Colombian congressional and presidential elections - March 13/May 29/June 19, 2022

[LAKISYLVANIA]

Interesting that Colombians in the US so overwhelmingly voted for the rightwing candidate but Colombians in Canada were almost evenly split. FWIW I know a few Colombians in Toronto and they are all pretty left wing

Doesn't surprise me

in almost every election, the "people living in the" US votes for the right-wing candidate.

Even in elections where 95% of people in the world supports the left wing, the people living in the US would vote right wing. Personally i do think this is very worrying.

[Oryxslayer]

Interesting that Colombians in the US so overwhelmingly voted for the rightwing candidate but Colombians in Canada were almost evenly split. FWIW I know a few Colombians in Toronto and they are all pretty left wing

Doesn't surprise me

in almost every election, the "people living in the" US votes for the right-wing candidate.

Even in elections where 95% of people in the world supports the left wing, the people living in the US would vote right wing. Personally i do think this is very worrying.

Not hard to understand. There are four main types of people who live abroad for significant amounts of time - and are motivated to show up at consulates.  The one without many defining characteristics and who behaves usually somewhat similarly to the nation is often the largest: those who are in neighboring countries and cross the border frequently for business or family.

The other three have clear delineators: those with money who live abroad for work and business, those who work in or are obtaining an education, and those who have retired someplace comfortable. America attracts the members of the first and Florida attracts members of the third. Given those groups align with Conservatives, its not surprising how the expat communities living in America behave.

[Sebastiansg7]

Another thing that causes the extreme right wing vote in the immigrant community in the US, particularly in Miami, is that many of them are of paisa origin.

In general terms, around 2/3 of people from the Paisa region tend to be naturally right wing, and these characteristics are accentuated when they move to Miami for some reason, probably has to do with their networking with Cuban and Venezuelans, the big trucks, the yachts, and so on, although I doubt that many of the immigrants can take yacht trips, or buy huge expensive trucks.

I can tell you this because I am actually from Medellin (I've been living in Bogota for almost 9 years now).

[Red Velvet]

Florida is also the main headquarter for the global extreme right. I mean:

Fugitive of Brazilian Justice joins event with Bolsonaro in Orlando

Only place in the world that a Latin American president can organize a rally in foreign soil and attract all these kinds of people. Most the Bolsominion specialists / journalists that praise Bolsonaro the most live in freaking Miami.

Hell, Hernandez in Colombia wasn’t even campaigning in Colombia, but in Florida as mentioned here. That State is a full caricature at this point. Let all these Ultra Right Wing people start their own nation there pls.

[Walmart_shopper]

Results by municipality (preconteo results)



More to say later but nothing particularly unexpected when looking at it from this basic angle: good but ultimately imperfect and just insufficient transfers from Fico to Rodolfo (I will need to drill deeper into this tomorrow to get a better idea), Petro confirms and shores up his strongholds, the regional divide remains quite important with mega-strongholds and lopsided results for both candidates.

In terms of cities: Rodolfo won Medellín, Bucaramanga, Cúcuta (with 81%, undoubtedly his best result in a big city by far), Manizales, Pereira, Armenia (these 3 quite narrowly), Ibagué, Villavicencio, Florencia, Yopal, Envigado, Itagui.

Petro won all Caribbean capitals, including 67.5% in Cartagena and 64% in Barranquilla, Bogotá, Cali, Popayán, Neiva, Pasto, Ipiales, Quibdó, Soacha, Palmira, Mocoa, Buenaventura, Tunja, Duitama, Sogamoso.

Is there neighborhood-level results available for Bogota or Cartagena?

[Hash]

Is there neighborhood-level results available for Bogota or Cartagena?

Not yet. The official count started today and should be complete in a few days, and results by electoral zone will be released at that point. In Bogotá, the localities match the electoral zones, so it is easy to put them together quickly. In other cities, like Medellín and Cali, comunas include one or more electoral zones, so it's not too difficult to collate them. Unfortunately, in Cartagena, there are only a few big localities and matching them to zones is much more difficult (and perhaps not very instructive given how big the localities are) - you can, however, use the names of specific polling locations in each zone to locate them on a map, but this is a painstaking process. I can tell you, however, that Fico won in Bocagrande three weeks ago, shockingly.

As last time, I'll have the results in Bogotá and a few other cities up as soon as possible. Hopefully tomorrow.

[icc]

It's interesting how unremarkable the patterns of support are.

Despite being a very different candidate from what has come before, and all the anti-Uribista rhetoric, the map looks almost identical to what we'd have seen in a Petro v Fico runoff if the result had been the same.

Petro would obviously have done a lot better in Santander (though still not close to winning) and maybe Boyacá, and probably would have done a bit, though not significantly, worse in the Caribbean and in Paisa areas (Antioquia & Eje Cafetero).

In large part, though, that's down to 'favourite son' votes rather than anything ideological. Certainly I can't see that any departamentos (at a push San Andres) would have voted the other way in a close Petro win versus an Uribista.

[Hash]

Results by localidad/comuna in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Manizales

Bogotá





Rodolfo wins Fico's two victories, Usaquén and Chapinero, which also become his best results by far. However, unlike in the rest of the city, turnout dropped a tiny bit there, although Rodolfo did win more than the % sum of Fico/Rodolfo from May 29, so it seems as if he did a decent job at winning over Fico's wealthy voters, and picking up some of Fajardo's support there. Rodolfo also won Barrios Unidos and came very close in Suba. Petro swept the rest of the city and got over 70% in the poor localities of the south, including 76.5% in Usme and 74.8% in Ciudad Bolívar. Rodolfo fell far short of the Fico/Rodolfo % share totals from three weeks ago in those places: did Rodolfo perhaps lose a few of his own voters in these low-income areas?

Medellín





Rodolfo wins everything but there's a clear north (poorer) south (wealthier) divide, with Petro getting over 40% or close to that in the north. Poblado gonna Poblado, with no less than 85.5% for the king of TikTok there. Rodolfo also got over 70% in Laureles-Estadio and Belén, which are quite wealthy as well.

Cali





Again the divide here reflects wealth: whereas Fico had just won the very wealthy gated communities and their racist inhabitants in Comuna 22, Rodolfo also won comuna 2, 17 and 19 which include the other (less farcically) wealthy areas of Cali. On the other hand, Petro absolutely dominated, with over 70% or close to it, in the poorer parts of Cali, even winning over 75% in parts of Aguablanca.

Manizales





I'm becoming repetitive but the patterns here are also class-based: Rodolfo won nearly 60% in Palogrande, the wealthiest comuna. Results in other comunas were more evenly matched and less lopsided than in the 3 biggest cities, but Petro generally won the poorer areas of Manizales including San José and Ciudadela del Norte, while Rodolfo won the slightly better off areas, like Atardeceres.

[LAKISYLVANIA]

https://twitter.com/PopulismUpdates/status/1539001236103385088

USA going evil mode again.

[buritobr]

It's not polite leaders of states/countries expressing there opinions in public about the results of elections which took place in other countries

[Velasco]

It's not polite leaders of states/countries expressing there opinions in public about the results of elections which took place in other countries

Politely or not, everybody gives opinions about everything. Nobody should be surprised by the statements of that rightwing givernor of Florida, a state where radicalized Latin American expats have a great influence.

Unsurpringly, a Peruvian Nobel Prize and former presidential candidate states that Colombians "have voted badly"

https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-06-21/mario-vargas-llosa-on-colombia-elections-they-have-voted-badly-lets-see-what-petro-does.html

 The event took place in Madrid, Spain, but it could just as well have taken place in Bogotá. By the time the writer Mario Vargas Llosa presented Madrid regional premier Isabel Díaz Ayuso with an award from his Fundación Internacional para la Libertad (FIL, the International Freedom Foundation) on Monday, everyone already knew that the big news of the day was the victory of the former M-19 guerrilla fighter and economist Gustavo Petro in Colombia’s election. After the ceremony, the Nobel Prize winner accompanied the Spanish conservative politician to the exit. There were cameras all around them. And in the brief space of time separating that moment from the televised statement by the outgoing president of Colombia, Iván Duque, Vargas Llosa analyzed the election results in four words: “They [Colombians] have voted badly.” (...)  

"Freedom Front"

[buritobr]

Vargas Llosa endorsed Keiko Fujomori against Pedro Castillo, Kast against Boric, Bolsonaro against Lula and Hernandez against Petro.

I am starting to think that the lesser of the evils in the runoff in Peru in 1990 was Alberto Fujimori

[H.E. VOLODYMYR ZELENKSYY]

Vargas Llosa endorsed Keiko Fujomori against Pedro Castillo, Kast against Boric, Bolsonaro against Lula and Hernandez against Petro.

I am starting to think that the lesser of the evils in the runoff in Peru in 1990 was Alberto Fujimori

And he supported Keiko’s attempt to steal the election in Peru as well.

[kaoras]

Vargas Llosa endorsed Keiko Fujomori against Pedro Castillo, Kast against Boric, Bolsonaro against Lula and Hernandez against Petro.

I am starting to think that the lesser of the evils in the runoff in Peru in 1990 was Alberto Fujimori

Let's not get as hyperbolic as him. I want to believe that Vargas Llosa wouldn't have castrated/attempted to genocide the indigenous. Though that makes his support for Keiko even worse.

[Velasco]

Vargas Llosa endorsed Keiko Fujomori against Pedro Castillo, Kast against Boric, Bolsonaro against Lula and Hernandez against Petro.

I am starting to think that the lesser of the evils in the runoff in Peru in 1990 was Alberto Fujimori

Let's not get as hyperbolic as him. I want to believe that Vargas Llosa wouldn't have castrated/attempted to genocide the indigenous. Though that makes his support for Keiko even worse.

Vargas Llosa is disgusting and I am certain his presidency would have been a failure, but there's no sign he has the criminal tendencies of Fujimori. Keep in mind that Vargas Llosa was a marxist in his youth who became an ardent neoliberal at a later age, that is to say, he's a convert. He began taking distance ftom the Cuban regime in the mid 1970s and evolved towards liberalism in the following years (he cites Hayek, Popper and Ortega y Gasset among his ",,masters"). By 1990 he was an enthusiast admirer of Thatcher and Reagan. Since then he has turned more rightwing, to the point that nowadays he's a committed fan of our Isabel Díaz Ayuso (the aristocratic Cayetana Álvarez de Toledo would be a better fit for him) and endorses the daughter of Alberto Fujimori.

However, regardless his past and present political views, Mario Vargas Llosa is an excellent writer. Possibly his masterpieces were written during his marxist phase, but his recent novels are still very well written. I'd like to think my attitude towards the famous writer is less sectarian than the attitude of Vargas Llosa towards leftwing politicians

[H.E. VOLODYMYR ZELENKSYY]

And of course the neoliberal reforms Vargas Llosa proposed in 1990 were immediately adopted by Fujimori as well after he won.

[Sebastiansg7]

Serious question, is there a more right wing area in South America than El Poblado in Medellín? Those 85+% victories of the right that are common there must be something rare even among the wealthiest boroughs/neighborhoods in the continent.

[Red Velvet]

Serious question, is there a more right wing area in South America than El Poblado in Medellín? Those 85+% victories of the right that are common there must be something rare even among the wealthiest boroughs/neighborhoods in the continent.

Some whole cities in Southern Brazil voted for Bolsonaro in 2018 with those >80% margins. See:

- Blumenau (84% city average)
- Joinville (83% was the city average, some electoral zones with >85%);
- Londrina (80% city average)

And if you go to even smaller towns nearby those you can find even larger margins (Pomerode, the most German city in Brazil and which is near Blumenau, voted 87% for Bolsonaro). But I wouldn’t say those margins are constant if that’s what you’re asking, they got that big because it was an election that the right won and the momentum was in their favor, which is a different scenario from yours, since Petro won overall.

But usually 85% percent is the ceiling. Of relatively “big” cities, those were the ones the most favorable to Bolsonaro.

[Velasco]

Serious question, is there a more right wing area in South America than El Poblado in Medellín? Those 85+% victories of the right that are common there must be something rare even among the wealthiest boroughs/neighborhoods in the continent.

If you want similar right-wing areas within big cities, take a look at Santiago's NE corner

Vitacura: Kast 83.3 / Boric 16.7

Keep in mind the second round of the last Chilean election was not particularly good for the right.

[Sir John Johns]

There is also La Puntilla (29,803 inhabitants in 2010, much more since as there were over 20,000 votes cast there in the 2021 elections), a ‘satellite city’ lying on the coast in Samborondón canton, in the periphery of Guayaquil (Ecuador).

Results of the last presidential election there were:

First round

Guillermo Lasso (CREO, conservative) 87.1%
Andrés Arauz (UNES, Correa’s coalition) 5.7%
Xavier Hervas (ID, social liberal) 2.2%
Guillermo Celi (SUMA, conservative) 1.6%
Yaku Pérez (Pachakutik, indigenous) 1.2%

Second round

Guillermo Lasso 92.3%
Andrés Arauz 7.7%

It was Lasso’s best parish in both rounds.

A quick research on Google Maps’ satellite photos and you understand what kind of people is living in La Puntilla:







There are private swimming pools and tennis courts just absolutely everywhere.

Gated communities have been built in La Puntilla since the 1980s to house super-wealthy families fleeing neighboring Guayaquil and some of the richest Ecuadorian people are living (or used to live there) from banana tycoon Álvaro Noboa to late former presidents León Febres-Cordero and Gustavo Noboa as well as several bigwigs of the Citizen Revolution (belonging, unsurprisingly, to the pro-business wing): Alexis Mera, Camilo Samán, Juan Carlos Casinelli and even Correa’s own sister, Pierina.

I don’t know if something similar (in the sense of so much caricatural) exists in other South American countries. Note that Samborondón canton is made up of two other parishes, one of them (Tarifa), having in 2010 (year of the latest census) a large majority of inhabitants not having running water at home, in a blatant illustration of the obscene economic inequalities existing in Ecuador.

[Red Velvet]

Well, I think one of the constants we can clearly define for all these LatAm places where the right gets over 80% of the vote is that they’re significantly wealthier and usually whiter than their countries average.

In Brazil those places are usually in interior areas of the Southern Region, which have lots of European immigrant descendants. Many people in Pomerode (the town that was 87% for Bolsonaro) still keep the language and culture from their ancestors that came from German Pomerania region. But Pomerode has only 30.000 population, so it’s not like it’s significant in the grand scheme of things or anything.



Doing some research, the city that was the most pro-Bolsonaro considering ALL cities of the country was Nova Pádua though, which is also on the Southern Region, with 92,96%. It’s even smaller than Pomerode though (which is already not big), with just 2.500 population.

Nova Pádua is small town of immigrants from the Italian region of Veneto, running away from the misery established by the war against Austrians in their country around 1866 in the Austria vs Italy conflict, after which Veneto was passed to Italy. They still use Veneto dialect. So yeah, that’s the common trend here for these ultra-right-wing towns/regions.



Important to say the left also has their mirror strongholds with even better margins though. But the areas background is the exact opposite. Haddad, who LOST the 2018 election, managed to get his best result of all country in the town of Guaribas, Northeast Brazil, with population over 4.500 people only. Haddad got 97,99% there and there are other interior towns of the Northeast with similar results.

Many streets there aren’t even paved, to evidence the class and regional contrast of the vote:

[bigic]

The parliamentary majority supporting the Gustavo Petro govt will include Liberal Party and Conservative Party. The U Party considers joining it, while Democratic Center (the party of outgoing president Ivan Duque) will go into opposition.
https://twitter.com/business/status/1541240091015798784?s=21&t=CTBxuMfn-ortw...

[Hash]

To shift focus back to the thread topic, here's a belated rundown of week 1 of castrochavismo in Colombia:

The presidential transition process has begun. Petro and Duque met on June 23. The transition process in the different ministries and agencies begins this week.

https://twitter.com/IvanDuque/status/1540117342050459650

Petro's transition team has four members: Daniel Rojas, his campaign's platform coordinator; Carolina Corcho, a doctor (vice president of the Colombian Medical Federation) and adviser on healthcare issues who was critical of the government's pandemic response and strongly supports Petro's healthcare reform proposal (and has clashed with Alejandro Gaviria, former health minister who endorsed Petro in the runoff); former senator Mauricio Lizcano, a traditional politician (former senator from the Partido de la U, former president of the Senate 2016-17, ex-uribista) whose new movement in Caldas (Gente en Movimiento) endorsed the Pacto during the campaign); and Aurora Vergara, an Afro-Colombian academic.

The outgoing administration's transition team includes the finance minister, Duque's chief of staff, the head of the administrative department of the presidency (Dapre) and the director of the national planning department (DNP).


The main things in the political world now are (a) the new governing coalition, and the future opposition, (b) the election of the congressional leadership for the first legislative year and (c) cabinet speculation. All are quite closely related.

Petro on his own, with the Pacto and closest allies (the Greens), does not have a congressional majority. He obviously needs an absolute majority in both houses to ensure control of the congressional leadership (which has great power in deciding the order of the day and can either greatly help or hinder the government's agenda) and of course to pass laws and constitutional reforms.

In Colombia, under the opposition statute (a law adopted in 2018 governing the status and prerogatives of the opposition), parties must, within a month of the new government taking office, declare themselves as governing parties, in opposition or independent. They can change their official declaration only once within the government's term. The law provides certain rights to the opposition, including additional funding, access to public broadcasting, representation in the congressional leadership (second vice presidency) and the right to official rebuttals including official responses to presidential addresses (petty Duque stopped giving official presidential addresses to avoid opposition responses). On the other hand, the party leadership and former electoral candidates or independent and opposition parties cannot get government appointments.

During his campaign Petro repeatedly said that he wants to build a 'Great National Agreement' (Acuerdo Nacional), both some sort of broad-based dialogue with all sides (and other sectors of society and in different regions) and increasingly a future governing coalition. Even before he won, Petro's campaign organized the first meeting of his 'national agreement', moderated by Alejandro Gaviria. Petro wants to include the opposition in the national agreement. Most notably, Petro invited Álvaro Uribe to a meeting and Uribe said he 'appreciated the invitation of President Gustavo Petro' and that he would attend in representation of the CD.

The Greens were the first to join the 'national agreement', i.e. the future governing coalition. This is not a surprise since the bulk of the Green congressional caucus endorsed Petro either in the first or second round (as did all three co-presidents: Antonio Navarro, Antanas Mockus and Carlos Ramón González).

Late on June 22, César Gaviria, leader of the Liberal Party, put out a statement saying that the party wished to be part of the governing coalition. It was put in very old politics language by Gaviria, of course, basically saying that with regards to eventual participation in a governing coalition, they're waiting for the position regarding their "participation and political representation" from Petro - that is, 'we want our bureaucratic quotas and appointments in exchange for our support'. Gaviria also used the opportunity to send a stern warning to the Liberals dissidents who had joined the Pacto against his own will during the election, saying that he didn't care about their opinions as they had left the party. In other words, the Liberals - who, in any case, will not be in opposition - want to be in government but in exchange for bureaucratic representation and their proper place in the congressional leadership (probably the presidency of the lower house in the first year). Petro is quite pragmatic now and will likely accede to Gaviria's conditions.

The Partido de la U, which had supported Fico and been part of the coalition behind him, also has no interest in being in the opposition (where it has never really been). After the election, the party's president, Dilian Francisca Toro (powerful regional 'baroness' of the Valle), said the party was willing to participate in a great national agreement. Yesterday, the party's caucus announced it had decided to be part of the governing coalition for the election of the congressional leadership (the new Congress takes office on July 20). As for future participation in a coalition, it has left that decision for later. But it too has said it will not be in opposition.

The Conservative Party, which had also supported Fico and been part of the coalition behind him, should logically be in opposition to a left-wing government, but logic is not something that Colombian Conservatives care about. They haven't been fully, 100%, in opposition to any government since Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), and their caucus is very much a group of regional machines and other such types who require access to government money and associated benefits to maintain their political careers. Conservative senator Carlos Andres Trujillo (leader of a powerful political group in Itagüí, Antioquia), in representation of the party and the caucus, met with Petro to 'look for agreements on the fundamental' ('agreement on the fundamentals' is an old line used by the late Conservative politician Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, which is very much in vogue now).

On the other hand, the party's president, Omar Yepes (an old Conservative cacique from Caldas), pressured the party to be in opposition to Petro, underlining that it is a right-wing party with positions against the left-wing ideas of the president-elect. Former president, Lolita Express passenger and crazy conspiracy theorist Andrés Pastrana (who has had a very schizophrenic, love-hate relationship with the party for over a decade now) is also very much opposed to supporting Petro's government.

However, the Conservative caucus issued a statement supporting the national agreement and saying that they would not be an opposition party. Petro welcomed their support, saying that history would be made if the Conservative Party supported the government's legislative agenda and referring to Álvaro Gómez Hurtado's spirit in the 1991 constitution and agreement on the fundamentals. Yepes has announced that he would resign as party president in response. The most likely outcome is that the Conservatives will declare themselves independent.

No news from Cambio Radical, but pre-election they had formed a common bloc with the U in Congress. Former vice president Germán Vargas Lleras, now a weekly columnist in El Tiempo, recently wrote a column praising the 'invitation to dialogue' by Petro. He still wields significant influence in CR so the party will most likely declare itself independent too.

This leaves the CD as the only strong opposition party in Congress. All this makes for a real sense of déjà vu, a flashback to Santos' Unidad Nacional coalition, particularly in his second term (Santos' coalition included the Liberals, Conservatives, CR and La U and was supported by the Greens and the left on issues related to the peace process, with only Uribe's CD in opposition). The CD was a very effective (tough) opposition, but circumstances are different now: the party is weaker than in 2014, more divided and most obviously lacks Uribe's presence in the Senate (and, increasingly, I feel, his own interest and passion in general). No single obvious congressional opposition leader has emerged yet from the CD, but there will be a fight between top candidate (and most voted candidate in the end) Miguel Uribe Turbay, and the far-right's darling María Fernanda Cabal (second most voted candidate in March).

Ingrid Betancourt, who supported Rodolfo in the end, has also said she would be in opposition, which is terrible news for the opposition. It is unclear whether this goes for her party as well (I feel like it will, she clearly runs the thing as her personal vanity project with no discussions allowed), but in any case this will be problematic for the party's only two congressmen: Humberto de la Calle (Senate) and Daniel Carvalho (House), who are both leaning more towards being independent.

The Nuevo Liberalismo's sad and pathetic transformation into the Galán brothers support group continues. The party leadership (that is, Galán) wants to declare the party independent, after having endorsed Rodolfo in the runoff. The party's members who endorsed Petro, led by former top candidate Mabel Lara (as well as Yolanda Perea, Afro-Colombian feminist leader who was also on the Senate list in March), asked that there be instead an honest and open dialogue with the incoming government and that the party should be part of the 'transformations'. To which Galán responded with a curt statement in which he says that he's the boss and that all the decisions are to be taken by him only.

https://twitter.com/juanmanuelgalan/status/1539754664979271680

Mabel Lara and Perea have left the party. Rodrigo Lara also sent in his resignation as a member to the party, which told him that he was never a member - I think Lara did that just to troll Galán, which is pretty funny.

Under the constitution (since 2015) and the opposition statute, the runner-up presidential and vice presidential elections are automatically entitled to a seat in the Senate and the House respectively. Both Rodolfo and his former running mate, Marelen Castillo, have now both announced that they would take their seats -- I'm honestly quite surprised Rodolfo accepted his seat, given that he thinks that legislative deliberative bodies are a waste of time and stupid and that he dislikes being in Bogotá for long periods of time. Both have said that they're open to participating in Petro's dialogue, and both have said they would not be formally in opposition - which has raised the interesting matter of whether those who will hold congressional seats by virtue of the opposition statute need to be in opposition.

As for the congressional leadership now. The presidencies of both houses (and other leadership positions in both houses) have one year terms (one legislative year or legislatura, July 20 to June 20). Usually, a coalition of governing parties agree in advance to share the presidencies of both houses over the congressional term. The first year is perhaps the most important as it is when the new president's congressional coalition is supposed to be at its strongest, and when the new government needs to pass the national development plan for the next 4 years and tries to pass the biggest items on its policy agenda including constitutional reforms. In the first year, the tradition holds that the largest party in the respective house holds the presidency for that year - now, this would imply that the Pacto holds the presidency of the Senate, and the Liberals can get the presidency of the House. The former seems to be set in stone now.

After a caucus meeting attended by Petro, the Pacto agreed on Roy Barreras as its candidate for president of the Senate. Barreras is a quintessential traditional politician - senator since 2010, representative for a term before that, president of the Senate already in 2012-13 - who has been, in succession, pastranista, uribista, santista and (since 2021) petrista, and has managed to be a convincingly passionate and vocal defender of each of them. He is now Petro's ruthless and shrewd political/congressional operator, as we saw in the Petrovideos, who knows the workings of Congress inside and out. Barreras is very much a pragmatic pick: a well known incumbent with ties with other parties (and not hated by his colleagues), a guy who has already been on the government's side (instead of always in the opposition, like most of the Pacto), an inside knowledge of how Congress operates, a skilled operator who can ensure the success of the government's agenda. He is also controversial because he's very much a traditional politician with the habits, behaviour and principles of the old world, so hardly 'change'.

His nomination has led to the first public divisions in the Pacto post-election. His two rivals for the job, Gustavo Bolívar (Petro's right-hand man in the Senate since 2018, controversial and hated by other senators, who pointedly did not elect him as second vice president - the opposition's reserved spot - in 2021) and Polo party president and veteran senator Alexander López (in the Senate since 2006), both criticized Barreras' nomination, saying it was not democratic, concerted or after dialogue.

In cabinet speculation, so far it is mostly speculation. There has, however, been one official appointment, on Saturday: Álvaro Leyva, a senior Conservative politician, will be foreign minister. Leyva has been representative (in the 1970s), senator (in the 1980s), member of the constituent assembly in 1991, minister of mines (under Belisario Betancur) and failed presidential candidate in 2006 (withdrew) and 2010 (lost in the Conservative primary). But most importantly Leyva has worked tirelessly for peace since the 1980s, and developed close ties with the FARC leadership - so close that he became seen as their negotiator, or at least their preferred intermediary with governments. He played a crucial role in the negotiations for the transitional justice section of the peace agreement with the FARC. Some on the right will dislike his appointment because of his past proximity to the old FARC's leadership, but he can be a talented diplomat. Especially when you consider Duque's foreign ministers lol.

The most sensitive portfolios will be finance and defence. For finance, everything suggests that Petro will pick a moderate rather than a leftist, to reassure the markets. For defence, Petro will wait until the last minute to fill that portfolio, given the current makeup of the military leadership (far-right hawks with an old internal conflict mentality) and the tensions between the military leadership and the incoming government.

In foreign policy news, Petro's foreign policy, without even being in office yet, is already more successful than Duque's foreign policy. Not that this is very difficult. On June 21, two days after his victory, he had a phone call with Biden. Duque waited 5 months after Biden's inauguration for a phone call. Petro also talked with Nicolás Maduro, and Petro announced that the border with Venezuela would be reopened. The border is not entirely closed today, but it remains effectively closed for vehicles and merchandise, since Venezuela unilaterally shut the border in 2019 after Duque supported Guaido. Diosdado Cabello has said that he would like to attend the inauguration in August. This would be a big mistake by Petro, so I don't really see it happening.

[icc]

Ingrid Betancourt, who supported Rodolfo in the end, has also said she would be in opposition, which is terrible news for the opposition. It is unclear whether this goes for her party as well (I feel like it will, she clearly runs the thing as her personal vanity project with no discussions allowed), but in any case this will be problematic for the party's only two congressmen: Humberto de la Calle (Senate) and Daniel Carvalho (House), who are both leaning more towards being independent.

Is it not the case that the decision is taken by the members in Congress, rather than the party as a whole? In which case there isn't a lot Betancourt could do about it if de la Calle and Carvalho don't want to be in opposition (particularly as de la Calle clearly has zero time for her since she left the Centro Esperanza coalition).

The Nuevo Liberalismo's sad and pathetic transformation into the Galán brothers support group continues. The party leadership (that is, Galán) wants to declare the party independent, after having endorsed Rodolfo in the runoff. The party's members who endorsed Petro, led by former top candidate Mabel Lara (as well as Yolanda Perea, Afro-Colombian feminist leader who was also on the Senate list in March), asked that there be instead an honest and open dialogue with the incoming government and that the party should be part of the 'transformations'. To which Galán responded with a curt statement in which he says that he's the boss and that all the decisions are to be taken by him only.

Quite astonishing how badly the Galáns have played their hand. They could surely have accommodated people like Lara / Marulanda without giving up effective control of the party, and almost certainly could have done with Lara and Perea, but seems like their heads have been too far up their own asses to work out any kind of effective strategy.

A shame, as the party did seem to have some genuine promise even after some of the criticisms had come to light, and ran some very interesting and promising candidates for Congress (including the one they actually managed to get elected).

[MRCVzla]

Serious question, is there a more right wing area in South America than El Poblado in Medellín? Those 85+% victories of the right that are common there must be something rare even among the wealthiest boroughs/neighborhoods in the continent.

I live in one of the most "wealthiest"/"anti-chavista" municipality in Venezuela, Diego Bautista Urbaneja in Anzoátegui state (northeastern), has around +40k inhabitants and 35k registered voters in a 12 km2 area with a lot of beaches, residential areas and a turistic complex built in the 70s, very Miami-esque. When there was high mobilization of opposition voters (pre-2017), the MUD always scored above 80% of valid votes: 83.9% in 2010 parliamentary, 82.0% in 2012 Capriles first run, 83.2% in 2013 Capriles second run and 86.7 in 2015 parliamentary majority (an average 2/3 overall turnout by itself). After 2018 in the "electoral type event" era, turnout droped from an 74-83% to 11-15%, in the last regional/local elections in 2021 turnout was up into 28% but with the opposition going divided (MUD 54% splinters 21%, still chavismo in an average scenario scores around 20% valid votes or below/6-7% overall turnout).

The other top wealthiest/anti-chavista municipality are in the Caracas Eastern area, Chacao with +85k registered voters (2010-2015: turnout 63-73% - opposition 81.3-85.9% valid; 2018-2020: turnout  11-14% - 26% in 2021) or El Hatillo (+55k registered voters, 2010-15: turnout 68-80% - opposition 81.6-85.8%; 2018-20 turnout 12-15% - 30% in 2021).

As for boroughs (parroquias), the most anti-chavista is definitely San José (Valencia, Carabobo state) with +100k registered voters, in 2015 they voted 91.7% for the MUD list with a 71% turnout, in the 2018 presidential type event just 9.4% showed up to the poll (and only 4.9% of them voted for Maduro) and in the 2020 parliamentary type event was even more below with 6.1% (3.5% voted for the PSUV-led list). In the 2021 regional election, the turnout in this borough was up just to 18% (valid votes: MUD 47.7% PSUV 37.4% Bertucci 8.3%, combined opposition 56%, way below they used to be like in my city). Of course the reason of still low turnout in this wealthy areas are more motivated by the massive diaspora in urban areas rather than abstentionism/political skepticism.
(End Off Topic)

On Topic, seems the Petro future administration is giving an early "national unity" vibes in order to pass legislation at least in the first year, still uncertain is how much he and the Pacto are going to conceed until they brokeup, radicalize or whatever will happens in order to put things in order (unequality, peace, security, social justice...), just wait and see but ofc the best for the Colombian people.