Supreme Court ruled private property can be seized

[Emsworth]

The standard implicitly imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as that imposed on the federal government by the Fifth. (Assuming we follow precedent and leave aside, for now, the issue of whether incorporation is a valid doctrine in the first place.)

Thus, private property may only be taken for "public use." I interpret these words strictly: the property must be taken for actual use by the government, e.g. for a military base or for a highway. If the property is being used by a corporation rather than the government, then the use is not public but private. Private use may entail incidental benefits for the public, but that does not make it public use. There is no constitutional justification for siezing property in this case. Therefore, the majority is, in my opinion, gravely mistaken in making this ruling.

[Emsworth]

The standard implicitly imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as that imposed on the federal government by the Fifth. (Assuming we follow precedent and leave aside, for now, the issue of whether incorporation is a valid doctrine in the first place.)

Thus, private property may only be taken for "public use." I interpret these words strictly: the property must be taken for actual use by the government, e.g. for a military base or for a highway. If the property is being used by a corporation rather than the government, then the use is not public but private. Private use may entail incidental benefits for the public, but that does not make it public use. There is no constitutional justification for siezing property in this case. Therefore, the majority is, in my opinion, gravely mistaken in making this ruling.

Even 3 of the 4 dissenters would disagree with this view.

I feel that such an interpretation would be much, much too broad and expansive. Moreover, it would plainly contradict the meaning of the actual language in the Constitution. If the property in question is being owned privately but operated for the public benefit, I could see that there is some reason behind the view that this is public use. In this case, however, the property is being operated for profit, and does not directly benefit the people as a railroad or canal might. The benefit is indirect: through tax revenues. There are, consequently, in my opinion, no grounds for the seizure of this property.

[Emsworth]

Not permitting eminent domain creates all sorts of hold-out problems that impede progress.  If a government want to initiate a revitalization project in a blighted area of a city, they need to have the power to seize existing property at its correct value.  The current owners should be compensated for this value as well as all other associated expenses.  That is, they should be left no worse off than before the property was seized. 

If it were up to existing owners to sell their property at whatever price they could get from the city or the developers, this would give a huge advantage to whatever owners were the last to hold-out; they could extort an completely exorbitant price, and the city would have no choice but to pay it, because they've already purchased the surrounding property.  This in turn gives all the property owners a disintentive to ever sell, because they want to be the ones to hold out for an extortionary price.   

Urban renewal would be basically impossible with eminent domain.  Again, if you don't agree with a particular project, then vote against the officials who are advocating it.  But this is a question of political policy and not constitutionality.

The use of the property may be greatly beneficial to the public. The project may be an admirable effort to benefit society. But that does not make it constitutional. In this case, the property is being taken for private use, not public use. As long as this point is not addressed by the opposition, I will continue to hold that this ruling was a terrible one.

Arguments relating to how important urban renewal is, how necessary revitalization is, etc., are absolutely irrelevant.

[Emsworth]

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It is the job of the Supreme Court to interpret the constitution.   I don't see a definition of "public use" in the document itself, so however the Supreme Court interprets it is the definition.   So you can't say that what the Supreme Court has done it unconstitutional.  There's room for reasonable disagreement here about what the definition should be, but neither side is obviously wrong.  The Court could have decided either way, and ultimately, made the decision which is far more beneficial to the public.

Your suggestion that the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution is one that I completely accept and agree with. However, we do remain entitled to deem the Court has interpreted the Constitution incorrectly.

[Emsworth]

It's called Pareto efficiency.  The use of eminent domain makes everyone better off overall without making anyone worse off (the definition of Pareto efficiency).   The person whose property is seized is justly compensated, so he doesn't lose or gain anything, while everyone else now gets a project that will help the economy.

The government may not violate the Constitution in order to achieve Pareto efficiency, or anything else, as a matter of fact.

I'm afraid that the opposition keeps saying that this seizure will benefit the community. This is not the salient point. It is utterly irrelevant. What matters is not how useful the seizure is. What matters is if the use is public or private - a point which the opposition has hitherto failed to address.

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What in the Constitution gives the government the power to take away property from one individual and give it to a corporation?

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Again, Pareto efficiency is constitutionally irrelevant.

I repeat: this use of property is not public. It may entail incidental benefits for the public, but ultimately, the property is being run for profit, and therefore the use is private.

[Emsworth]

Now you care about what the authors thought?
To bad you can't keep that line of thinking regarding the "welfare clause", or the "interestate commerce" clause.

Speaking of which, I think that the courts should keep original intent in mind, but should not rely on it alone. One must consider not only the intent of those who wrote the Constitution and the amendments, but also the intent of those who ratified them. In many cases, one cannot unequivocally state that one interpretation matches the original intention of a clause. Judges cannot conclusively determine if all, or if even a majority of the delegates or of the state legislatures/conventions interpreted the clauses a certain way. (Remember that documents like The Federalist are the opinions of just a few delegates, and need not necessarily represent the views of the majority.)

I do not suggest that original intent should be abandoned as an interpretive tool - I just feel that it should not be the sole or primary one. Instead, a reading of the plain text of the Constitution - what the Framers actually did, not just intended - is preferable wherever possible. A completely literalist reading is not necessary, however.

In this particular case, one can consider the plain meaning of the words "public use." Undoubtedly, these words indicate use by the public or by the government. The view that they refer to use by private corporations is, in my opinion, far too strained.