf]

"Xi Jinping Thought" has been put into the constitution.

Yeah, I'm getting a drink as we speak... This BBC article is punchier than what I can say right now.

It looks like the list for the Central Committee has been sent out/leaked already. Biggest point of note is that Wang Qishan is not on the list, so assuming this is accurate we know he retired for good.

Some shockers: Li Yuanchao is out - that means 13 vacancies on the Politburo.
As far as I can tell Yang Jing is not on the list. The two brain trust members I gambled on - He Yiting and Li Shulei - are not on it. Liu He is (corroborating earlier reports).
Zhang Youxia is on the list - he is what one or two sources I read predicted would be appointed by Xi to lead the CMC. Smart money is on him, I guess.
One guy I forgot completely was Yang Jiechi, former US ambassador and a high-ranking "State councillor" in the formal Chinese government. Reaching 67 this year, he was someone I thought would just step down. Instead, he is on the Central Committee list and will probably cap off his career serving directly under Li as vice-premier.
Also didn't mention Li Xiaopeng, who is finally on the Central Committee list; he is an "arch-princeling" because he is former Premier Li Peng's son. Having quit his job leading a major state-owned electric utility corporation, he has bummed around for a decade in party politics with middling success.

The Congress voted on a separate list just for the Central Committee for Discipline and Inspection - the only current Politburo member also on that committee's list is Zhao Leji. This is as strong a signal as you can imagine that he really will enter the PSC as the "Corruption Czar."

[Foucaulf]

For those of you watching at home, the PSC will officially be revealed at 11:45 China time (so 11:45 PM Eastern). That said, I do agree with Bill Bishop's take in this article:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

In that sense, what people mean by "factional balance" on the PSC does not apply anymore. The new committee is no longer one where dissent among top leadership is aired out and consensus is reached. Everyone on the PSC will, more or less, iron out the kinks in Xi's agenda as codified during this Congress.

Let me sum up the current consensus predictions anyway.

Certain to enter (99% confidence in my mind)
Zhao Leji as CCDI chief, "Corruption Czar." What other proof do we need given his appointment to the CCDI?
Li Zhanshu as "Chief Legislator," No. 3 on the PSC. There's no hard evidence Li will take such a high spot, but I'll go out on a limb. Maybe he could take No. 5 (Head of Central Secretariat).

Confident of entry (80% confidence)
Wang Yang as executive vice premier of China (No. 7 in past PSCs). In a "factional balance" scenario you would see him at No. 3 (as I mentioned when I started this thread).
Han Zheng as chair of the People's Political Consultative Conference (No. 4).

Certainly out of contention
Wang Qishan, retired.
Li Yuanchao, retired.

Confident out of contention
Hu Chunhua. I originally pegged his chances of entering the PSC as less than Wang's, and given the consensus position that Wang will be No. 7 in the PSC, there's nowhere to go down for Hu. Maybe he'll be given some vice-premier position or even Vice-president, like the arrangement for Li Y. in 2012?

Who's left? The only doubt I have in my mind is whether Wang Huning or Chen Min'er will get the number 5 spot. IMO Wang H. at No. 4, replacing Han, and Chen at No. 5 is beyond my "line of plausibility."

The consensus pick is that Wang Huning will be picked over Chen, which I would buy except Wang has made literally zero appearances at the Party Congress and treated with no fanfare... "Seniority" would suggest Wang gets in, but "future leader in PSC" suggests Chen will make it.

One last thing: if Li and Zhao are placed where they are, and Hu Chunhua doesn't make it, these two outcomes combined is just as norm-breaking as keeping Wang Qishan on, if not more.

See you all in a few hours.

[Foucaulf]

Is Xi's unique power something that is unique to him and his skills in gaining it, or was it a vacuum that could have been plumed by anyone in his position? What was stopping Hu Jintao from doing the same thing several years ago, was it a lack of broader ambition?

Tough question. For a more established perspective you should read this piece: "The Resistible Rise of Xi Jinping."

I think something that is easily lost among all this China-watching: The Party in everyday Chinese life has decreased in influence over the last thirty years. The Party has power over the media, but people just go to the internet and apps instead. Party leadership is not a prestige position as society pays greater attention to celebrities or entrepreneurs. Top students and workers will still be awarded with Party membership, but how many take that very seriously?

The grounds were fertile for a Xi-like takeover in the early 2010s, because the Party does seem caught up in this gross insecurity; that they could not project strong leadership and become a government with no real vision. If you read the article I linked, people sound glad it was Xi who made it instead of Bo Xilai (at least Xi is amassing all of his power to accomplish objectives that are really quite staid).

Xi's personal talent seems to be choosing good advisers and allies in his major campaigns; he wouldn't have reached the top without good connections anyway. The anti-corruption campaign is, after all, a team effort.

There is also something particular Chinese IMO about lowering your head down after you've been barked at by your leader enough. That's what Xi did, using his platform to first demand codes of ethics from politicians, which later segued into professions of loyalty.

Why Hu didn't do the same thing years ago is probably explained by my earlier post on "factional stability." The system as it was set up after Deng motivated leaders to wait and expand their influence after their formal retirement. Now the situation looks pretty bad for Hu, as his close allies in leadership face a culling in a few hours' time.

[Foucaulf]

Watching the PSC introduction feed now... this should be posted as soon as the 7 members come out (or 5 or 9, who knows at this point)

1. Xi Jinping
2. Li Keqiang
3. Li Zhanshu
4. Wang Yang
5.  Wang Huning
6. Zhang Leji
7. Han Zheng

They are just coming out on the red carpet now, but Xinhua leaked the list about 4 minutes before the PSC walked out.

Xinhua also showed the Politburo list. Total victory for Xi's faction.

Pro-Xi: 12 (Xi, Li Z, Zhao, Ding, Liu H, Li X., Li Q., Chen X. Chen M. Huang, Cai, Wang Chen)
Pro-Xi PLA: 2 (Xu, Zhang Y.)
Loyal to Xi: 4 (Han, Li H, Wang H. Yang Xiaodu )
Pro-Hu: 5 (Li K., Hu, Chen Q., Wang Y., Sun)
Pro-Jiang: 1 (Guo S.)
??: 1 (Yang Jiechi, the diplomat)

We can do a seat change count of sorts. Using Cheng Li's classification of factions on the 18th Politburo and my knowledge of pro-Xi people, I can construct a factional side-by-side of the 18th Politburo. Brackets name only those who were in both Politburos.)

Pro-Xi: 4 (Xi, Zhao, Li Z., 1 retiree) (+8 in 19th Politburo)
Pro-Xi PLA: 1 (Xu) (+1)
Loyal to Xi: 3 (Han, Wang H., 1 retiree) (+1)
Pro-Hu: 9 (Li K. Hu., Wang Y., Sun, 5 retirees) (-4)
Pro-Hu PLA: 1 (1 retiree) (-1)
Pro-Jiang: 7 (all retired) (-6)
?? : 0 (+1)

Turnover ended up at 15 people leaving the Politburo... Liu Qibao (former propaganda chief) and Zhang Chunxian (former Xinjiang Secretary) also given early leave.

Other tidbits: the Party Secretariat, a major organ of power within the party, is stacked with Xi's people (6/7).
Since the predicted order of the PSC was switched, Han Zheng is going to be senior vice-premier of China and Wang Yang will be PPCC head. It'll be interesting to see which small groups in the Party Wang will get assigned to.
Li Shulei, who I mentioned in my earlier posts, was promoted to vice-secretary on the CCDI under Zhao Leji's supervision.


What is there left to say? "Total victory" is not an exaggeration: every major party organ is now packed with Xi's confidantes across the years. He has a named ideology in the Constitution. Xi's overhaul of the military is evident and close to completion.

In his speech given after the PSC was revealed, Xi has already made note of
1) several historically meaningful deadlines before 2022: 2018 (40 years since Deng's initial "reform and opening up) and 2021 (Centennial of the CCP's foundation).
2) Xi on the CCP: "If you're large and in charge, then you've gotta behave like it."

There really is no significant political opposition to Xi's agenda now. When he mentioned 1), it's to signal the next five years will be about changing regulation and his particular style of balancing state corporations and the market. When he mentioned 2), it's about forcing the Party back into the centre of Chinese society and culture, no matter if people are down with it.

Whatever Xi's true political beliefs are, we're gonna start seeing them in action very soon.