Beninese Parliamentary Election - April 26, 2015

[Sir John Johns]

Election will be held in Benin on April 26, 2015 to elect the 83 members of the National Assembly, the unicameral parliament of Benin. This election is widely seen as an electoral test for the various political forces just eleven months before the 2016 presidential election. The political climate of the last few months has been marked by the breakdown of the governing alliance which had until recently supported President Yayi Boni.

Firstly elected in 2007 and reelected in 2011, Yayi Boni is ineligible to run for a third term, even though he unsuccessfully tried to start a constitutional review process. Officially the goal of the review process was to get few minor constitutional amendments passed, but many deputies, even within the presidential majority, suspected that the president would also tried to get rid of the two-term limitation on presidential terms; consequently, all plans to review the constitution failed to gather enough support in the National Assembly to be started.

Currently, the president's main objective is to win a reliable majority in the National Assembly in order to revisit the constitution, still officially to adopt the minor amendments previously rejected by the deputies. He will however face the competition of various former allies who are betting that Yayi Boni couldn't run again in 2016 and are preparing their own presidential bids.

Meanwhile, the alliance uniting all the relevant opposition parties has imploded due to the rivalries between the countless presidential contenders for 2016. A very unique constitutional provision, stating that any presidential candidate should be between 40 and 70 years of age, prevents various political heavyweights (former president Nicéphore Soglo; Adrien Houngbédji, the unfortunate challenger of Yayi Boni in 2006 and 2011; Bruno Amoussou, the leader of the main opposition alliance) to run for president in 2016. This leaves an open presidential field with numerous declared or potential candidates and no clear frontrunner so far, not taking into account the uncertainty about a further candidacy of Yayi Boni. As such, many parties are intending to use the upcoming election as an indicator for the March 2016 presidential ballot.

The voting system and the electoral institutions

The 83 members of the National Assembly are elected on a closed party lists with the country being divided into 24 multi-member constituencies (two per each department) whose total number of seats are determined by population and varies from 2 to 5. The seats are allocated in each constituency through proportional representation using the simple quotient and greatest remainders system. Parties or electoral alliances are required to field lists in every constituency, possibly to prevent the emergence of ethnically- or regionally-based parties. In any case, such a provision hasn't permitted the emergence of true national parties as the overwhelming majority of the parties has their votes concentrated in a handful of constituencies while making insignificant results in the rest of the country.

The Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA) is in charge of supervising the election process. Among its tasks are the review, the correction, and the updating of the Permanent Computerized Electoral Roll (LEPI), the computerized electoral register set up in 2011 with the aim of improving the transparency and the effectiveness of the registering process.

Nevertheless, the 2011 LEPI was widely criticized by the opposition parties who claimed that more than one million of voters, mainly found in the opposition-leaning areas, weren't registered on the electoral rolls. As a consequence the March 2011 presidential election and the April 2011 legislative election were both denounced as fraudulent by the opponents of Yayi Boni, something that the international observers didn't agree with.

In the run-up of the local elections, initially planned to be held in 2013, Yayi Boni's government and the opposition parties came to an agreement to fix the LEPI's problems. A Council of Guidance and Supervision of the LEPI (COS-LEPI) was set up with its members chosen among the deputies from both the opposition and government parties. The new body was put in charge of the monitoring of a fair and effective revision of the LEPI.

Said revision met however financial and technical difficulties, which were compounded by the political bickering between members of the COS-LEPI. As a consequence, the date of the local elections was several times postponed until a January 2015 ruling of the Constitution Court fixed the deadline for the LEPI revision on January 15, 2015, and the date of the local polls on 31 May, 2015.

Questions remain on the accuracy of the new LEPI (whose revision was completed in a rush) and on the ability of the COS-LEPI and the CENA to organize the legislative election in time and in decent conditions. Indeed, few days ago, the COS-LEPI found itself unable to complete the printing and the distribution of voter ID cards due to money shortages. The problem was solved by a new ruling of the Constitutional Court which transferred the task of printing and distributing the voter ID cards from the COS-LEPI to its technical branch, the National Processing Center (CNT); the same ruling ordered the government to provide funds for the completion of the process.

A new electoral code, adopted in 2012 by the National Assembly, will be used for this election. Among the new provisions introduced this year: each polling station is now staffed by returning officers with at least a bachelor's degree and by a member of the majority and one from the opposition; the results will be now displayed in every polling station; each voter can now refer alleged abuses violation of the electoral code to the public prosecutor.

Background

The democratization process in Benin, widely seen as remarkable, was initiated in 1990 when president Mathieu Kérékou – a northerner military office who had take power by force in 1972 and instituted a Marxist-Leninist regime – convened a National Conference, comprising delegates of “the living forces of the nation” in order to discuss the economic and social problems faced by the country. The process quickly got far beyond Kérékou's control as the National Conference proclaimed itself a sovereign assembly whose ultimate goal was the drafting of a democratic constitution. Kérékou was then stripped of his powers and forced to appoint a civilian as prime minister in the person of the southerner economist Nicéphore Soglo. In December 1990, the new constitution, which guarantee individual rights and freedoms and establish a multi-party democracy, was largely approved by referendum. The following year, Soglo, running as an independent, was elected president of Benin, defeating Kérékou in the run-off.

In 1996, Kérékou, by then converted to capitalism and evangelism, defeated the then-unpopular Soglo and became president again. Five years later, he was reelected president in the second round after Soglo and Adrien Houngbédji who had finished respectively second and third in the first round, had withdrew from the run-off, alleging electoral fraud. The two terms in office of Kérékou were characterized by massive corruption even if the democratic institutions remained untouched. An attempt by Kérékou to remove the two-term limitation on presidential terms epically failed and “the Chameleon” left the power in 2006 without having designate a political successor. The heterogeneous alliance which has so far supported him then quickly collapsed.

The 2006 presidential election was won by the Northerner Yayi Boni, an economist and a former president of the West African Development Bank, who, running as an independent, defeated the Southerner Adrien Houngbédji in the run-off. Once in power, Yayi Boni created his own political movement, the Cowry Forces for an Emerging Benin (FCBE), an alliance of more than twenty tiny political parties. In the 2007 legislative elections, the FCBE won 35 seats out of 83 in the 2007 legislative elections and ended up as the largest force in the National Assembly. Thanks to an agreement with various small parties, Yayi Boni obtained a working majority to implement his political agenda. The new president then faced numerous critics for his populist and unpredictable style, his personal rule and his growing authoritarian tendencies. By 2010, Yayi Boni had lost control over the National Assembly as his poor management of the ICC Service scandal – a pyramid scheme in which the president's own cousin was involved – had came under fire.

Somehow, Yayi Boni was largely reelected as president by first round (the first time ever since 1991) in March 2011 gathering 53.14% against 35.64% for his closest rival, Adrien Houngbédji, the candidate of the Union Makes the Nation (UN), a broad opposition alliance comprising more or less every relevant opposition parties, including Houngbédji's own Democratic Renewal Party (PRD), Nicéphore Soglo's Benin Rebirth (RB), and Social Democratic Party (PSD, formerly supportive of Kérékou.

The legislative election, held the following month, saw the victory of the president's FCBE which won 41 seats out of 83 and thus fell short of the absolute majority. The UN won 30 seats with the remaining 12 seats going to six small parties of which four (Union for Benin, Amana Alliance, Strength in Unity Alliance, and Cauris 2 Alliance) belonged to the presidential camp. In June 2011, the RB decided to leave the UN and joined the governing alliance, thus giving Yayi Boni a large majority in the National Assembly. Few months later, the PRD also quit the UN and adopted a more cooperative attitude toward the president.

[Sir John Johns]

Yayi Boni's two terms in office are largely seen as a major disappointment if not a complete failure.

The corruption scandals
Elected on the promise to put an end to the rampant corruption in the country, the president and his government have been embroiled into an impressive series of financial scandals. Beside the already mentioned ICC Service scandal that ruined thousands of savers, the current administration has been linked to (among others) the following scandals: numerous frauds surrounding the organization of a Community of Sahel-Saharan summit in Cotonou; the mismanagement of funds allocated to the construction of new National Assembly building; a bribery case related to the planned construction of a dry dock that led to the resignation of the secretary of the Presidency; the significant delays in the construction of a new airport in Parakou, the capital of the president's native department of Borgou.

The economic performance of Benin under Yayi Boni hasn't being particularly impressive. The Beninese economy continues to suffer from rampant corruption and from the enormous size of the informal sector. Despite the efforts of the government, notably through an expansion of micro-credit, the poverty rate hasn't dropped significantly. Even more, accusations have been raised that the anti-poverty programs are mostly used in order to buy a political clientele.

The aborted constitutional reform
Despite having theoretically a majority in the National Assembly, the president has been unable to pass long-time promised constitutional reforms. Said reforms look like very limited and politically harmless (it would enshrined the CENA and the Court of Accounts into the Constitution and would rendered economic crimes imprescriptible), but a majority of deputies feared that such reforms would open the way to more ambitious changes or would permit Yayi Boni to run again in 2016 thanks to a legal technicality (the amended constitution could be then considered as a new constitution with the president terms served under the current constitution no longer counted).

In spite of Yayi Boni's reaffirmations that he has no plan to scrap the two-term limit on presidency and will retire in 2016, a majority of deputies remained mistrustful of the president. The latter's insistence to get the constitutional amendments passed only reinforced the suspicion of the deputies who have, so far, rejected any attempt to start a constitutional review process. When referred to by a citizen, the Constitutional Court ruled in November 2014 (possibly under the influence of the events in Burkina Faso) that the removal of presidential term limits should require the unanimous support of a 1990-like National Conference. Thus, it became almost impossible to get rid of the term limitation through a constitutional amendment.

The decline in the freedom of the press
Deputies' concerns over a constitutional change have been fueled by the authoritarianism of the president. Since Yayi Boni came into office, Benin, which had been so far considered as a model in that domain, has experienced a sharp decline in press freedom. The nomination of political allies at the head of the High Authority of Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC), the media regulatory body, has permitted the government to routinely sue newspapers or TV-channels and get them temporarily suspended.

In 2011, the daily newspaper Le Bénin Libéré was banned, the first time since 1990 that such a thing happened, for having described in an article as “badly elected” the African presidents who took part into an international summit in Benin.

Two years later, Lionel Agbo, a former spokesman for the Presidency under Yayi Boni, was sentenced to six months in prison for “insult to the head of state”, an offense which hadn't been prosecuted since 1990. In a speech, Agbo had claimed that Yayi Boni secretly intended to change the constitution in order to be able to run for reelection in 2016 and that the members of the president's inner circle are corrupt. In addition, the director of a private TV which had aired Agbo's speech was also sentenced to three months in prison. These disproportionate sentences provoked an outcry and the two convicts were later pardoned by the president.

Possible ethnic and religious favoritism
Yayi Boni has also been criticized for the alleged favoritism he displays towards the northern and central ethnic groups, especially his own community, the Yoruba-speaking Nagos who are living in Central Benin. Since recently, it seems that the president is now also at odds with the northerner Baribas (to which his own mother belonged to). Opponents have also denounced the growing influence of evangelical pastors in the entourage of Yayi Boni, who is himself a pentecostal minister.

The favoritism displayed by the administration was exposed in December 2013 with the discovery of irregularities in the competition tests organized to recruit officials for the ministry of Finance, as it turned out that the examiners have favored their own relatives during the tests. To denounce these irregularities, the public service unions organized a peaceful demonstration which was brutally dispersed by the police.

The repression of the protest and the subsequent certification of the recruitment examinations by the government only raised anger and provoked the biggest social movement in recent Beninese history. A general strike broke out in the public sector with protesters' demands then broadening to include the removal of the officials responsible of the repression of the initial demonstration, salary increases, measures to combat corruption, and the abandon of  constitutional review plan. The strikers quickly gained the support of the opposition parties and were joined by the doctors and the magistrates. After a four-month strike, the unions stopped the movement as the government conceded salary increases and ordered the cancellation of the litigious tests.

The Patrice Talon Affair
The major event in Yayi Boni's second term in office was however the Patrice Talon legal saga. A powerful cotton magnate which also had financial interests in the Cotonou port (and thus controlled two of the most important economic sectors of Benin), Patrice Talon used to be a close friend of Yayi Boni and the main funder of his two presidential campaigns. However, shortly after Yayi Boni's reelection, the businessman and the president came at odds with each other over. According to Talon, the dispute was caused by Talon's refusal to support and fund a Yayi Boni's 2016 presidential campaign.

After wrongdoings had been exposed in the cotton sector, Talon was indicted in a case of embezzlement of public funds in April 2012 and saw shortly thereafter his assets being seized by the government. In October 2012, while Talon had managed to flee to France to escape imprisonment, it was announced that an attempt to poison Yayi Boni had been foiled. The president's own niece, his personal physician, and one of his former ministers were all arrested in the case and accused of having received money from Talon in exchange for poisoning Yayi Boni. Furthermore, in March 2013, the president claimed that a coup, allegedly funded by Talon, had been also foiled.

An increasingly paranoiac president proceeded then in the following months to the removal of any official suspected of having links with Talon. In August 2013, prime minister Pascal Koupaki – widely seen as a serious contender for 2016 – was abruptly sacked and the whole government was entirely dissolved to force the departure of several experimented ministers. The following cabinet was mostly composed of Yayi Boni's loyal followers; the post of prime minister – which isn't actually enshrined in the Constitution and has been revived only three times since 1990 – was suppressed, in contradiction with Yayi Boni's 2011 promise to share the power with a prime minister.

The judicial procedure against Talon and his presumed associates didn't however goes well for the president: French judiciary rejected repeated requests from Beninese government for extradition of Talon; meanwhile, in Benin, the trial of the poisoning case ended with the withdrawal of all charges against the six defendants. Despite the latter decision having been upheld on appeal, the six defendants remained illegally in prison. In December 2013, it was reported that the judge who had ordered the acquittal of the defendants at first instance had fled to the United States as he feared his life was at risk in Benin.

A mediation of then-secretary general of the Francophonie (and former president of Senegal) Abdou Diouf permitted to bring this bizarre affair to an end. In May 2014, Yayi Boni pardoned Talon and released the six defendants involved in the alleged poisoning attempt in exchange of a letter of apology from Talon. Nonetheless, bad blood remains between the president and Talon with the latter being periodically attacked by the government for, allegedly, providing funds to the opposition parties.

The disintegration of the FCBE
In the meantime, Yayi Boni had lost his grip over his parliamentary majority. In December 2013, the budget proposed for 2014 was rejected by the National Assembly and only passed by a presidential decree. By the end of 2014, with the prospect of a Yayi Boni's 2016 presidential bid rendered more and more remote due to the ruling of the Constitutional Court over term limitation, various influent FCBE leaders decided that they had then nothing to gain from continuing to support the president and that maybe it was time for them to fulfill their own presidential ambitions.

In December 2014, twelve northerner deputies abandoned the FCBE and founded the Sun Alliance whose avowed objective is to put an end on the hegemony of the presidential party over Northern Benin. The following month, the RB, which had been at odds with Yayi Boni since months, formally announced the end of its coalition with the FCBE and its intention to run independently in the upcoming legislative and local elections. In February 2015, the president of the National Assembly, Mathurin Nago, who had show at time his independence from the presidency, launched his own party, the United Democratic Forces, to run against the FCBE in the next elections and prepare Nago's own 2016 presidential candidacy. The formation of the FCBE electoral lists provoked further desertions as friends or relatives of the president were given the safest slots at the expense of infuriated incumbent deputies who then decided to
form their own dissident lists.

[Sir John Johns]

The political parties

Beninese political parties are very regionally-based and largely non-ideological being rather based on patronage, ethnicity, and traditional tribal ties. Since the return to democracy in 1991, the political cleavages have only been defined by support or opposition (the degree of which may vary) to the incumbent president.

There are between one hundred and one hundred fifty active political parties in Benin with almost all of them being actually the personal vehicle of ambitious politicians (who are also generally businessmen and the main/only funders of their party) who use their parties in the only goal to advance their career or defend their economic interests. For electoral purposes, all these tiny/one-man parties coalesce into unstable and generally short-lived political alliances in order to improve their chances to have elected candidates. Generally speaking, the Beninese politicians have no allegiances to these electoral alliances and frequently switch sides or cross floor during their term in office, a process which is referred to as the “transhumance”. As a consequence, the Beninese political landscape is characterized by both a high fragmentation and a high volatility.

A good illustration of the “transhumance” process is this map which indicates the current affiliation (i.e. the party or electoral alliance for which they are running or they are supporting this year) of the incumbent deputies (possible errors).

Main parties

This year, there are twenty parties or electoral alliances which are running in the legislative elections against eighteen in 2011.

The Cowry Forces for an Emerging Benin (FCBE)

Formed in January 2007 by the federation of some twenty tiny political parties, the FCBE's main raison d'être is to support President Yayi Boni and his government. The name of the alliance referred to the cowry shell which was widely used as a commodity money in pre-colonial times and thus traditionally associated with wealth and abundance. Despite an attempt to turn the FCBE into a unified party, it remains so far of federation of parties.

In the 2007 legislative election, the FCBE won 35 seats out of 83 and became the largest political force in Benin. Despite internal struggles and departures, it managed to improve this result in the 2011 legislative election as it gained then 6 seats for a total of 41 seats won. The FCBE was subsequently reinforced by the integration of various satellite parties, like the Amana Alliance whose leader is currently foreign minister. Several deputies elected for opposition parties have also joined the FCBE during the current legislature. As previously mentioned mentioned, the party has however suffered from internal dissensions and departures these last months and its representation in the National Assembly has been reduced to 27 deputies.

These last years, the FCBE has appeared as the only Beninese party with a national base. Back in 2011, FCBE deputies were elected in every constituency but one. However, the party has always do better in the northern and central parts of the country, where it had quickly replaced Kérékou's FARD-Alafia as the hegemonic party, as Yayi Boni is belonging to the Nago ethnic group while also having Bariba and Peul roots. More generally, the northerner voters are said to be characterized by a more pronounced parochialism than the southerners and to systematically vote en masse for the northerner candidate over the southerner one no matter how bad the former is. The situation is, conversely, more contrasted in the South as the northerners Kérékou and Yayi Boni have both managed to make electoral breakthrough in the area.

This time, however, it seems that the FCBE has alienated the Bariba community (living in the northern Borgou Department). This could undermine the party's support in the North and prevent the FCBE to achieve its goal of winning 50 deputies and a parliamentary majority to pass the constitutional reform.



The formation of the FCBE electoral lists has been marked by the sidelining of veteran deputies and the purge of any candidate who had showed some sign of independence to the main benefit of members of the president's inner circle, including several of his personal friends and members of his own family.

Thus, the president's wife, Chantal Yayi de Souza, is running for reelection in the 5th constituency (southern Atlantique Department) which includes her native town of Ouidah; her own brother-in-law has been nominated as her substitute. In the 16th constituency (West Cotonou), the FCBE top candidate is Chantal Yayi de Souza's brother, the powerful minister of Development and possible 2016 presidential contender Marcel de Souza; the 26-year old son of the presidential couple, Chabi Yayi, is the second name on the list. In the northern 8th constituency (southern part of Borgou), Chabi Sika, a very loyal incumbent and a tool of the regime who is also a distant relative of Boni Yayi, was unexpectedly pushed aside in order to make room on the FCBE list for the president's nephew, Adam Bagoudou, who was until then served as intendant of the presidential palace.

As in any of his previous campaign, Yayi Boni is personally involved in the electoral campaign and has made numerous campaign trips across the country. The whole government is also mobilized as twenty ministers out of twenty-seven are currently running for deputies. As their actions have been previously largely publicized, it could help to keep the FCBE afloat. The president is also using his large network of FCBE local elected officials, notably the mayors, especially as the local elections will be held soon. However, like on national level, the FCBE has suffered from several desertions at the local level. The mayors of Abomey-Calavi (a populated suburb of Cotonou) and Grand-Popo (southwestern Department of Mono) have recently left the party; they have been followed by about twenty Cotonou city councilors. These defections in the FCBE ranks have been motivated by the favoritism and the nepotism that have prevailed during the formation of the electoral lists.

The final result of the FCBE remains to me the great unknown as some sources have predicted the collapse of the party while others have claimed that the party could achieve a majority in the National Assembly thanks to patronage, the use of the state's resources, and the division of the opposition.

[Sir John Johns]

Union Makes the Nation (UN)

An opposition alliance of about ten southern-based parties, the UN has its roots in the Alliance for a Democratic Dynamic (ADD), an electoral alliance founded before the 2007 legislative election and which then comprised three important opposition parties: the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the African Movement for Development and Progress (MADEP), and Soglo's Benin Rebirth (RB). In the 2007 election, the ADD finished second behind the FCBE and won 20 seats, thus becoming the largest opposition movement in the National Assembly.

The following year, the ADD was transformed into the UN to include Adrien Houngbédji's Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) – then the second largest opposition party –, the Key Force (FC) and various tiny opposition parties. Before the 2011 presidential election, the UN agreed on a joint candidacy and nominated Houngbédji as the presidential candidate at the expense of the RB leader Léhady Soglo. Houngbédji finished second with 35.64% of the votes and failed to force Yayi Boni into a run-off. The April 2011 legislative election was a big disappointment for the UN which won 30 seats, down from the 34 seats obtained in 2007 by the combined ADD, PRD, and FC standing alone.

In June 2011, the RB left the UN to participate into governing coalition with the FCBE. An unsuccessful attempt to turn the alliance into a unified party led then to the departure of the PRD in 2012. This left the PSD, the FC, and the MADEP as the main components of the UN which is currently presided by former PSD leader Bruno Amoussou.

The backbone of the UN is formed by the following parties:

Social Democratic Party (PSD)

The PSD was founded in 1990 as a social democratic party and, as such, is currently a member of the Socialist International. In the late 1990s/early 2000s, the party was a big supporter of Mathieu Kérékou and became the backbone of the pro-Kérékou Union for Future Benin (UBF). Shortly before the retirement of Kérékou, the UBF imploded and the PSD choose to run independently in the 2006 presidential election in which its candidate, Bruno Amoussou, finished third and won 16.3%. The PSD endorsed Yayi Boni in the run-off and was rewarded with ministerial posts in the cabinet of the new president. However, the party quickly grew critical of Yayi Boni and left the government after few months. Since then, the PSD has constantly sided in the ranks of the opposition to the president.

The PSD is characterized by its very mono-ethnic electoral base. Almost all of the party leadership – including the historical leader Bruno Amoussou and the current leader Emmanuel Golou – is belonging to the Aja ethnic group, which inhabits the southwestern Department of Kouffo. In the 2011 legislative election, the PSD, running as part of the UN, won 3 seats, all in the two constituencies (11th and 12th) in Kouffo, for a long time an impregnable stronghold of the party; recently, however, the FCBE has made inroads in the department.

The PSD has been led until 2012 by Bruno Amoussou who is running for reelection in the 11th constituency as the PSD list top candidate. For his part, the new leader of the party, Emmanuel Golou, has made the surprising choice of not running for reelection, apparently to prepare his 2016 presidential bid.

African Movement for Development and Progress (MADEP)

The MADEP was founded in 1997 as the personal vehicle of Nago businessman Séfou Fagbohoun. The new party was almost immediately rejoined by dissidents from the PRD. A controversial oil tycoon, Fagbohoun is widely suspected of having used his political connections, especially his relationship with Kérékou, to buy in 1999 at an undervalued price the SONACOP state-owned oil company as part of a shady privatization process. For a long time an ally of Kérékou, the MADEP ran its own candidate, who got 3.25%, in the 2006 presidential election before endorsing Yayi Boni in the run-off.

Few weeks thereafter, however, the newly elected Yayi Boni ordered the arrest of Fagbohoun under suspicions of insider trading in the SONACOP privatization case. Fagbohoun spent two years in prison before being acquitted of all charges by a Beninese court, in a blow for Yayi Boni and his anti-corruption crusade. Fagbohoun didn't obviously miss the occasion to portray himself as the victim of a political conspiracy and has since turned into one the staunchest opponent to the president.

The MADEP draws most of its electoral support from the Nagos living in the Plateau Department (21st and 22nd constituencies) where the party, running under the banner of the UN, won in 2011 its three only seats. Fagbohoun, in order to please local recriminations (a commune absolutely wanted to have “its” deputy), made the risky choice of moving from the 21st constituency (where he was elected in 2011) to the 22nd constituency where he appears in second position on the UN list. As the 22nd constituency has only two seat, the MADEP leader will need a truly exceptional UN performance to be reelected to the National Assembly.

Key Force (FC)

An electoral alliance founded before the 2003 legislative elections by the merger of various pro-Kérékou southern parties of which the most important is the Movement for an Alternative for the People (MAP). The MAP was founded in 1988 as a pro-democracy party by students opposed to the regime of Kérékou. In 2001, the leader of the MAP, Lazare Sèhouéto, was however appointed the campaign manager of Kérékou for the presidential election. After Kérékou's reelection, the MAP was rewarded with ministerial positions it kept until 2005, when the party and the FC quit the government over Kérékou's attempts to change the Constitution. Running as the candidate of the FC, Sèhouéto won 2% in the 2006 presidential election and endorsed Yayi Boni in the run-off. In the 2007 legislative elections, the FC won 4 seats and became later a component of the UN. Four years later, running as part of the UN, the FC was reduced to 2 seats: one in the 24th constituency (southern Zou Department) won by Sèhouéto and other in the 5th constituency (southern Atlantique Department) which includes the cities of Ouidah and Allada, won by Sèhouéto's lieutenant Éric Houndété.



The FC traditionally competes with the RB for the Fon vote as both Sèhouéto and Houndété are belonging to the Fon ethnic community. The two leaders are running for reelection in their respective constituencies but it appears that Houndété, who has gained a lot of notoriety as parliamentary leader of the UN, could be defeated due to the recent defection of Désiré Vodonou, a historical MAP/FC leader in his constituency, who had decided to take part in the election with his own political party. A defeat of Houndété will seriously hamper the ambition of the latter of being selected as the UN presidential candidate for 2016 against Emmanuel Golou, his rival inside the alliance.

The UN is also comprising the following one-man parties:

Movement for Democracy and Solidarity (MDS): The party founded by Sacca Fikara, a leading opponent to the Kérékou regime in the 1980s. The MDS was, for a time, part of the G13 Alliance and supported Yayi Boni. However, by 2009, Sacca Fikara has turned into a vocal opponent to the president as illustrated by the fact he was punched by a FCBE deputy during a parliamentary debate. The following year, the MDS became part of the UN alliance and Fikara was reelected deputy of the 20th constituency – including the Fikara's Wémè-populated (a Fon subgroup) native town of Dangbo – under the banner the UN.

Union for Development of a New Benin (UDBN): The UDBN is the electoral vehicle of Claudine Prudencio, the niece of former president (1968-1969) Émile-Derlin Zinsou, who entered politics in the late 2000s as a fangirl of Yayi Boni. After a stint in Yayi Boni's government as minister for Tourism and Handicrafts, Prudencio was elected in 2011 a deputy for the FCBE in the 6th constituency (southern Atlantique department). A close associate of Patrice Talon, she broke with the president several months ago, officially over the latter's economic management. Prudencio is running for reelection in the 6th constituency, which is comprising the town of Abomey-Calavi whose mayor has also left the FCBE.

Restore Hope: A one-man party managed by Candide Azannaï, a maverick politician who has crossed floor several times during his parliamentary career. Initially a powerful leader inside the RB, he was expelled from this party in 2006 after having clashed with the Soglo family. The same year, he supported the candidacy of Yayi Boni and received in exchange the post of Industry minister in the latter's government. In 2007, he was reelected deputy of the 16th constituency (western Cotonou) while running independently; four years later, he kept his seat after having joined the FCBE. He however quickly left this latter party to protest the president's repeated attempts to change the Constitution. After having tried to return to the RB, Azannaï finally ended up in the UN for which he will attempted to be reelected in the 16th constituency.

Citizen Alternative (AC). A new party founded by Joseph Djobénou, the coordinator of the 2013 “Red Wednesday” demonstration organized to oppose the revision of the constitution, and also the personal lawyer of Patrice Talon. Djobénou appears on second position, behind Candide Azannaï, on the UN list in the 16th constituency.

Party for the Hope of Benin (PEB-Tohinlô). A party founded in 2013 by Parfait Houangni, a deputy initially elected for RB in the 23rd constituency (Zou Department) who has decided to join the presidential majority. Few months later, Houangni decided however to no longer supported the president and rejoined the UN which nominated him as its top candidate in the 23rd constituency.

[Sir John Johns]

Democratic Renewal Party (PRD)

A (theoretically) conservative and pro-business party founded in 1990 by Adrien Houngbédji, then a staunch opponent to Mathieu Kérékou. Incidentally, the party uses the same acronym that the late Republican Party of Dahomey which used to be active in the 1950s and the 1960s. Both parties share the same Goun electorate, an ethnic group living in Southeast Benin, around Porto Novo, the capital of the country.

Running as the PRD candidate in the 1996 presidential election, Houngbédji finished third with 19.7% in the first round and endorsed in the run-off the northerner Kérékou over Nicéphore Soglo, his rival in the South. Houngbédji was then appointed by Kérékou to the post of prime minister, a post reinstated especially for the occasion. After two years in office, Houngbédji resigned and joined the ranks of the opposition to Kérékou. In the 2001 presidential election, Houngbédji finished again third with 12.6% and decided to withdraw from the run-off, denouncing electoral fraud. Five years later, Houngbédji ran once again for president only to be defeated in a landslide in the run-off by Yayi Boni 25.4%/74.6%, barely improving his first round result (24.2%).

The PRD has the distinction of being the only relevant party to have constantly sided in the ranks of the opposition to Yayi Boni. Running alone in 2007, the party won 10 seats. Two years later, it joined the UN and Houngbédji was nominated as the presidential candidate of the opposition alliance for 2011, being ironically endorsed by a bunch of political parties that had supported Yayi Boni over the PRD leader back in 2006. In 2011, Houngbédji finished second behind Yayi Boni with 35.6% while his party, running as part of the UN, won 9 seats. The following year, the PRD left the UN among rumors it could enter government but it finally stayed in the opposition.

As previously mentioned, the PRD electoral base is located in Southeast Benin where, back in 2011, it elected deputies in the 6th (Atlantique Department), 15th (East Cotonou), 19th and 20th (Ouémé Department) constituencies. Beside Houngbédji's own Goun ethnic community, the PRD is also strong among the Toffins (a Fon-related group) and the Yorubas.

The future of the party remains unknown as it has always be conceived as the personal propriety of Houngbédji who is now constitutionally barred from running again for president as he has reach the age limit of 70. As Houngbédji hasn't designate a political heir, the PRD has no obvious candidate for the 2016 presidential election and could chose to support a candidate from another party. These last years, the PRD has also been weaken by the defection to the FCBE of several local office-holders including the mayor of Porto Novo, Moukaram Océni.

Benin Rebirth – Patriotic Awakening Alliance (RB-RP)

 An electoral alliance founded very recently between the relatively powerful RB and the far less important RP.

Benin Rebirth (RB)

The most important component of the RB-RP Alliance, the RB is, for all purposes, the electoral vehicle of the members of the Soglo family. The party was established in 1992 by Rosine Vieyra Soglo in order to provide a firm political support to her husband, then-president Nicéphore Soglo. Widely referred to as “Maman” (“Mun”), Rosine Vieyra Soglo ruled over the RB with an iron hand for years and systematically excluded any politician darring to challenge the Soglo family's leadership. In 2010, a reluctant Maman was pushed aside to let her son, Léhady Soglo, succeed her as president of the party.

The RB has never claimed any ideology and has only been constant in its opposition to Kérékou, the arch-enemy of Nicéphore Soglo. It has also generally had bad relations with the PRD. After two unsuccessful attempts to be reelected president (1996, 2001), Nicéphore Soglo, who had then reached the age limit of 70, was elected mayor of Cotonou in 2003 (reelected in 2008) while his son, Léhady, succeeded him as the RB's natural presidential candidate. In the 2006 presidential election, Léhady Soglo won only 8.4%, far less than the results obtained by his father in 1996 (35.7% in the first round; 47.5% in the run-off) and in 2001 (27.1%). The RB endorsed Yayi Boni in the run-off and then entered the government of the new president. After several months, the party withdrew its support to Yayi Boni and became a founding member of the ADD and of its UN successor opposition alliances.

In 2011, Adrien Houngbédji was nominated presidential candidate of the UN over an ambitious Léhady Soglo who only reluctantly conceded his defeat. The failure of Houngbédji and the bad results obtained by the UN in the 2011 legislative elections convinced the RB to withdraw its membership from the UN in June 2011 and to participate into the FCBE-led governing coalition. Starting in 2013, the relations between the RB and the FCBE deteriorated after the minister for Development Marcel de Souza had strongly criticized Nicéphore Soglo's record as mayor of Cotonou. In January 2015, the RB officially broke its alliance with the FCBE in order to prepare the ground for the candidacies of Léhady Soglo for mayor of Cotonou and president.

In 2011, while running as part of the UN, the RB won 9 seats all located in the southern departments of Maritime [Cotonou] (15th and 16th constituencies), Zou (23rd and 24th), and Atlantique (6th); this year, the party is aiming to win 15 seats. The RB usually draws most of its support from the Fon community, the largest ethnic group in Benin, which is mostly found in the Zou, Ouémé, Atlantique Departments and in the city of Cotonou, one of the RB stronghold.

The party list in West Cotonou (16th constituency) is led by Maman, who is now over 80, with Léhady Soglo as second-ranking candidate. They will be opposed to the relatives of the current president, Marcel de Souza and Chabi Yayi, in a battle of the presidential families. In the 5th constituency (Atlantique Department, including Allada and Ouidah), the top candidate on the RB list is Ismaël Tidjani Serpos who used to be a former minister for popular justice under the Marxist-Leninist regime. After having rejoined the PRD in the 1990s, Tidjani Serpos became the vice-president and the parliamentary leader of this party. In last February, disappointed with the second position on the PRD list he had received, he switched to the RB which made him its top candidate in the 5th constituency. In the 15th constituency (East Cotonou), the top spot on the RB-RP was offered to Benjamin Ahounou who was until recently the local leader of the FCBE in the area. In the 24th constituency (Zou Department), the incumbent deputy Célestin Goutolou, elected in 2011 for the FCBE, ended up on the RB-RP list as he couldn't get a good slot on the FCBE list. Weirdly enough, the RB-RP has also managed to attract the support of a northerner incumbent deputy, Boubacar Djaouga who was elected in 2011 for the 7th constituency (Borgou Department).

Patriotic Awakening (RP)

The RP is the vehicle of Janvier Yahouédéou, an entrepreneur in the IT sector, who entered politics to run as an independent in the 2006 presidential election and then won 0.8%. The following year, Yahouédéou was elected deputy of the 24th constituency (Zou Department) for the FCBE before joining the opposition ranks in 2009. Running under the banner of the RP, he won only 0.6% of the votes in the 2011 presidential election and failed to be reelected deputy. This year, Yahouédéou, whose tiny party has recently formed an electoral alliance with the RB, is running again in the 24th constituency, an area inhabited by the Mahis, a Fon subgroup to which Yahouédéou is belonging to. Yahouédéou has already expressed his interest into running once again for president the next year.

Sun Alliance

The Sun Alliance was formed in December 2014 by twelve northerner deputies who were elected for the FCBE in 2011 but grew disenchanted with Yayi Boni.

Three political parties are part of the alliance:

Union for Democracy and Solidarity (UDS)

A party founded by the deputy of the northern 8th constituency (Borgou Department) Sacca Lafia who became the first Bariba to run for president in 2001; he then won 1.2% of the votes. After having joining the FCBE, Lafia was reelected deputy under the banner of this party in 2007 and 2011. Since 2013, he is also the chairman of the COS-LEPI in which post he turned into an opponent to Yayi Boni. Lafi would faced a tough reelection in the 8th constituency as the mayor of Pèrèrè, his native town, has decided these last weeks to left the UDS after 20 years to join the FCBE.

Hope Force (FE)

A party led by Antoine Dayori, a politician who was firstly elected deputy in 2003 in the 3rd constituency (northern Atacora Department) as a member of the Key Force. Two years later, he ran for president under the banner of the Hope Force and won 1.2% of the vote. Reelected as deputy for the FE, he ran again for president in 2011 but withdrew few days before the election to endorse another northerner candidate, Abdoulaye Bio Tchané. That same year, he was reelected deputy of the 3rd constituency as the member of an alliance between his FE and the UPR and, few weeks later, joined the FCBE.

Union for Relief (UPR)

The personal vehicle of Salifou Issa, a businessman of half-Zarma (or Djerma) half-Haussa extraction. In 2011, Salifou Issa ran for president and won 1.2% of the vote; the same year, he was elected deputy of the 1st constituency (Alibori Department) where he had previously been elected mayor of Malanville; in that latter election, Issa was running as part of an alliance between the UPR and Dayori's Force Hope but he subsequently joined the presidential majority.

The mastermind of the Alliance is the Borgou-born military officer Robert Gbian who is belonging to the Bariba community. The former director of Yayi Boni's military cabinet between 2006 and 2012, Gbian is planning to run for president in 2016 and has actively seek the support of the Bariba traditional chiefs. He is running as top candidate of the Sun Alliance list in the 7th constituency (northern part of Bornou) predominantly inhabited by the Baribas. Gbian has managed to attract the support of the son of Mathieu Kérékou, Modeste Kérékou, who is running on second position on the Sun Alliance list in the 4th constituency (Atacora Department).

[Sir John Johns]

Other parties

United Democratic Forces (FDU)

An electoral coalition formed in February 2015 by four parties which left the FCBE under the leadership of Mathurin Nago, the president of the National Assembly. Until recently a close ally of Yayi Boni, Nago has broke with the president after a series of confrontations with the government over the delays encountered in the construction of a motorway connection in Bopa, the birthplace of Nago, and part of Nago's 18th constituency (southwestern Mono Department). More importantly, Nago is seriously considered a 2016 presidential bid.

However, Nago managed to attract only two other deputies in his new movement: the chairperson of the Law Committee, Hélène Aholou Kèkè, who is facing a though reelection contest in the southeastern 20th constituency (Ouémé Department) against the historically well-established PRD and the FCBE; one of the deputies from the northern 2nd constituency (Alibori Department), Samari Bani, who was elected in 2011 for the now-defunct Strength in Unity Alliance before joining the FCBE during the current legislature; Bani is a member of the Boo community, a subdivision of the Baribas.

National Alliance for Democracy and Development (AND)

An electoral alliance founded by Valentin Aditi Houdé, the leader of the tiny Rally for Progress and Renewal (RPR), a split-off from the RB established in 1998. A former minister under Yayi Boni, Houdé led the G13 Baobab Alliance in the 2011 legislative election, which then won two seats including Houdé's one in the 6th constituency (Atlantique Department). Since then, Houdé has turned into a vocal opponent to the president. Few weeks ago, the AND has been joined by three incumbent deputies (two elected in 2011 for the FCBE and one for the UB) who failed to secure spots on the FCBE lists.

Scout Alliance

The name of French is Alliance Éclaireur with the latter word, beside of meaning scout, is also a derived from the verb “éclairer” (“to enlighten”) which explained why the logo of the party is a flashlight. The only point of the Scout Alliance is to provide electoral support for five transhumant deputies coming from both the FCBE and the opposition and who have all failed to secure a spot on the lists of their respective parties.

Union for Benin (UB)

An alliance of micro-parties launched in 2011 by old-timer politicians to support Yayi Boni. In the legislative elections held the same year, the party won two seats, one in the 5th constituency (Atlantique Department) by the then-mayor of Allada, Lucien Houngnibo, and another one in the 21st constituency (Plateau Department); thus the alliance doesn't seem to have a geographical coherence. Afterward, the deputy elected in the 21st constituency left to the AND, leaving Houngnibo as the only UB deputy. Fortunately for Houngnibo, he was later rejoined by two incumbent FCBE deputies who have failed to obtain a spot on the FCBE lists, one elected in the 12th constituency (Couffo Department), the other one, Orou Sé Guéné, elected in the 7th constituency (Borgou Department). The latter is theoretically ineligible to run as he has been sentenced in December 2014 to six months in jail for having help some good friends, prosecuted for murders, injuries and other nice things, to escape arrest by the police.

Rally for Democracy and Republic (RDR)

A party whose only goal is to permit the reelection of its founder, Épiphane Quenum, elected for the RB in 2011 in the 16th constituency (West Cotonou), and those of another incumbent deputy who was elected (as a substitute) in 2011 for the Alliance Cauris 2 in the 5th constituency (Atlantique Department).

Union of the Forces Committed to Democracy and Development (UFEDD)

A party founded recently by Nicaise Fagnon, a former transport minister under Yayi Boni who has been elected deputy of the 9th constituency (Collines Department) for the FCBE. Since then, Fagnon has joined the ranks of the opposition and provoked the anger of the president by the crucial role he plaid into the establishment of a parliamentary committee of inquiry to investigate the management of public funds allocated by the central government to the communes. A FCBE deputy for the 4th constituency (Atacora Department) has also joined the UFEDD. Christine Ouinsavi, a former Industry minister under Yayi Boni, also renounced to run this year for the FCBE after having been only offered a substitute position on the party's list and joined the UFEDD; however the Constitutional Court prevented her from being selected on the UFEDD lists.

Union for a Democratic Dynamic (UDD-Wologuèdè)

This party was founded in 2008 by Zéphirin Kindjanhoundé, elected the previous year in the 24th constituency (Zou Department) for the ADD. The acronym of the party is apparently a tribute to the Dahomeyan Democratic Union, a political movement active in the 1950s and 1960s and which drew its political support from the Fon community. Wologuèdè is a Fon term meaning “the chain difficult to get around”. Kindjanhoundé was reelected deputy in 2011, this time for the FCBE, but was quickly expelled from the latter party for its opposition to the president. This year, he is running independently on the banner of his tiny party. Beside of Kindjanhoundé, the only relevant candidate on the UDD list is Françoise Assogba, currently a minister in the Yayi Boni government, who is running in the 5th constituency (Atlantique Department). The fact that Assogba has been permitted to stay in government despite not running on the FCBE list (she failed to be selected) had led many to believe that the UDD is actually a bogus opposition party.

RESO-ATAO

A party whose acronym means “Rally of the Elites for an Objective Success through a Triumphant Alternative with Oriented Actions” or something like that (even in French, it's made little sense). Behind this idiotic name lies a young politician, Mohamed Atao Hinnouho, who was elected in 2011 in the 15th constituency (Eastern Cotonou) for the PRD but has since left the party to launch his own electoral vehicle. Atao has achieved some fame in Cotonou by distributing aid (notably electric motor pumps) to victims of floods.

Chameleon Coalition

An alliance of completely irrelevant parties with the least negligible ones being the Socialist Party of Benin (PSB-Baanitè). The name of the alliance explicitly referred to Kérékou's nickname. The leader of the coalition, also the president of the PSB, is Ali Houdou a nostalgic of the Kérékou regime and a big fan of Gaddafi as he organized in 2011 a march to commemorate the death of the great leader. Houdou is running in the 16th constituency (West Cotonou) with zero chance to be elected, especially considering how many big names are running there. The Chameleon Coalition conveniently selected as its top candidate in the northern 3rd constituency (Atacora Department) the incumbent FCBE deputy who has failed to get renominated by the presidential party.

Alliance for a Triumphant Benin (ABT)

A political party founded these last years and dedicated to the promotion of is leader, Abdoulaye Bio Tchané (as you can notice, the party shares the same acronym than his founder's full name) in the perspective of a 2016 presidential bid. An economist who succeeded to Yayi Boni at the presidency of the West African Development Bank, ABT has already run for president in 2011, as an independent candidate. Widely considered as a strong challenger, he won however a quite disappointing result of 6.1%. Since then, it since that the idea of a further presidential candidacy of ABT has largely faded away but this hadn't discouraged ABT to make another try. This year, however, he chose to not run for deputy as he has few chances to get elect.

Patriotic Alliance of Awakening for Union (Alliance PEU)

A party founded last month by Désiré Vodonou, a long-time militant of the Key Force. Vodonou has gained notoriety for being arrested and jailed for three years in a case of fraudulent sale of gold. Having always protested his innocence, he considered the FC didn't provide him enough moral support and so decided to left the party. Vodonou is running in the 24th constituency (Zou Department) against the FC incumbent deputy Éric Houndété and could hurt the chance of the latter of being reelected.

Movement of Awakening of the Citizen's Awareness for Another Alternative (MECCA)

A new party led by the pro-presidential mayor of Agbangnizou (Zou Department) Léopold Houankoun.

Union for Democracy and Change (UDC-Nounagnon)

A party founded in 2008 as part of the FCBE by Élisabeth Agbossaga Djawal, a municipal councilor in Bohicon, near Abomey (Zou Department). For some reason, this insignificant party, while still apparently supportive of Yayi Boni, has decided to run alone this year with Djawal running in the 23rd constituency where is located Bohicon.

Alliance for a New Governance (ANG)

An electoral alliance organized around the Communist Party of Benin (PCB), the only Beninese party with a coherent ideology. It has zero chances to have deputies elected.

New Hope for Benin Alliance

A coalition of three opposition parties led by veteran politician Sévérin Adjovi, the mayor of Ouidah.

[Simfan34]

Very impressive work. Will be following your updates- hopefully Boni will be made to stick to his terms.

[Sir John Johns]

The CENA has finally disclosed provisional results:
FCBE 32 seats
UN 15 seats
PRD 10 seats
RB-RP 7 seats
Sun Alliance 4 seats
FDU 4 seats
AND 4 seats
Scout Alliance 3 seats
ABT 2 seats
UB 2 seats

Turnout 65.9%

No idea what kind of coalition will be formed with such a divided National Assembly, especially ten months before the presidential election (whose date has been recently changed to 28 February 2016).

According to rumors that are circulating, among the defeated candidates were Séfou Fagbohoun (UN), Lazare Sèhouéto (UN), Hélène Aholou Kèkè (FDU), Chabi Yayi (FCBE), and Léhady Soglo (RB-RP). If this is true for the latter, he will have big troubles to ensure his election as mayor of Cotonou at the end of the month. Éric Houndété, Candide Azannaï, Claudine Prudencio (all three for UN), Janvier Yahouédéou (RB-RP) and Mathurin Nago (FDU) are said to have been confortably reelected.

With such results, the big winners are the UN (which seem to have performed very well in Western Cotonou thanks to their top candidate there Candide Azannaï), the PRD (said to have won the Southeastern constituencies in a landslide), and the ABT, which managed to enter parliament. Conversely, the score of the FCBE, while not disastrous, is far from the 50-seat objective. The Sun Alliance also made a poor result as it failed to challenge the FCBE hegemony over North Benin.

The elections are widely seen as having been free and fair, without major incident. Several cases of vote buying has however been reported. Also, the big problem remains the logistical organization with delays in the distribution of voters ID cards, the centralization of results and the counting of the votes.

[Sir John Johns]

The Constitutional Court has proclaimed the results

FCBE 33 seats
UN 13 seats
PRD 10 seats
RB-RP 7 seats
AND 5 seats
Sun Alliance 4 seats
FDU 4 seats
ABT 2 seats
Scout Alliance 2 seats
UB 2 seats
RESOATAO 1 seat

Among the defeated: Chantal Yayi de Souza and Chabi Yayi for the FCBE; Séfou Fagbohoun, Lazare Séhouéto, and Sacca Fikara for the UN; Léhady Soglo and the FCBE turncoats for the RB-RP; Antoine Dayori and Modeste Kérékou (truly a bad election for presidential relatives) for the Sun Alliance; Hélène Aholou Kèkè and Samari Bani for the FDU; the criminal Orou Sé Guéné, who will probably now go to jail, for the UB.

The results in Cotonou are truly horrible for the RB: one single seat won out of nine, going to Rosine 'Maman' Soglo; in the 15th constituency, it managed to be somehow been outpaced not only by the PRD (which won there in a landslide) but also by the RESO-ATAO. The party could now expected to lose the mayoralty at the end of the month.

Fight has already began for the post of president of the newly-elected National Assembly between Bruno Amoussou (UN) and Adrien Houngbédji (PRD), the latter being apparently favored by Yayi Boni.

[Famous Mortimer]

To make a long story very, very short:

FCBE (President's ideology-less Northern ethnic coalition) 33 seats
UN (Social democratic Southern ethnic opposition coalition) 13 seats
PRD (Conservative Southern ethnic opposition party) 10 seats
RB-RP (Neo-liberal Southern ethnic opposition coalition controlled by Soglo family) 7 seats
AND 5 (Anti-Soglo splinter of the RB) 5 seats
Sun Alliance (Northern ethnic opposition coalition) 4 seats
FDU (Former supporters of the president, mostly but not entirely Southern) 4 seats
ABT (Personalist party of Abdoulaye Bio Tchané, minor neo-liberal presidential candidate) 2 seats
Scout Alliance (Coalition of people who couldn't get the support of other parties) 2 seats
UB (Coalition of people who support the president but couldn't get the support of the ruling party) 2 seats
RESOATAO (Personalist party of Mohamed Atao Hinnouho, PRD defector) 1 seat

[Sir John Johns]

Maybe, I have been unclear in my previous posts, but all Beninese political parties but the irrelevant Communist Party are ideology-less. Remember that everybody but the RB has been supportive of Kérékou at times and that everybody but the PRD has been supportive of Yayi at times. I don't remember having seen a single newspaper article mentioning the label of 'right-wing' or 'left-wing' when talking about the Beninese political landscape.

Also, I'm not sure that the term of “ethnic” is 100% accurate to refer to Beninese political parties; “ethnic-based” is possibly a better term. Benin isn't like Lebanon or Bosnia-Herzegovina where mono-ethnic parties supported by mono-ethnic voters. While most of the parties are associated with an ethnic or geographical base, they all make efforts to broaden their support with generally limited results due to the heavy competition between parties. There are something like 60 ethnic groups in Benin, each having (or using to have) its own language, which are arranged into eight major sociolinguistic groups:

Fon and related 39.2% (the Fon themselves account for 17.6%, the largest subgroup in Benin)
Aja and related 15.2%
Yoruba and related 12.3%
Bariba and related 9.2%
Peulh (Fula) and related 7%
Ottammari (or Tammari) and related 6.1%
Yoa-Lopka and related 4%
Dendi and related 2.5%
Others (mostly Haussa and Zarma) 1.6%


Source: 2002 Census (find the breakdown by departments here (page 5)

With such an ethnic diversity (and I don't have spoke about the religious divides), a party needs to extend its support outside of a single ethnic community if it want to have some political influence. This is exemplify by the case of the northern voters, divided into Bariba, Fula, Tammari, Yoa-Lokpa, and Dendi (not to mention the small Haussa communities), have all united behind a single candidacy (first Kérékou, then Yayi Boni) in order to get a Northern native elected to the presidency and thus benefiting of a better economic redistribution (the North is more rural and impoverished than the South).

Map of the distribution of the seats. I can't find so far a map of results by constituencies, the Supreme Court only gave the number of seats won and the name of the elected deputies.



In recent news: yesterday, about twenty members of the Beninese Gendarmerie surrounded Candide Azannaï's home and tried to kick down its door only to find he wasn't president inside. The purpose of the operation was apparently to give Azannaï a summons to appear before the courts for having slander the president. Various opposition leaders, including Nicéphore Soglo, Janvier Yahouédéou, Éric Houndété, and Adrien Houngbédji have all protested the exaggerated violence displayed by the  Gendarmerie and showed their support to Azannaï. Shorty thereafter, demonstrations broke out in Cotonou in support of Azannaï.

[Sir John Johns]

Yesterday, Adrien Houngbédji (PRD), the candidate of the anti-Yayi coalition, has been elected president of the National Assembly with 42 votes against 41 for the FCBE candidate, Komi Koutché, who is also currently finance minister and is widely seen as presidential material (but not for next year as he will be still too young to be able to run). Houngbédji will presided over the National Assembly for the third time as he was previously president in 1991-95 and 1999-2003.

Despite this very narrow victory, the opposition gained control of all posts in the Bureau of the National Assembly but one:

1st vice-president, Éric Houndété (UN)
2nd vice-president, Robert Gbian (Sun Alliance)
1st quaestor: Valentin Houdé (AND)
2nd quaestor: Georges Bada (RB-RP)
1st parliamentary secretary: Sofiath Thanou (FCBE)
2nd parliamentary secretary: Alexis Agbélissessi (FDU)

The pro-Yayi coalition so far is comprising the FCBE, the Scout Alliance, the Union for Benin, and three deputies (out of five) elected under the AND banner but who have already left this party. This put the total number of pro-presidential deputies to 40; the name of the additional deputy who has voted for Koutché remains unknown as the election was made through a secret ballot.

The remaining parties, including RESO-ATAO whose leader has been actively courted by Yayi, are all currently siding in opposition to the president. There is however no doubt that the two blocks will not remained unchanged until the end of the legislature and defections from one or both of the camps are expected.

This is a very bad time for the president Yayi as the Netherlands have, several days before the election of Houngbédji, decided to suspend development aid to Benin after it has been exposed that 4 million euros of Dutch aid had disappeared. The scandal had forced the resignation of the minister for Energy and Water, Barthélémy Kassa, who however remains a deputy. The opposition is now calling for the removal of Kassa's parliamentary immunity and for the resignation of further ministers, including Koutché.

[Sir John Johns]

For some reason, the Constitutional Court of Benin never published the detailed results by constituencies and only gave the distribution of seats by party and by constituency (this is also apparently the case for presidential elections; only national totals by candidates are provided on the Constitutional Court's website).

Provisional results compiled by the CENA with 99.27% of the votes counted can however be found here (the CENA doesn't have a website). It's however VERY IMPORTANT to keep in mind that these results are only provisional with several poll stations not counted or not being taken into account due to a number of cast votes larger than the number of registered voters; in the latter cases, the results have been fixed by the Constitutional Court.

National results as given by the CENA (I have been forced to change some colors compared to the map of the seats distribution)

FCBE 30.19%
UN 14.35%
PRD 10.57%
AND 7.64%
RB/RP 7.09%
Sun Alliance 6.66%
FDU 4%
ABT 3.7%
Scout Alliance 3.42%
UB 2.9%
RESO-ATAO 2.16%
PEU Alliance 1.51%
UD-Wologuede 1.13%
UDC-Nounagnon 1.03%
all others under 1%

So here, some maps made from these results, but they should be taken with a grain of salt. Most notably, there are large discrepancies between the provisional and the definitive results in the 5th constituency: in the provisional results, the UN finished first and got 2 seats; however, in the definitive results, the UN got only 1 seat out of 5, an indication that it actually finished in third place behind either the AND or the UB which both got 2 seats; in any case, the race there was very close and very disputed with the three parties all scoring between 16.93% and 17.1% in provisional results. The FCBE vote is also possibly underestimated in the 7th constituency while the UN vote is overestimated in the 15th constituency.

[BaconBacon96]

Only on Atlas can one find election maps for Benin.