Colombian Local and Regional Elections - 27 October 2019

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Regional and local elections are being held in Colombia on 27 October 2019. Voters will elect 1,101 mayors, 32 departmental governors, members of municipal councils (concejos municipales), members of departmental assemblies (asambleas, members are known as diputados) and members of local administrative boards (juntas administradoras locales or JAL). Primaries, where requested by parties, will be held on 26 May 2019. Office holders currently serve four year terms, which in this case will begin on January 1, 2020. Mayors and governors may not immediately seek reelection, but may serve non-consecutive terms. For now (but probably not for long, and maybe not for people elected in 2019), there are no term limits for municipal councillors, assembly members and JAL members.

Since 1991, Colombia is a "unitary decentralized republic with autonomy of its territorial entities". Territorial entities are constitutionally defined as departments, districts, municipalities and indigenous territories (which have self-government) although the law may grant the status of territorial entity to regions and provinces (which hasn't happened yet). Between 1886 and 1991, Colombia was one of the most centralized countries in South America (modelled around republican France until the 1980s) - governors were appointed by the president, and mayors were appointed by the governor (until a constitutional reform in 1986). While the rather powerless councils and assemblies were directly elected, the first direct mayoral elections took place in 1988 and the first direct gubernatorial elections took place in 1992. In practice, Colombia remains a fairly centralized country, probably in large part because territorial entities have a weak fiscal capacity in all but a few cases (*and are often run by incompetent morons and/or criminals), although the governors of larger departments and mayors of the largest cities have become important political figures and the mayor of Bogotá is often said to be "the second most important public office in Colombia" (behind the President).

As far as elected local office holders are concerned, Colombia's territorial organization is fairly simple - the 32 departments are the first-order administrative divisions (think: states or provinces), while the 1,101 municipalities are the second-order administrative divisions. Bogotá is the Capital District (Distrito Capital) and has a special status, as it is not part of any department (and usually gets counted as a municipality). It's only once you get nerdier, digging into the weeds of it all, that Colombia's territorial organization becomes messier and confusing - with administrative regions, special districts, metropolitan areas, provinces, corregimientos departamentales, comunas/localidades and corregimientos municipales.

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Territorial organization of Colombia

As I previously said, Colombia's territorial organization appears fairly simple - the 32 departments are the first-level administrative divisions (think: states or provinces), while the 1,101 municipalities are the second-level administrative divisions. Bogotá is the Capital District (Distrito Capital) and has a special status, as it is not part of any department (and usually gets counted as a municipality). But once you get nerdier, Colombia's territorial organization becomes messier and confusing - with administrative regions, special districts, metropolitan areas, provinces, corregimientos departamentales, comunas/localidades and corregimientos municipales. I suppose it is an impossible topic to master completely (and I don't really see why you really should), but I'll try to explain it in some amount of detail.

Colombia is a "unitary decentralized republic with autonomy of its territorial entities" (art. 1, Const.). Territorial entities are constitutionally defined as departments, districts, municipalities and indigenous territories (which have self-government). Territorial entities enjoy autonomy for the management of their interests, within the limits of the Constitution and the law, and have the right to govern themselves by their own authorities, exercise the powers that correspond to them, manage fiscal resources and establish the necessary taxes for fulfillment of their functions and to participate in national revenues.

Decentralization - administrative, political and fiscal - in Colombia is recent, only dating back to the 1991 Constitution, which defined the country as a "unitary decentralized republic", enshrining the autonomy of territorial entities and providing for the direct election of both mayors and governors (direct election of mayors was introduced in 1986). Decentralization was a key element of the democratization of Colombia's political system in the 1991 Constitution, responding to popular demands for greater political participation and implicitly recognizing the country's significant regional diversity. The 1886 Constitution, a conservative and positivist reaction to the chaos of the ultra-federalist Rionegro Constitution of 1863, established an ultra-centralist unitary state inspired in part by France. Governors were appointed by the president, and mayors in turn were appointed by the governor. Only in 1968 was the constitution amended to recognize the 'independence' of departments to manage their own affairs, and only in 1986 was the constitution amended to allow for the direct election of mayors (the first elections took place in 1988).

The centralization of power prior to the late 1980s was symbolic of Colombia's exclusivist political system. Governors were appointed by the president, and mayors in turn were appointed by the governor. As a result, opposition political movements outside the old two-party system were effectively excluded from power at the local level, which favoured the consolidation of exclusivist, authoritarian regional political cultures and institutional structures in which political minorities were depreciated as 'extremists' or 'marginals'. Decentralization after the 1980s opened the possibility for third parties and movements outside the old duopoly to gain power or, at least, representation. However, while decentralization was imagined, in theory, to re-legitimize a broken political system by fomenting participative democracy and democratizing local governance, it also resulted in violent competition for power and provided a very favourable opportunity structure for criminal interests and all illegal armed groups. Local governments' revenues increased, but remained dependent on transfers from the central government and had far weaker repressive capacities than the state, while traditional local elites became increasingly vulnerable both to intimidation by illegal groups and pressures for democratization from above and below. Illegal groups, but also legal or 'hybrid' corrupt/criminal private interests (contractors, businesses and corporations), have taken advantage of decentralization to infiltrate and 'capture' local and regional governments and access to public funds.

32 Departments

Colombia is divided into 32 departments (departamentos). Article 298 of the Constitution defines the autonomy and general role of departments:

The departments enjoy autonomy for the administration of sectional matters as well as the planning and promotion of economic and social development within their territory, within the limits established by the Constitution.

The departments exercise administrative functions of coordination, of complementarity with municipal action, of intermediation between the nation and the municipalities, and the provision of services determined by the Constitution and the laws.

Departments were created in 1886, replacing the sovereign states of the federal United States of Colombia (1863-1886). Departments had also previously existed under the Gran Colombia between 1819 and 1830, the present-day territory of Colombia being subdivided into one and, after 1824, four departments; between 1835 and 1858, the first-level administrative divisions were known as provinces. There were nine departments in 1886 (including Panamá), 14 in 1910, 16 in 1952, 21 in 1966 and 23 in 1990. Prior to 1991, sparsely-populated peripheral areas were directly administered by the central government as commissariats (comisarías) and intendencies (intendencias), commonly known as the national territories (territorios nacionales). The 1991 Constitution elevated all nine national territories to the rank of departments.



Each department is administered by a directly-elected governor (gobernador), who is the head of the local administration/legal representative of the department as well as the agent of the President for the maintenance of public order and implementation of national policy. Governors are elected for four-year terms by FPTP, and may not serve consecutive terms. The governor manages and coordinates the public administration of the department (appointing and dismissing public officials, including managers of public enterprises etc.); promotes the cultural, social and economic development of the department; appoints members of his/her cabinet (known as secretaries, or secretarios de despacho) presents projects of ordinances to the departmental assembly and enforces the Constitution, national laws and departmental ordinances.

The departmental assembly (asamblea departamental) is a directly-elected deliberative body, made up of no less than 11 members and no more than 31 members according to the Constitution. In practice, the largest assembly, that of Antioquia, currently has 26 members while the smallest ones have 11 members. For the first time following these elections following a 2015 constitutional reform, the first runner-up in gubernatorial elections will obtain an ex officio seat in the departmental assembly. Members of departmental assemblies are known as deputies (diputados) and are elected for four-year terms, with no term limits, using the same electoral system as in congressional elections (open or closed-list proportional representation using the d'Hondt/cifra repartidora method, the threshold is half the quota). Departmental assemblies are not legislative bodies, and are instead 'political-administrative bodies' which adopt their decisions through ordinances and resolutions. Assemblies as deliberative bodies enact regulations on matters within their areas of responsibility, decree local taxes and levies, adopt development plans, authorize the governor to sign contracts and negotiate loans and determine the structure of the departmental administration. Like Congress, assemblies also exercise 'political control' (oversight) and they may, since 2007, summon cabinet secretaries to oversight hearings and propose motions of no confidence against cabinet secretaries (removal requires a two-thirds majority). Departmental assemblies have been directly elected since 1905.

Bogotá has a special status as the Capital District and is not part of any department, but is nevertheless the capital of the department of Cundinamarca (despite not being part of that department).

The department of the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina (i.e. San Andrés and Providencia) has special, additional powers recognized by the Constitution on matters including local administration, immigration, land use, culture, taxation, environmental preservation, foreign trade, finance and economic development. San Andrés and Providencia is a free trade zone with a special customs and taxation regime (no customs tariffs, reduced consumption tax, VAT exemptions on certain transactions, special contribution for tourists and temporary residents) as well as special immigration rules (special permanent and temporary residency statuses, population density controls).

1,101 Municipalities

Colombia has 1,101 municipalities (municipios) or districts, including Bogotá (Capital District). Although they are second-level administrative divisions, municipalities are, under the 1991 Constitution, the "fundamental entity of the political-administrative division of the state". Article 311 of the Constitution defines the basic functions of municipalities:

As the fundamental entity of the political-administrative division of the State, it is the responsibility of the municipality to provide those public services determined by law, to build the projects required for local progress, to arrange for the development of its territory, to promote community participation, the social and cultural betterment of its inhabitants, and to execute the other functions assigned to it by the Constitution and the laws.

Municipalities have some important powers and responsibilities including land use/spatial planning, promoting local development, local security, housing, provision of utilities, public transit, school lunches and local roads.

Municipalities, originally known as municipal districts (distritos municipales), were formally created by the 1886 Constitution. Prior to 1886, first-level administrative subdivisions were further subdivided into provinces or cantons, themselves made up of parochial and later municipal districts.

Municipalities are created by ordinances of departmental assemblies at the initiative of the governor, the assembly or citizens, conditional on fulfilling certain requirements: new municipalities must have an 'identity', a population of at least 25,000 (raised from 7,000 in 2012), minimum revenue levels, a study by the departmental planning body on the viability and socioeconomic suitability of the new municipality and that the new municipality does not remove more than a third of the territory of the existing municipalit(y/ies). The creation of the new municipality must then be approved by voters in a referendum. 65 municipalities have been created since 1993. The newest municipalities were created in 2007.

There are currently a total of 1,101 municipalities in Colombia (numbers do seem to inexplicably vary between different government agencies, but this is the number according to the official administrative divisions of the statistical agency DANE). Antioquia (125) and Boyacá (123) have the most municipalities, while Guainía and the Archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia have only one municipality. Five municipalities, including Bogotá, have over one million inhabitants (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena) and another 94 have over 100,000 inhabitants. Taraira (Vaupés) is the least populated municipality, with an estimated population just over 900 (it is also the only municipality with a population of less than 1,000 according to current population estimates). The largest municipality by land area, Cumaribo (Vichada) is larger than countries like Croatia, the Netherlands and Denmark. Unlike in some other Latin American countries, most Colombian municipalities have the same name as the municipal seat (cabecera municipal). About 38 municipalities have a different name than their municipal seat.

Some parts of the Colombian territory are not part of any municipality. The island of San Andrés is not a municipality and is directly administered by the department since the municipality was abolished in 1972 (leaving the island of Providencia as the department's only municipality). Large, remote and very sparsely populated areas of the Amazon in the departments of Amazonas, Vaupés and Guainía are directly administered by the department as corregimientos departamentales, of which there are currently 20. The few inhabitants in those regions do not elect mayors or municipal councillors.

The mayor (alcalde) is the head of the local administration and the highest police authority of the municipality. Mayors are elected for four-year terms by FPTP, and may not serve for consecutive terms. The mayor manages and coordinates the public administration of the municipality (appointing and dismissing public officials, including managers of public enterprises etc.); maintains public order as the highest police authority; promotes local development; appoints members of his/her cabinet (known as secretaries); presents proposals to the council and enforces the Constitution, national laws departmental ordinances and local resolutions. Mayors dictate decrees, resolutions and orders.

The municipal council (concejo municipal) is a directly-elected deliberative body made up of no less than 7 members and no more than 21 members. The size of the municipal council - always an odd number - varies according to the municipal population, with cities of over 1,000,000 inhabitants electing 21 councillors and municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants electing 7. For the first time following these elections following a 2015 constitutional reform, the first runner-up in mayoral elections will obtain an ex officio seat in the municipal council. In 2015, 12,063 councillors were elected in Colombia. Councillors (concejales) are elected for four-year terms, with no term limits, using the same electoral system as in congressional and assembly elections. Municipal councils are deliberative, not legislative, bodies which adopt their decisions through agreements (acuerdos). Councils enact regulations on matters and services within their areas of responsibility, decree local taxes and levies, adopt development plans, adopt the budget, regulate land use, authorize the mayor to sign contracts and determine the structure of the local administration. Councils also exercise 'political control' (oversight) and they may, since 2007, summon cabinet secretaries to oversight hearings and propose motions of no confidence against cabinet secretaries (removal requires a two-thirds majority). Municipal councils have been directly elected since their creation in 1886.

All decisions made by the mayor or the council must be revised by the governor who may, for reasons of unconstitutionality or illegality, refer them to the competent court to decide on their validity.

Comunas and corregimientos

Municipal councils may divide the municipality into comunas (in urban areas) and corregimientos (in rural areas), "in order to improve the provision of services and ensure the participation of citizens in the management of local public affairs". Comunas are usually made up of one or more neighbourhoods (barrios), while corregimientos are made up of several veredas. By law, comunas in larger municipalities must have a population of at least 10,000 while in smaller municipalities they must have a population of at least 5,000.

Each comuna and corregimiento has a directly-elected Local Administrative Board (Junta Administradora Local, JAL) made up of no less than 3 and no more than 9 members, who are known as aldermen (ediles) and serve four-year terms with no term limits. The JALs participate in the elaboration of municipal plans and programs, oversee and control the provision of local services, formulate investment proposals, deliver non-binding statements about new building projects, promote local small businesses, encourage civic participation and other powers which may be delegated to it by the municipal council. JALs were created in 1968.

I can't find the total number of comunas/corregimientos in Colombia, but there are over 700 and, in 2014, 4,755 aldermen were elected to JALs.

Bogotá, D.C.

Bogotá, the capital of Colombia and of the department of Cundinamarca, is administered as the Capital District (Distrito Capital, DC) under a special administrative system. Historically part of Cundinamarca, Bogotá briefly existed separately as the federal district between 1861 and 1864 and as the capital district between 1905 and 1909. In 1954, Bogotá was made a Special District (Distrito Especial), administratively separate from Cundinamarca, and with the annexation of the neighbouring municipalities of Bosa, Engativá, Fontibón, Suba, Usme and Usaquén (as well as parts of Sumapaz) it gained its current boundaries. With the 1991 Constitution, Bogotá became the Capital District. Bogotá is neither a department nor a municipality (but often gets counted as a municipality, and its institutions and administrative system closely resemble that of municipalities), and as a de facto first-level administrative division, Bogotá holds the powers and responsibilities of both a department and municipality (it also receives financial transfers directly from the central government).

The Senior/Superior Mayor of Bogotá (Alcalde Mayor), the head of the local administration, is directly elected for a four-year term by FPTP and may not serve consecutive terms. A constitutional reform to hold a second round in mayoral elections in Bogotá if no candidate obtains an absolute majority (or maybe 40% with a 10% lead over second) is currently being debated in Congress, and has three debates left to go. There are also proposals to extend the provisions for runoffs to all gubernatorial elections and mayoral elections in municipalities with over 500,000 inhabitants. If adopted this year, however, it would only apply beginning in 2023.

The mayor of Bogotá's duties and powers are broadly similar to those of other mayors in the country, but because of the size and importance of the city, the office is often considered as the second most important elected office in Colombia after the President. The office is not a springboard to the presidency (only one elected mayor, Andrés Pastrana, later went on to become president), but most mayors have sought the presidency, either before or after their terms.

Bogotá's city council, officially known as the District Council (Concejo Distrital), is made up of 45 directly-elected councillors who serve four-year terms (with no term limits). The council's duties and powers are, again, broadly similar to those of municipal councils elsewhere in the country.

Bogotá is divided into twenty localities (localidades), the equivalents of comunas. Each locality has a directly-elected JAL, made up of at least 7 aldermen (ediles), and a local mayor (alcalde local). Local mayors are appointed by the senior mayor from a list of three names selected by the respective JAL, and local mayors may be dismissed at any time by the senior mayor. Localities have somewhat greater powers than comunas, notably managing and distributing a small portion of the city's budget (earmarked for 'local development') and having some powers over the use of public spaces.
 

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Other administrative divisions

The Constitution and laws allow for and have created a large number of other administrative divisions or structures, not all of which are territorial entities. In most cases, these other administrative divisions/structures remain poorly or incompletely planned and implemented, resulting in a confusing and haphazard jumble lacking any coherence (and, perhaps most importantly, often lacking money to do anything). I don't really understand the complete purpose or intricacies of most of these, and I kind of doubt most congressmen actually do either.

Districts

Besides the special case of Bogotá, some other municipalities in Colombia are also legally recognized as districts (distritos) rather than normal municipalities. Districts are, for the most part, equivalent to municipalities and they are also territorial entities. A Constitutional Court sentence from 2009 described districts as "territorial entities different from municipalities, endowed with an independent political, fiscal and administrative legal regime". In general, districts are supposed to be municipalities with some kind of special feature or defining characteristic - harbours/ports, tourism, cultural events, historical sites and so forth.

There are currently nine districts in Colombia: Barranquilla ('Special Industrial and Port District'), Buenaventura ('Special Industrial, Port, Biodiverse and Eco-touristic District'), Cali ('Special Sports, Cultural, Tourist, Business and Services District'), Cartagena ('Tourist and Cultural District'), Santa Marta ('Tourist, Cultural and Historical District'), Riohacha ('Special Tourist and Cultural District'), Mompox ('Special Tourist, Cultural and Historical District'), Tumaco ('Special Industrial, Port, Biodiverse and Eco-touristic District') and Turbo ('Port, Logistical, Industrial, Tourist and Commercial District'). Cartagena and Santa Marta were declared districts in 1987 and 1989 respectively, and their status was preserved by the new constitution in 1991. Barranquilla was declared a district in 1993, while Buenaventura was declared a district in 2007. A 2007 constitutional reform declaring the cities of Cúcuta, Popayán, Tunja, Buenaventura, Turbo and Tumaco as districts, but in 2009 the Constitutional Court ruled that the inclusion of all other cities besides Buenaventura were unconstitutional for procedural reasons.

In 2013, Congress finally adopted a law establishing the 'regime for special districts', including requirements for the creation of new districts. Unlike municipalities, districts are created by laws passed by Congress, and require prior consent from the respective municipal councils and the commission of territorial organization. Districts must have a population of at least 600,000 or be located in coastal areas, with potential for the development of harbours or for tourism and culture, being either departmental capitals or on border municipalities. Municipalities which have been declared as UNESCO World Heritage Sites are exempted from these rules. Riohacha (La Guajira) was established as a district in 2015, followed by Mompox (Bolívar) in 2017, and Cali (Valle), Tumaco (Nariño) and Turbo (Antioquia) in 2018.

Districts have greater powers than municipalities, notably to regulate tourism, culture, recreational activities and environmental protection as well as in the promotion and coordination of economic development. For example, districts have the power to manage, administer and regulate the use of public touristic, industrial, historical, recreational and cultural property. The law allows districts to have direct access to the central government and departments in matters like tourism, culture, economic and social development. One of the common justifications for the creation of special districts is to better promote economic and social development in lower-income municipalities (like Buenaventura, Tumaco, Turbo, Riohacha...), although it is not clear if the special status is of any real value in the long-term (it hasn't in Buenaventura).

Like Bogotá, districts are subdivided into localities (localidades), which each have a directly-elected JAL and a local mayor appointed by the district mayor (alcalde distrital) from a list of three names selected by the JAL. Like in Bogotá, localities have greater prerogatives than comunas and administer a small budget (local development fund). At least 10% of the district's revenues are earmarked for the localities.

Metropolitan areas

The Constitution allows two or more municipalities which are linked by various dynamics (economic, territorial, social, cultural, demographic etc.) to form metropolitan areas (Áreas Metropolitanas) in order to program and coordinate the harmonious and integrated development of the territory, rationalize the delivery of public services, jointly provide some of them and execute projects of metropolitan interest. Metropolitan areas are not territorial entities but have a separate legal personality, administrative autonomy and a special administrative and fiscal regime.

Metropolitan areas were created by a constitutional amendment in 1968, and first regulated by government decree in 1979. According to current legislation (2013), metropolitan areas may be created at the initiative of a governor, mayors, a third of councillors or 5% of citizens of the respective municipalities. A referendum on the proposal is held in each of the municipalities within three to five months, and approval requires an absolute majority and at least 25% turnout in each municipality. The integration of other municipalities into an existing metropolitan area follows the same procedure, except that the turnout quorum in the referendum is lower (5%). The metropolitan area is then created through an administrative act by the mayors and presidents of the municipal councils of the municipalities.

Each metropolitan area has a Metropolitan Board (Junta Metropolitana), which is made up of the mayors of all municipalities, a representative from the core municipality's municipal council, a representative from the other municipal councils, a non-voting permanent delegate of the central government and one representative from local NGOs dedicated to 'environmental protection and renewable natural resources'. The President of the Metropolitan Board (Presidente de la Junta Metropolitana) is the mayor of the core (largest) municipality, while the vice president is a mayor of one of the other municipalities elected by the board's members for a one-year term. There is also a director of the metropolitan area, a senior bureaucrat and the metropolitan area's legal representative; the director is selected by the metropolitan board from a list of three candidates submitted by the mayor of the core municipality.

Metropolitan areas are responsible for identifying and regulating metropolitan issues (phenomena affecting two or more municipalities), coordinating the provision of public services, executing public works project of a metropolitan nature, adopting integrated metropolitan public/mass transit policies (including setting fares), adopting a comprehensive metropolitan development plan and acting as the environmental authority in the urban perimeter, among other powers. Metropolitan areas receive a share of some local property tax revenues as well as contributions from municipalities.

The law allows for metropolitan areas to become districts, which would have the effect of merging all municipalities (and merged municipalities becoming localities), but this has not happened to date and, as far as I know, there is no serious discussing of this happening for any of the current metropolitan areas.

There are six legally recognized and configured metropolitan areas in Colombia: the Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Aburrá (Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá; Medellín) created in 1980, Metropolitan Area of Bucaramanga (Área Metropolitana de Bucaramanga) created in 1981, the Metropolitan Area of Barranquilla (Área Metropolitana de Barranquilla) created in 1981, the Metropolitan Area of the Centre West (Área Metropolitana de Centro Occidente; Pereira) created in 1981, the Metropolitan Area of Cúcuta (Área Metropolitana de Cúcuta) created in 1991 and the Metropolitan Area of Valledupar (Área Metropolitana de Valledupar) created in 2005. Medellín's metropolitan area is the oldest and largest (10 municipalities, over 4.2 million inhabitants) of the metropolitan areas. There are another 15 or so de facto but not legally configured metropolitan areas, like the metropolitan area of Bogotá, which only exist for statistical purposes and do not have the institutions of a metropolitan area.

Provinces

Provinces (provincias) are, according to the Constitution, formed by neighbouring municipalities or indigenous territories belonging to the same department. Although the constitution does allow for the central government or departments to devolve some powers to provinces, and even for provinces to be legally recognized as territorial entities, in practice provinces have no power or separate institutions and are mostly used for administrative, planning and statistical purposes. Many provinces correspond to historical or cultural sub-regions within departments. There are 106 provinces in Colombia, in all departments except the departments in the Amazon and Llanos/Orinoquía (except Meta). In some departments like Antioquia or Huila, provinces are known as sub-regions.

Confusingly, the 2011 organic law of territorial organization (LOOT) provides for the creation of 'administrative and planning provinces' (Provincias administrativas y de planificación, PAP), similar to metropolitan areas but with less resources and fewer powers.

Regions

The Constitution allows two or more departments to create administrative and planning regions (Regiones administrativas y de planificación, RAP), which may later be transformed into territorial entities (Regiones entidades territoriales, RET). Political interest in the creation of regions associating two or more departments is fairly recent, and received a major impetus with the 2011 LOOT, which finally (20 years later) legally regulated the creation and powers of RAPs. The aim of regions is to promote regional socioeconomic development and regional investment and competitiveness.

According to said law, RAPs are formed by the governors of two or or more geographically contiguous departments, with prior opinion of the Senate's territorial organization commission and prior approval of their respective departmental assemblies. Regions have a regional administrative and planning council made up of the governors of the region and mayors of the metropolitan areas in the region. Since 2014, 18 departments and Bogotá have joined four RAPs - the special Central Region (RAPE Región Central) created in 2014 (Bogotá, Cundinamarca, Boyacá, Tolima and Meta), the Pacific RAP (Chocó, Valle, Cauca, Nariño) created in 2017, the Caribbean RAP (Bolívar, Magdalena, La Guajira, Sucre, Córdoba, Cesar, Atlántico) created in 2017 and the Eje Cafetero RAP (Caldas, Risaralda, Quindío) created in 2018. An Amazonia RAP (Huila, Putumayo, Caquetá, Guaviare, Vaupés, Guainía and Amazonas) is in the process of being created. This leaves 7 departments which are not part of any region (Antioquia, Santander, Norte de Santander, Arauca, Casanare, Vichada and San Andrés).

A 'regions law', which supporters are hailing as a major step forward in the decentralization and regionalization process, has been approved by both houses of Congress and is pending final conciliation in Congress and presidential promulgation. This new law would more clearly define the powers of RAPs (the most substantive being to lead projects of regional interest) and their sources of revenues, as well as the conditions for their future conversion into RETs. As currently envisioned, RAPs are basically talking shop associations of departments with few substantive powers besides vaguely worded goals of 'promoting' regional development, the generation of institutional capacities or the incorporation of a regional emphasis in planning, or providing technical advice to territorial entities on regional issues. According to the bill, RAPs' investment revenues would come from contributions of the departments, loans authorized on its behalf by departments and co-financing from the national budget. The bill also provides for the conversion of RAPs into RETs, after 2022. RAPs would be able to convert into RETs after at least five years of existence, at the request of its departmental governors (with consent of the assemblies), following the adoption of a law in Congress and approval in a regional referendum. RETs would have enjoy more budgetary autonomy (although its sources of revenue would be similar to RAPs) and have greater powers to formulate, adopt and implement regional policies and projects. The central government would also devolve specific powers to RETs.

The 'regions law' has largely been spearheaded by congressmen from the Caribbean region, Atlántico governor Eduardo Verano (a longstanding proponent of regional autonomy and decentralization for the Caribbean) and been supported by the federation of departmental governors. It has, however, received significant pushback from Antioquia's congressmen and the finance ministry. The former are skeptical of the idea of regionalization because Antioquia is not part of any region (and seems unlikely to join an existing one) and are worried that the new regions will affect the distribution of financial transfers from the central government to departments and municipalities. The finance ministry is also opposed to the law, and may push President Duque to veto it, because they evaluate that the law would have a fiscal impact and that the national budget cannot be used to finance regional projects or regions' operating costs.

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Early polls:

Bogotá

Claudia López (Green) 47%
Carlos Fernando Galán (Ind.) 9%
Miguel Uribe (Avancemos/Liberal) 5%
Hollman Morris (MAIS) 5%
Luis Eduardo 'Lucho' Garzón (En Marcha) 4%
Ángela Garzón (CD) 2%
Jorge Rojas (UP) 1%
Celio Nieves (Polo) 1%
Luis Ernesto Gómez (Activista) 1%
María Andrea Nieto (Ind.) 0%

None 18%
DK/DA 7%

Claudia López is off to a very strong start; while undoubtedly partly thanks to her victory in the Green nomination contest two weeks ago, 47% (!) is a very impressive number for any candidate this early (when most are undecided) and isn't just the result of strong name recognition. This confirms that she is still the early favourite and the candidate to beat (and that beating her won't be easy). However, being an early favourite is not necessarily a good thing: most early favourites in Colombian elections go on to lose. One thing which is still playing out in her favour is that the rest of the field, which hasn't yet been 'cleared out', remains extremely divided. Former senator Carlos Fernando Galán (the son of Liberal martyr Luis Carlos Galán, assassinated in 1989), who has just formally announced his candidacy (as yet another 'civic' candidate, having left CR a year ago), is a very distant second, probably largely by virtue of name recognition. But Galán could stand a solid chance as a 'third way' centrist candidate (which is what basically everyone in the race is trying to be). Particularly if he joins forces with Lucho Garzón, the first left-wing mayor of Bogotá (2003-07), now seeking a spot as a 'third way' centrist with the backing of former interior ministers Juan Fernando Cristo and Guillermo Rivera's Liberal dissident movement En Marcha (lol).

On the 'right', uribista candidate Ángela Garzón is still very low (but has room to grow if uribistas rally around her) and she is surpassed by Miguel Uribe Turbay (endorsed by the Liberals), Peñalosa's former secretary of government (2016-18) and the 'continuity' candidate -- which explains why Garzón backed out of an open primary against Miguel Uribe. On the 'left', the two petrista candidates - Hollman Morris and Jorge Rojas (who both have ballot access secured thanks to endorsements from recognized parties) - are unsurprisingly weak (5% and 1%), although Hollman Morris - despite the recent accusations of sexual harassment/violence (by his wife and two other women) and his refusal to drop out (because women are liars/it's all a right-wing conspiracy etc. etc.) - is the strongest (probably because of name recognition: nobody knows who Jorge Rojas, a former Petro cabinet member, is but more people know Hollman Morris, an incumbent city councillor and manager of the city's public TV channel Canal Capital during Petro's term). Petro hasn't given his support to any of the two and, given their weakness and Morris' #MeToo scandal (with petrista women - like Petro's 2018 running-mate Ángela María Robledo - calling on him to drop out), he is desperately seeking out a stronger third candidate and/or trying to negotiate a deal with Claudia López from a position of strength. The Polo's candidate, city councillor Celio Nieves, and former vice minister of the interior (2017-18) Luis Ernesto Gómez (founder of the 'new politics' progressive civic movement Activista) are the other two potential candidates who may end up dropping out to support Claudia López.

Medellín

Aníbal Gaviria (Liberal) 15%
Alfredo Ramos Maya (CD) 9%
Daniel Quintero (Ind.) 5%
Jesús Aníbal Echeverri (La U) 4%
Carlos Alberto Zuluaga (Conservative) 2%
Juan Carlos Vélez Uribe (Ind./ex-CD) 2%
Ana Cristina Moreno (CD) 2%
Jaime Cuartas (Green) 2%
Fabio Humberto Rivera (Liberal) 2%
Santiago Jaramillo (Ind./ex-CD) 1%
Luis Bernardo Vélez (Col. Renaciente) 1%
Víctor Correa Vélez (Polo) 1%
Jaime Mejía (CD) 1%
Nicolás Duque Ossa (CD) 1%
Santiago Gómez Barrera (Creemos) 1%
Beatriz Rave (Green) 1%
Aura Marleny Arcila (Liberal) 1%
Enrique Olano Asuad (Ind.) 1%
All others at 0%

None 26%
DK/DA 22%

Meanwhile, in Medellín, the field remains very messy and divided. Former mayor (2011-15) and governor (2003-07) Aníbal Gaviria, who hasn't yet made up his mind about running for either governor or mayor, is leading, I imagine largely because of name recognition. If/when he decides to enter either race, he'd be the early favourite, would likely quickly receive the Liberal endorsement and could attract uribista votes (his sister, former senator Sofia Gaviria, was just appointed ambassador to Switzerland and Aníbal endorsed Duque in 2018). Former uribista senator Alfredo Ramos Maya, the son of former governor Luis Alfredo Ramos, is probably going to win the CD nomination (as the most well-known, and strongest, of the three remaining CD pre-candidates). It is still very early, but uribismo might be disappointed with their low starting point, considering this is Medellín. Although if Aníbal Gaviria runs for governor instead, then uribismo would be clear favourites in Medellín.

The rest of the field is a complete mess, with no one standing out yet (because, in large part, because of low name recognition). Former TIC vice minister Daniel Quintero Calle - basically the same kind of profile as Luis Ernesto Gómez (young, 'new politics', progressive and 'techy') - is in third, with a pretty good number (imo) and could be a solid candidate for progressives to support. Fajardista candidates (Jaime Cuartas, Beatriz Rave, Luis Bernardo Vélez and others) are all still very low and, unsurprisingly, the left barely registers. Santiago Gómez, former secretary of government (2016-18) and the candidate for incumbent mayor and professional snake oil salesman Federico 'Fico' Gutiérrez's movement Creemos is polling very low despite Fico's popularity (over 80%) -- but Santiago Gómez's campaign has been pretty bad and Creemos has been dormant since 2015. Uribismo is openly interested in an alliance with Fico (who has become even closer to uribismo since last year, and has a strong ally in the party with senator Paola Holguín [whose father was a strawman for... Pablo Escobar!]), although not everyone in the CD seems overly keen to support Santiago Gómez.

Other candidates worth mentioning are Juan Carlos Vélez Uribe, former senator (2010-2014) and 2015 CD mayoral candidate, who is running as an independent (signatures) because he has become a persona non grata in uribismo after his very embarrassing post-plebiscite infamous interview in 2016; and Santiago Jaramillo, an ex-CD councillor expelled from the CD after he famously had several mental breakdowns and went completely insane in 2017 (and then started attacking Uribe) and has now completely embraced the 'crazy' label.

Cali

Jorge Iván Ospina (Green) 29%
Roberto Ortiz "El Chontico" (Ind./ex-Liberal) 16%
Alejandro Eder (Compromiso Ciudadano) 7%
Alexander Durán (Ind.) 3%
Roberto Rodríguez (CD) 3%
Michel Maya (Ind./ex-Green) 2%
Danis Rentería (Col. Justa Libres) 1%
Diego Sardi (CR) 1%
Ray Charrupí (Ind.) 0%

None 24%
DK/DA 14%

In Cali, it is also very early, but things seem to be clearing up around two, potentially three, strong candidates: former mayor (2007-11) Jorge Iván Ospina, the early favourite; 2015 Liberal mayoral candidate (and runner-up) Roberto Ortiz "El Chontico"; and businessman Alejandro Eder, supported by Sergio Fajardo. The early favourite, still leading in the polls, is former mayor and Green candidate Jorge Iván Ospina. Ospina, the son of a M-19 commander killed in 1985, was mayor between 2007 and 2011 and later senator from 2014 to 2018. He remained popular throughout his term as mayor, during which he inaugurated the integrated public transit system (MIO), built a large 'educational citadel' and launched '21 mega-projects', although he had a poor record on security and healthcare. Ospina is a left-winger (and is friends with Gustavo Petro, who will likely support his candidacy this year), but in his first mayoral campaign, he allied with traditional and corrupt politicians, like former senator Juan Carlos Martínez Sinisterra (convicted for parapolítica). His main weakness, which his opponents are exploiting, is that he's facing over 60 open investigations in the Procuraduría and Fiscalía, largely over contracts when he was mayor. Ospina, on the defensive, claims that these investigations are part of a campaign against him orchestrated by his opponents and that every officeholder in Colombia leaves office with some kind of investigation (in both cases, he is probably correct).

His strongest opponent appears to be, for now, the runner-up from four years ago (then as a Liberal, now collecting signatures), Roberto 'El Chontico' Ortiz, a businessman who made his fortune in the lottery business (which has since served as his political base and electoral muscle, strong from thousands of single mothers who sell his lottery tickets on the streets). Although the CD has selected its candidate (councillor Roberto Rodríguez), many uribistas - including former senator Susana Correa (now head of the powerful DPS) and rep. Christian Garcés (famous for advocating US-like gun laws, what could go wrong etc.) - would prefer to support 'El Chontico', clearly the stronger candidate and already pretty close to uribismo. The third candidate, who polls respectably here, is Alejandro Eder, scion of a powerful sugar producer family who has served as head of the reincorporation agency (2010-14) and ProPacífico (a non-profit private foundation which supports economic development initiatives in the region). Eder is supported by Sergio Fajardo (and his movement, Compromiso Ciudadano), in what was the first major local rift in the 'Coalition Colombia' (Fajardo and Ospina dislike one another, and fajardistas are uneasy with Ospina because of his ethical problems). Given the historical strength and influence of the local business elite in Cali mayoral elections, Eder could be a strong contender (as a centrist and 'non-populist' counterweight to Ospina on the left and El Chontico on the right). Alex Durán, tied for fourth here, was secretary of health in the current administration and is said to be among mayor Maurice Armitage's favourites for his succession.

Cartagena

William García 14%
Claudia Fadul (Compromiso Ciudadano) 7%
Fernando Araújo Perdomo (Ind./ex-Conservative) 6%
Armando Córdoba (Frente Amplio/Green) 5%
Nausícrate Pérez Dautt (Frente Amplio) 3%
Jorge Cárcamo (Frente Amplio) 3%
Germán Viana (Frente Amplio) 2%
Julio Carrascal (Frente Amplio) 1%
Edinson Lucio (Frente Amplio) 1%
Nabil Báladi (Polo) 1%
Minerva Romero Julio (CD) 1%
Guillermo Gómez (crazy far-right evangelical) 1%
Francisco Hernández (CD) 1%

None 36%
DK/DA 18%

As I've mentioned here and elsewhere, Cartagena hasn't had an elected mayor serving out their full term since 2007 and it has been in a state of near-constant political crisis and instability for most of the last 5+ years. In large part because nearly all politicians in La Heroica are corrupt criminals who belong in jail and/or incompetent morons who couldn't run a lemonade stand. It is still unclear whether the mayor elected in 2019 will also be an incompetent moron/crook. The guy in front here, William García Tirado, certainly would be: he is a former representative (2010-14), at one time political ally of former senator Javier Cáceres (convicted for parapolítica). His 2015 mayoral candidacy was cut short when his signatures were not validated, but he ended up backing the eventual winner, the disastrously corrupt and incompetent Manolo Duque, who appointed him director of the local housing corporation and promptly used that office (which he held until last summer) to distribute juicy contracts to his pals.

Former economic development minister (1998-99) and foreign minister (2007-2008) Fernando Araújo Perdomo, member of an economic and political elite family in Cartagena, is third in this poll. Although he would run as an 'independent' (signatures), he is close to uribismo (his son, Fernando Araújo Rumié, is a CD senator) and the Conservatives (esp. Andrés Pastrana) and he would be the likeliest candidate for the city's business elite, which is working to back a strong candidate of its own, officially to end the cycles of corruption and political instability. And he would come with a nice implicit push from the government -- Cartagena is basically under quasi-direct rule from Bogotá, via VP Marta Lucía Ramírez (who is 'monitoring' caretaker mayor Piedrito Pereira), who incidentally is close to Araújo. Sergio Fajardo's candidate, Claudia Fadul (briefly caretaker mayor in the 1990s and has held other major private and public offices), is second in this poll. The alternative left, as the 'Frente Amplio', was supposed to hold a primary to select a candidate but it seems to have fallen through and I'm not sure what's happening with them. Of the several left-wing, or ostensibly left-wing, candidates, the strongest in this poll is Armando Córdoba, the Green-petrista candidate in last year's mayoral by-election.

But, with the majority still undecided (36% 'none' + 18% undecided), it is obviously still very early and things will certainly change a lot between now and October.

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Recent Invamer polls in the top 5 cities:

Bogotá



Claudia López (Green-Polo-Activista) has a significant lead (in this poll, in other polls the race is much tighter even if she's still ahead in all) but her lead is increasingly tenuous and being chipped away. As the frontrunner and the candidate to beat, she's been facing attacks and criticisms from all sides (left and right) as the other candidates have made gains. Miguel Uribe - the candidate of the right - has consolidated the right-wing vote, and now rivals Carlos Fernando Galán (whose candidacy seems to have stagnated) for second, although his further growth may be limited by incumbent mayor Enrique Peñalosa's unpopularity (although his approvals have modestly improved recently, for whatever reason) while Galán has more room to grow as the candidate with the highest favourables (by far). Petro's candidate Hollman Morris has also gained ground, consolidating the left and probably siphoning off leftist voters away from Claudia López. She remains the favourite, but her lead, again, seems to be weakening as she fends off attacks from all three of her opponents.

Medellín



In one of the most crowded field out of all the major cities (along with Cartagena), uribista candidate Alfredo Ramos (a lightweight whose only talent is being the son of Luis Alfredo Ramos) maintains an unimpressive lead which seems to be largely the product of higher name recognition + the uribista label in the uribista capital of Colombia. This poll has been getting a lot of press because Daniel Quintero Calle, a progressive 'alternative' independent candidate (former vice minister of information and communication technologies under Santos), has surged into a strong second and seems to be threatening Ramos. Quintero Calle has been gaining ground as his name rec increases (along with his favourables: there's very little to dislike him for at first glance, except 'not a right-winger' in a right-wing city). Santiago Gómez, who is desperately trying to claim the mantle of incumbent popular mayor (and skilled scam artist) Fico Gutiérrez, is doing a bit better but still struggling. The other surprise in this poll are the relatively good numbers for Beatriz Rave, the Green/fajardista candidate who may be benefiting from Sergio Fajardo's public support. The centre-left 'alternative' candidates (Quintero Calle, Rave, Valderrama, Hernández) uniting behind a single candidate could prove to be a winning combination, although settling on a single candidate this late in the game will be the trickiest part. In any case, the uribistas are scared since Álvaro Uribe is now warning about 'pseudo-chavistas' and arguing that Ramos offers a continuation of Fico, which will undoubtedly piss off Santiago Gómez although if he doesn't improve his numbers soon he may find that Fico's implicit support will go to Ramos instead, especially if Fico is serious about laying the groundwork for a 2022 presidential candidacy (likely as an uribista candidate, given that he's basically become an uribista since Duque's election).

It would be amazingly wonderful and hilarious if uribismo was to lose in Medellín (again), particularly as it looks likely that CD gubernatorial candidate Andrés Guerra will lose to Aníbal Gaviria's mega-coalition.

Cali



In Cali, former mayor Jorge Iván Ospina (Green) seems to be consolidating his advantage (he's leading in all polls except obvious outliers) over Roberto 'El Chontico' Ortíz - who is essentially the right-wing/uribista candidate - while fajardista candidate Alejandro Éder is still languishing a distant third and unable to gain ground (or consolidate himself as a 'third option'). Ospina has been able to put together a 'catch-all' (and todo vale) alliance including both traditional machines (the powerful machine of Valle governor and regional baron Dilian Francisca Toro has just endorsed him; he also has the Liberals) and the left (Petro, the Greens, the Polo), while 'El Chontico' seems to be struggling by being confined to the right/uribismo in a city which is more left-leaning and anti-uribista.

Barranquilla



Like four years ago, in Barranquilla there's no doubt over the outcome: the charista steamroller's candidate Jaime Pumarejo (former housing minister in 2017), endorsed by all traditional parties, will win in a huge landslide over a weak and divided left-wing opposition. Incumbent mayor Alex Char is the most popular mayor in Colombia (and maybe in the Americas?) with a 91% approval in this poll (increasingly convinced that Alex Char will be president soon tbh). In this poll, Petro's candidate Antonio Bohórquez is a very distant second. I'd be a bit more interested in a poll of the gubernatorial race in Atlántico, even though the charista steamroller's candidate Elsa Noguera will obviously win in a landslide, because the left's candidate there is Nicolás Petro, Gustavo Petro's son...

Bucaramanga

Juan Carlos Cárdenas 16.8%
Claudia Lucero López 16.8%
Jaime Beltrán 15.3%
Fredy Anaya 15.1%
Ariel García 12.2%
Sergio Prada 4.4%
Sergio Isnardo Muñoz
4.3%
Carlos Toledo 3.3%
Jhan Carlos Alvernia 2.5%
Pedro Nilson Amaya 2.2%
Blank vote 7.1%

Like four years ago, the race in Bucaramanga will likely go down to the wire with no clear favourite. The surprise in this poll is a surge in support for Juan Carlos Cárdenas, a businessman who has the implicit support on incumbent mayor (and overall strange man) Rafael Hernández (who is still pretty popular despite controversies) - like four years ago with Hernández, he could benefit from a late consolidation of the 'voto de opinión' around him against the two traditional machine candidates (Claudia Lucero López and Fredy Anaya). I'll note the very strong numbers for Christian right candidate (Colombia Justa Libres) Jaime Beltrán.
 
I promise to be better in keeping this thread updated and providing some details on the major races between now and Oct. 27.

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There's been a big turnaround in the polls in Bogotá since late September/early October: Carlos Fernando Galán (ind. / "Bogotá para la Gente") has pulled ahead of the early frontrunner, Claudia López (Greens/Polo). For example, the latest Invamer poll for Semana/Caracol had Galán at 34.3% (+11.5 from early Sept.), López at 31.2% (-5.4), Miguel Uribe Turbay at 14.1% (-8.2) and Hollman Morris at 10.8% (-2.9). Other polls from reputable sources show even bigger leads for Galán.

As the early favourite, Claudia López clearly suffered from being the target of all her rival's attacks and criticisms, from left and right, and she didn't really do a very good job at countering these attacks. She failed (for now?) to consolidate the leftist vote, because of competition from Gustavo Petro's damaged goods candidate Hollman Morris -- who won't win, but will draw away left-wing/anti-Peñalosa voters who would otherwise most likely have voted for Claudia López. She lost the crucial centrist vote (which helped Sergio Fajardo win the city last year) to Carlos Fernando Galán, perhaps in part because of her pugnacious and aggressive personality always scares away some moderates while Galán ran a very centrist campaign emphasizing his alleged "independence" from political clans/groups and focused on overcoming polarization and negative politics. One of his biggest social media hits was the "Vamo a Calmarno Challenge", consisting of him saying good things about his three rivals and challenging them to do the same (i.e. avoid personal attacks). It also helped that he wasn't, until now, the target of as many criticisms and attacks as Claudia López. Given how he emerged in the last month or so as the main alternative to Claudia López, while right-wing continuity candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay (endorsed by the CD, Liberals, Conservatives, MIRA and CJL; and effectively unpopular incumbent mayor Enrique Peñalosa's candidate) stagnated and failed to break through, it is also likely that Galán has attracted right-leaning voters who want to defeat Claudia López (who is loathed by most right-wingers). Galán has the highest personal favourables (by far) and has crafted the image of a friendly, down-to-earth, independent and affable guy with his now emblematic red jacket.

On a side note, I am very glad that, despite the media's best efforts, Miguel Uribe has gone nowhere. I guess people got suspicious when they saw the usual suspects on TV/radio try to make Miguel Uribe a thing just like they did with Iván Duque last year, when they had him playing the guitar and dancing instead of answering actual political questions.

With the election next Sunday (the 27th) the narrative/focus of the race has shifted towards Galán and the main question is whether he will be able to secure his current lead (assuming the polls are correct). He's become the target of more attacks and criticisms: there's been some sort of scandal, which is somewhat unclear and does seem to be fairly minor stuff, and one of his campaign's advisors was recently arrested (in some old bribery scheme from the time of corrupt leftist mayor Samuel Moreno's admin). Leftists are trying to weaken his argument that he is "independent" from political clans/groups by highlighting his past membership (until 2018) in Cambio Radical (Vargas Lleras' party), which is about as far away as you can get from independence/clean and ethical politics; they're also trying to tie him to unpopular Peñalosa (Galán supported Peñalosa in 2015, with CR, and Galán's proposals would not represent a major shift away from Peñalosa's policy agenda). Claudia López is trying to regain leftist support, notably with the recent endorsement of Ángela María Robledo, who was Petro's running mate in 2018 -- Robledo, likely most petrista feminists, had already refused to support Hollman Morris, accused of sexual harassment and violence against women. At the same time, she's also trying to regain centrist support by bringing out Fajardo (and running the risk, perhaps, of alienating more petrista leftists given their hatred of Fajardo) while trying to calm down her confrontational tone (which, as mentioned above, can be blamed for her collapse in the polls), avoid directly attacking Galán to concentrate more on herself and her platform/image.

Not sure if there will be more reputable polls between now and Oct 27 (there have been two sketchier, probably garbage polls, from little known outfits, both of which have excited Hollman Morris as he is within striking distance in both).

... and the latest reputable poll in Bogotá shows the race is now in a statistical tie with Galán losing 2 pts and López gaining 5 pts.

https://twitter.com/EligeBogota/status/1184675211586818048

Will be going right down to the wire!

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This is today.

Medellín (Mayor): In the country's second largest city, uribismo is trying to (finally) elect a mayor of their own in an uribista stronghold (72% for Duque in the runoff last year) where local politics haven't been as favourable to Uribe than national politics. The CD's candidate is Alfredo Ramos Maya -- a former one-term senator (2014-18) and son of former mayor/former senator/former governor Luis Alfredo Ramos, one of the major uribista 'barons' in Antioquia, still under investigation by the Supreme Court for parapolítica. Ramos has led every poll, but is playing it safe after what happened four years ago - when then-uribista candidate Juan Carlos Vélez Uribe led every poll but ended up narrowly losing to snake oil salesman Federico 'Fico' Gutiérrez (an ambitious career politician who is close to both uribismo and fajardismo - although far more the former these days - and campaigned as a young 'independent' without political or ideological baggage). Ramos, who is quite young (41), is campaigning very much 'Fico' style with rhetoric full of meaningless buzzwords and gimmicks (as well an unhealthy obsession with solving everything through technology and 'innovation'). Ramos' strongest rival, who has uribismo a bit worried, is centre-left progressive Daniel Quintero Calle, a former vice minister of information and communication technologies (2016-17) under Santos, running for his new movement 'Independientes'. As the name of his movement suggests, Quintero claims to be independent of traditional politicians and clans (and has, with the exception of Liberal senator Iván Agudelo, rejected their backing). A strong second in the polls, Quintero has been attacked by uribismo for having voted for Gustavo Petro in 2018 (in the first round, he voted for Liberal candidate Humberto de la Calle), which is pretty damning in a very right-wing city like Medellín (also, following uribista logic, having voted for Petro means that he is Petro's candidate, and also a pseudo-chavista communist FARC sympathizer). The third strong candidate is Fico's old friend and right-hand man Santiago Gómez ('Seguimos contando con vos'), campaigning explicitly as Fico's continuity candidate and with the favouritism of the incumbent administration (something illegal and which has gotten the Procuraduría to open an inquiry into accusations that Fico's administration is favouring Gómez). Unlike Fico, however, Santiago Gómez isn't a good retail politician and while some of Fico's massive popularity has boosted his standing in the polls a bit he hasn't been able to break through. Other candidates include Sergio Fajardo's official candidate Beatriz Rave (Greens), Fajardo's cousin and Fico's 2015 campaign manager Juan David Valderrama ('Todos Juntos'), former representative Víctor Correa (Polo) and 2015 CD mayoral candidate Juan Carlos Vélez Uribe ('Medellín Avanza', persona non grata in uribismo since his infamous tell-all post-plebiscite interview in 2016).

Antioquia (Governor): The clear favourite is former governor (2004-07) and former Medellín mayor (2011-15) Aníbal Gaviria ('Es el momento de Antioquia'-Liberal/La U/CR/Greens). Gaviria is the brother of former governor (2000-03) Guillermo Gaviria, kidnapped and assassinated by the FARC in 2003, and the son of businessman/Liberal politician/press magnate Guillermo Gaviria Echeverri (founder of the newspaper El Mundo, whose current editor in chief is Aníbal's sister). Gaviria was elected mayor of Medellín in 2011 in alliance with gubernatorial candidate Fajardo (the 'AMA alliance'), an ephemeral alliance which didn't last for very long. Gaviria has the endorsements of the Liberals, CR, La U as well as the Greens (an endorsement which was a blow to fajardismo, traditionally allied to the Greens), and the support of most Conservative congressmen (who have abandoned the official Conservative candidate, Juan Camilo Restrepo, former president of the Urabá banana producers' group Augura). Gaviria is also on good terms with uribismo - he endorsed Duque in 2018 (his first major political reappearance since leaving office in 2015) and his sister, former Liberal senator Sofia Gaviria, was recently appointed ambassador of Colombia in Switzerland. His main rival is uribista candidate Andrés Guerra, who finished second to Luis Pérez four years ago; Guerra also comes from a political family (his father is Liberal cacique Bernardo Guerra Serna, who recently called his son a traitor; his brother is controversial Liberal councillor Bernardo Alejandro Guerra). Because Álvaro Uribe alone guarantees a substantial amount of votes in Antioquia and the strength of the uribista voto de opinión (especially in the Aburrá Valley), the result should be fairly narrow - probably like in 2015, when Luis Pérez (backed by a similar mega-coalition of traditional parties) beat Guerra by 10%. Other major candidates include the fajardista Iván Mauricio Pérez (Compromiso Ciudadano) and Mauricio Tobón ('Tú puedes'), close to incumbent governor Luis Pérez but whose campaigned petered out.

Cali (Mayor): The most likely winner is former mayor (2008-11) Jorge Iván Ospina (Green/Liberal/La U/Colombia Humana-UP/Colombia Renaciente), who retains a significant lead in the polls over his main opponent, right-wing candidate Roberto 'Chontico' Ortíz (CD/Conservative/CR/MIRA). Ospina's advantage is his ability to build an unholy alliance of traditional (controversial and corrupt) machines/clans (now including, most importantly, Valle governor Dilian Francisca Toro's group in La U) and the left (he is friends with Gustavo Petro, who supports him - just like Ospina broke with his party to support Petro in the first round in 2018). Ospina is dogged by several scandals and allegations of corruption during his first term, and 2 weeks ago it was announced that he will be indicted for contract irregularities in November - in response to which he went on a very melodramatic (and, of course, short-lived) hunger strike-photo op. He repeatedly insists that these legal problems are part of a plot/smear campaign by his opponents ('Chontico' but also the local elite-owned newspaper which hates him), and has called into question the suspicious timing of the case against him. His opponents have tried to make a case of it, and the suspicions of corruption (as well as his longstanding willingness to form alliances of convenience with traditional corrupt machines) do hit the Greens' image as a clean anti-corruption party (indeed, fajardista Green rep. Catalina Ortíz is not supporting him, and Claudia López has said she wouldn't vote for him) -- but they don't seem to be hurting his support. His top rival, 'Chontico' (a businessman who made his fortune in the lottery business, which has since served as his political base and electoral muscle, strong from thousands of single mothers who sell his lottery tickets on the streets), placed second (as a Liberal) four years ago is now running as an 'independent' (ballot access through signatures) but is supported by the right including uribismo (which is fairly weak in Cali but got stronger in 2018). He's run a pretty nasty campaign, accused of being behind a video which says that Ospina is the 'candidate of the FARC'. Stuck in a distant third and unable to break through is the fajardista candidate Alejandro Éder (Compromiso Ciudadano), a scion of the city's business/agro-industrial elite (his family owns Manuelita, a major agribusiness corporation in the sugarcane industry) with an interesting background (he was director of the reincorporation agency, was a peace negotiator in Havana and founded a private non-profit foundation to support regional development). Working in Éder's favour is that he's a clean, non-politician outsider with a business background; but he's also seen as the candidate closest to incumbent mayor Maurice Armitage (who isn't particularly popular) and is perceived as too elitist and close to big business to appeal to poorer voters (Chontico and Ospina's base).

Valle (Governor): It doesn't seem like anything will be able to stop the anointed successor of incumbent governor and regional baroness Dilian Francisca Toro, Clara Luz Roldán (La U/CR/Liberals/MAIS/ASI). Dilian is one of the most powerful regional political bosses in Colombia (with five congressmen) and controls the strongest machine in the Valle, which is actively working for Roldán (who herself has been campaigning since 2018 and used her previous position as director of Coldeportes to cement her political aspirations). Her rivals on the left and right have been unable to form alliances to challenge her. On the left, the strongest candidate is former labour minister Griselda Janeth Restrepo, supported by petrismo, the Polo and Juan Fernando Cristo's dissident Liberals (the other centre-left 'alternatives' are fajardista Green Duvalier Sánchez and Afro-Colombian anti-racism activist Oscar Gamboa). The right is divided between uribista agrobusinessman Francisco Lourido (CD), former representative Álvaro López Gil (Conservative), human rights lawyer Mónica Gaitán (Col. Justa Libres) and Carlos Andrés Clavijo (AICO).

Barranquilla (Mayor): They don't even need to hold elections here because everyone has known the outcome for months now: charista candidate Jaime Pumarejo (CR and supported by the CD, Liberals, Conservatives and La U) will win in a landslide, securing a fourth consecutive term for charismo at the helm of the Caribbean region's largest city. Outgoing mayor Alex Char, elected in a similarly boring election four years ago with 73%, is the most popular mayor in Colombia with 85-90%+ approval ratings and is the most visible figure of charismo, which is the single most powerful regional political clan in Colombia. Jaime Pumarejo comes from an old Liberal political dynasty (his family owns El Heraldo, the regional newspaper, and his father was the first directly-elected mayor of Barranquilla in 1988) and is a Char loyalist. He was briefly housing minister in 2017 under Santos, as a 'quota' of charismo. He faces three opponents who don't stand a chance: former city councillor and Char's only opponent in 2015 Rafael Segundo Sánchez (ASI), former city councillor Antonio Eduardo Bohórquez (Polo/Colombia Humana-UP) and Diógenes Rosero (Green), the first two at one time close to former mayor Bernardo 'el Cura' Hoyos (convicted of corruption).

Atlántico (Governor): In the gubernatorial race in Atlántico there is no real competition either: charista candidate Elsa Noguera (CR/Liberal/Conservative/CD/La U) will win easily, further consolidating charista hegemony over the Atlántico with both the capital city mayor and the governor from within their ranks, taking the governor's seat from the Liberals who have held it since 2008 (the outgoing Liberal governor, Eduardo Verano, was backed by the Chars in 2015 but is not from the Char clan). Noguera was mayor of Barranquilla (2012-15) and housing minister (2016-17) She is backed by basically all the traditional political class of the department, including uribismo, which is no small feat. The election is still getting a lot of media attention because her main rival is Gustavo Petro's son, Nicolás Petro (Colombia Humana-UP/MAIS/Greens), a political novice seeking to inherit his father's levels of support in the department in 2018. There are three other candidates.

Bucaramanga (Mayor): Bucaramanga will be one of the more interesting races, with an uncertain outcome and a campaign of surprises. Mayor Rodolfo Hernández (an atypical, eccentric and blunt businessman 'outsider' - who slapped a councillor, called firefighters fat and lazy, regularly insulted other politicians and called them corrupt, made racist comments about Venezuelans and is often rude and coarse etc.), facing another suspension from office by the Procuraduría for political participation, preferred to resign outright in September to give himself full leeway to openly campaign in favour of his preferred successor: businessman and fellow 'anti-politician' outsider Juan Carlos Cárdenas (Ciudadanos Libres), who worked for Cemex for over 20 years (vice president, president of Cemex Peru) and, like Hernández, is an engineer with a long private sector career but no prior political experience. His campaign has been described as a 'photocopy' of Hernández's 2015 campaign (even down to the logo), with a very similar rhetoric against the 'crooks' who robbed the city, politiquería (politicking)/traditional politicians and corruption. Hernández's endorsement has boosted Cárdenas into contention and is now one of the leading candidates. Cárdenas is also supported by Sergio Fajardo. But he is facing strong competition, notably from the traditional machines. His strongest rival, representing 'traditional politics' (machine politics), probably Claudia Lucero López ('Hagamos Ciudadanía' - Liberal/La U/CD/MIRA), the wife of Liberal senator Miguel Ángel Pinto and aunt of Liberal governor Didier Tavera (although family relations here seem strained now). Although it's her first time running for elected office, she's worked in the public sector and has experience in political wheeling-and-dealing from her family ties. She is supported by uribismo (thanks to her husband's lobbying in Bogotá), La U and the Christian party MIRA. Back in August, she compared herself to Jesus. The other strong 'traditional politics' candidate is controversial former Opción Ciudadana rep. Fredy Anaya (husband of current Liberal representative Nubia López, endorsed by CR and the Conservatives), supported by his strong clientelistic networks and family businesses. Former Liberal councillor (2011-18) and evangelical pastor Jaime Andrés Beltrán, candidate of the Christian right party Colombia Justa Libres, is also polling quite well and is to be reckoned with given the strength of the evangelical vote in Santander. Other candidates: Sergio Isnardo Muñoz (MAIS), Ariel Gerardo García (AICO) and Carlos Francisco Toledo (Colombia Humana-UP).

Santander (Governor): One of the most interesting gubernatorial races, particularly as Liberal governor Didier Tavera, probably from having alienated too many people, has no clear heir apparent. The top two candidates in the election are probably, on the one hand, former senator Mauricio Aguilar (Siempre Santander/Conservative) - son of former governor Hugo Aguilar (2004-2007, convicted for parapolítica and under investigation for illicit enrichment) and half-brother of former governor (2012-2015) and incumbent CR senator Richard Aguilar (also facing several corruption scandals from his governorship), supported by a good chunk of Santander's corrupt old political establishment (including our friend, businessman moonshining as politician Fredy Anaya); on the other hand, former Polo senator (2018) and surprise runner-up four years ago Leonidas Gómez (Dignidad Santandereana-Green/Polo/Colombia Humana-UP), who campaigns against corruption and traditional politics. He's also supported by Rodolfo Hernández. Leonidas Gómez was elected to the Senate last year, but resigned within months to run for governor again, a move which was criticized and divided his own movement. The other major candidate is Christian evangelical and infamous homophobic Partido de la U assemblywoman Ángela Hernández (La U/Liberal/CD/MIRA/CJL), who gained national attention for leading protests against the education ministry's anti-discrimination booklets and then supported theocratic book-burner Alejandro Ordóñez's clerico-fascist presidential campaign in 2018. This year she is mostly campaigning with the image of a 'young woman' distant from traditional politics, despite being endorsed by traditional political parties like the Liberals (completely making a farce of their name, for a change). Days before the election, another major candidate, CR's Elkin Bueno (controversial former three-time mayor of Barrancabermeja, accused of parapolítica and various other corruption scandals), withdrew but his name is still on the ballot.

Unfortunately that's all I've been able to put together in the little time I've had, but I will provide commentary (and explanations) on results in many other races I've been following.

If anyone has any questions, I'd be glad to answer them.

[Estrella]

I have a question - to what extent will the results outside big cities be representative of empirical factors (income, race, geography,...) as opposed to caudillismo? I'm guessing it's mostly about the latter, but are there some patterns other than "we own villages X, Y and Z, so they're going to vote for us" and are they related to how those places vote federally?

And this isn't really related to these elections, but what (if any) were the ideological differences between the Ls and Cs during the National Front era?

[Hash]

I have a question - to what extent will the results outside big cities be representative of empirical factors (income, race, geography,...) as opposed to caudillismo? I'm guessing it's mostly about the latter, but are there some patterns other than "we own villages X, Y and Z, so they're going to vote for us" and are they related to how those places vote federally?

Not to a very large extent, because local/regional elections are the elections which are, far far, still heavily dominated (and controlled) by machines, clans and caudillos - as well as very local friends-and-neighbours considerations. To a very limited extent, some very localized results in mayoral or gubernatorial races may respond more to empirical factors -- class, local economy or race. As this election kicked off, one of the main questions was to which extent the unprecedented trends seen in the 2018 presidential election (the defeat of the machines in many places, the strength of the left with Petro and the strength of 'alternative' forces in general with Fajardo and Petro) would be repeated in 2019, but as the campaigns took form it became clear that machines and other 'local factors' would remain far more important.

[Hash]

Bogotá is counting the fastest and has 19.5% reporting:

Claudia López 35.77
Galán 30.66
Morris 16
Uribe 12.56

Claudia López's lead has been shrinking rather quickly. Not looking particularly great for her.

[Estrella]

Thanks!

Is there a results website with all the races? (a clickable map or something like that)

[Hash]

Thanks!

Is there a results website with all the races? (a clickable map or something like that)

https://resultados2019.registraduria.gov.co/inicio/0/colombia

In Bogotá (68.1% reporting) it is getting tighter but Claudia López's lead seems to be stabilizing a bit now:
Claudia 35.36
Galán 32.36
Morris 14.10
Uribe 13.43

In Cali (18.3% reporting):
Ospina 37.43
Ortiz 23.72
Eder 18.79
Rentería 5.91

In Medellín something YUGE may be happening but we need to be cautious (19.6% reporting):
Quintero 39.82
Ramos 29.27
Gómez 11.72
Valderrama 3.16

In Bucaramanga (33.8% reporting) it is shaping up to be a big landslide for Cárdenas:
Cárdenas 50.01
Beltrán 13.28
Anaya 11.99
Lucero López 9.8

[Hash]

Btá update: at 77.2% it is stabilizing at a narrow and feeble lead for Claudia López: 35.37 - 32.43 - 13.98 (Morris) - 13.5 (Uribe). She leads by 70,300 votes now.

[Hash]

Claudia López will narrowly win in Bogotá! With 83.56%:

López 35.31
Galán 32.49
Morris 13.92
Uribe 13.54

Bogotá's first woman mayor, and first openly gay mayor.

[Hash]

40% reporting in Medellín and I'm getting nervous:

Quintero 38.59
Ramos 30.44
Gómez 11.82
Valderrama 3.07

[Hash]

49.4% reporting in Medellín and jesus christ what the sh**t

Quintero 38.43
Ramos 30.56
Gómez 11.85
Valderrama 3.03

43.3% reporting in Cali and it's looking set for Ospina

Ospina 37.68
Ortiz 24.39
Eder 18.38
Renteria 5.94

In Bucaramanga at 66.6% it's over and it's a triumph for Hernández-Cárdenas

Cárdenas 49.46
Beltrán 13.53
Anaya 12.16
Lucero López 10.1

In B'q'lla obviously it's over too (62.9% reporting)

Pumarejo 62.87
Bohorquez 13.58

[Hash]

73% reporting in Medellín and, wow, I don't know what to say. I think it's over and this is astounding stuff!

Quintero 38.59
Ramos 30.29
Gómez 12
Valderrama 2.98

God bless you Medellín.

[Hash]

Looking through the mayoral results, there are some pretty big surprises and unexpected results in many places - Medellín obviously, Cartagena, Cúcuta, Villavicencio, Manizales and Armenia.

In general, these results - particularly because of the three largest cities - this is terrible stuff for uribismo

[Hash]

Final results in Bogotá:

Claudia López (Greens/Polo) 35.21%
Carlos Fernando Galán (Bogotá para la Gente) 32.48%
Hollman Morris (Colombia Humana-UP/MAIS) 13.99%
Miguel Uribe Turbay (Avancemos/Liberal/CD/Conservative/MIRA/CJL) 13.56%^
Blank vote 4.73%

Turnout 55.03%

Claudia López wins by 2.73% and 86,179 votes. For the first time, the mayor-elect has won over 1 million votes (in fact, both top 2 finishers won over 1 million votes).

[Hash]

We also have final results from Bucaramanga:

Juan Carlos Cárdenas (Ciudadanos Libres) 48.36%
Jaime Andrés Beltrán (Colombia Justa Libres) 13.85%
Fredy Anaya (Conservative/CR) 12.66%
Claudia Lucero López (Hagamos Ciudadanía/Liberal/La U/CD/MIRA) 10.74%
Ariel Gerardo García (AICO) 3.71%
Sergio Isnardo Muñoz (MAIS) 2.82%
Carlos Francisco Toledo (Unidad Alternativa/Colombia Humana-UP/Polo/Activista) 2.18%
Blank vote 5.64%

Turnout 58.75%

An unexpectedly massive (like, landslide-massive) victory for Juan Carlos Cárdenas and, by consequence, his main supporter, former mayor Rodolfo Hernández. It will be a boost for Hernández's presidential ambitions in 2022, although gubernatorial results are disappointing for him (and for everyone who doesn't like corrupt criminals). It is a big defeat for the traditional machines, notably the Liberals (historically quite dominant in local politics for several years up to 2015), and their two crooked candidates - Anaya and Claudia Lucero López.

[Hash]

And now, a word from the Eternal President:

https://twitter.com/AlvaroUribeVel/status/1188599494633492481

"We lost, recognize defeat with humility. The fight for democracy doesn't end"


*replace Republican with Uribista and change the TV screen to Quintero Calle beating Ramos by 8% in Medellín*

Such a wonderful night! Long live Colombia!

[Hash]

Final results in Medellín, definitely the biggest surprise of them all and the result which makes this election particularly bad for uribismo:

Daniel Quintero Calle (Independientes) 38.56%
Alfredo Ramos (CD) 29.88%
Santiago Gómez (Seguimos contando con vos) 12.09%
Juan David Valderrama (Todos Juntos) 2.88%
Beatriz Rave (Green) 1.81%
Victor Correa (Polo) 1.28%
Gemma María Mejía (CJL) 1.19%
Juan Carlos Vélez (Medellín avanza) 0.88%
Jairo Herran Vargas (Colombia Humana-UP) 0.43%
Luis Guillermo Hoyos (PRE) 0.29%
Jorge Orlando Gutiérrez (Col. Renaciente) 0.16%
Luis Fernando Muñoz (ADA) 0.12%
Blank vote 10.37%

Turnout 50.1%

Quintero Calle wins an historic and unexpected victory, and deals a very brutal defeat to uribismo (in its stronghold), beating Ramos by 8.7% and 68,300 votes. Quintero had the right 'style' to win in Medellín, and his general profile fits with that of his predecessors - young (and with messy hair) and independent - but I always felt his victory was unlikely given that he was the target of a particularly nasty right-wing smear campaign in which he was depicted as a chavista ('pseudo-chavista', as Uribe said)/communist and that the uribistas constantly reminded people that, you know, he voted Gustavo Petro in 2018 (in a city where Petro won only 22% and is very unpopular). I felt it would be much tougher for him to benefit from last minute anti-uribista strategic voting (which helped Fico beat uribismo in 2015), and never really thought that he would win (and never win by such a large margin) -- well, except when I was drunk on Friday night and predicted he'd win (lesson to self: only predict elections when drunk). There definitely was some last minute anti-uribista strategic voting because candidates fishing in the same pool as Quintero (Valderrama, Rave, Correa) did worse than polls had predicted and ended up with only crumbs. Uribismo may remain dominant for national elections in Medellín, but it has now had its candidates defeated in three consecutive mayoral election - and, unlike in 2015, the winner this year is a genuine progressive! I look forward to looking at results by comuna to see what happened and where Quintero won his victory.

Anyway I still can't believe this result and even though Quintero isn't perfect, I am very happy about this. Long live Medellín!

[Bidenworth2020]

can I get a brief summary of columbian politics? it looks utterly fascinating

[Hash]

can I get a brief summary of columbian politics? it looks utterly fascinating

I made a few brief effortposts on Colombian politics, a bit superficial and lacking in details, last year before the presidential election. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask me.


National results for parties for municipal councils: the best, though still imperfect, estimate of how parties fared nationally since council elections have the most valid votes (after mayors) and almost everywhere (except those random empty places in Amazonas, Vaupés and Guainía with like 10 people each, and the island of San Andrés) has a municipal council.

Liberal 2.6 million votes - 13.03% (2015: 14.4%)
CR 2.08 million votes - 10.42% (2015: 12.71%)
Conservative 2.06 million votes - 10.33% (2015: 12.34%)
Partido de la U 1.98 million votes - 9.9% (2015: 13.57%)
Greens 1.8 million votes - 9.07% (2015: 7.45%)
CD 1.54 million votes - 7.71% (2015: 6.45%)
ASI 1.05 million votes - 5.28% (2015: 5.32%)
MAIS 782k votes - 3.91% (?)
AICO 635k votes - 3.17% (?)
Colombia Renaciente 535k votes - 2.67% (?)

Note that in some places these parties (and others) ran in coalitions, or didn't have candidates at all, so these figures are probably a lower estimate of their national performance.

I would hesitate to draw any conclusions from this because municipal council elections definitely don't have any national element to them, and the parties behave differently from place to place (as do voters obviously). But, as in 2015, uribismo performed poorly and still has a very tough time building a large base at the local level - compare their 1.5 million votes to the 2.5 million votes they won for the Senate in 2018. On the other hand, it is a good result for the Greens, one party whose voters - at least in large urban areas - may share similar motivations and a similar profile. The Liberals manage to do pretty well and confirm their status as the largest party in Colombia (less impressive than it sounds).