2013 Elections in Germany

[ERvND]

A great analysis, Franknburger. Two things aside and in addition to it:

3.) Another key constituency of the state's CDU is "Heimatvertriebene" (post WW II displaced persons from former German territories in the East). In 1950, they accounted for 27% of the State's total population, concentrated in the central eastern part of the State (roughly everything east of the middle Weser - Hameln to Verden), and, to a lesser extent, along the Elbe and upper Weser towards Wilhelmshaven and Oldenburg. Their integration into the CDU did not occur immediately, but via several other parties - BHE, DP, and, most importantly, the NPD in the late 1960s / early 1970s.  Thus, you still find a (demographically decreasing) number of CDU politicians in Eastern Lower Saxony with late 1960s/ early 1970s NPD past, the most prominent of which is the current major of Brunswick (CDU, ruling with FDP support).  This, in turn, is not pushing enthusiasm for any kind of cooperation with the CDU in the left-leaning part of the electorate in central-eastern Lower Saxony.

First: It has never been thoroughly proven that the German refugees voted overwhelmingly for right-wing parties. There are also different instances; in rural southern Germany, for example, it were refugees who built up the local Social Democratic Party chapters after the war. So, in my opinion, the story went the other way round: Leftist, liberal and centrist refugees tended to abandon their eastern heritage rather quickly. Right-wing refugees, on the other hand, would emphasize their East European roots and their restorative claims. Both led to the popular impression that all refugees were and are right-wing.

Second: By now, the political and electoral influence of the organized refugees ("Heimatvertriebene") is marginal at best. They never really managed to pass their identity and ideas to the following generations, so when the last "real" refugees die, it will be basically over for them. As you said, however, their extremist right-wing image is still very much alive. Especially for the Greens and The Left, the "Heimatvertriebene" are a popular boogeyman, and every CDU politician mentioning the matter will immediately be accused of nazi connections. This doesn't correspond to the real political impact of the last refugees, though.

[ERvND]

Literally their only well known policy is pushing for unrealistic, impossible tax cuts, and even that has bewn unsuccesful for them.

Maybe I'm just American, but I feel like more than 4% of the population would support that agenda...

What makes the FDP unpopular is not so much their tax cut agenda but the fact that they were not able to push it trough (not even the slightest bit of it), despite being part of the government for almost four years now.

[ERvND]

It is perfectly imaginable and understandable for me that things went the other way round in rural Southern Germany, and refugees there flocked to the SPD in opposition to the prevailing CDU/CSU establishment (actually a pretty fascinating detail of the southern German political landscape that I had not been aware of before).

This parallel, yet opposite, development is indeed fascinating. One has to see, of course, that there were a lot of conservative/right-leaning refugees in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, as well. The close connections between the "Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft" and the CSU, for example, are notorious. It holds true, however, that many refugees felt attracted by a political party that was (and still is) perceived as an anti-establishment, "outsider" force in the South. At least up until the 1970s, you can savely assume that - while not every refugee was a Social Democrat - almost every Social Democrat in rural Southern Germany was a refugee. By the way: There is no "indigenous" Social Democracy in said region to this day. As far as my personal observations reach (Upper Bavaria south of Munich), around 80% of SPD members there are no native-born Bavarians, but "Zugereiste", especially from Franconia and Northern Germany. To some degree, they have replaced the refugees as social outsiders.

However, I think it is equally important to recognise and understand the political socialisation of left-leaning people of my generation (babyboomers), which often was started by older relatives making statements like "The Nazis were not worse than the Russians", followed by swearing on the treacherous SPD giving up German lands in the East. So, the refugee functionnaire might be the bogeyman, but the real source of anger was the own grandfather or uncle  - and that is what is making the "Heimatvertriebenen" issue so emotional.
The real tragic is that the refugees rarely shared their experience. My mother-in-law, e.g., only recently told me and my wife how she, at the age of seven, saw her mother being raped by a Russian soldier. Its understandable - this is not the kind of stories you really want to tell at the coffee table. But since most of such stories have probably never been told, the "real" refugees came, and are still coming, across as backward-oriented, revanchist, nazi-leaning phrase-mongers.

What you say here is very true and very important. Actually, I can understand both sides (at least I hope so): The refugees' bitterness against Russians, Poles and Czechs, but also the following generation's outrage against the views of their refugee mothers and fathers. While this is completely comprehensible, I find it still annoying that it doesn't seem to be possible to discuss these matters in a neutral way, without emotional involvement and outbursts of sentiment. I mean, the events happened 70 years ago. This shows, however, that the memories seem to be too fresh still, and that the expulsion affected the German society in a more profound way than we like to admit.  

[ERvND]

Now, let's assume that until the election in Autumn 2013 [...]

Won't happen. Here is why: German voters see the effects of the economic crisis in other European states (60% youth unemployment etc.) and are thankful that Merkel, CDU and CSU "saved" them from such misery. This notion is, of course, not true: The black-yellow coalition has done exactly zilch to this effect. If anything, the former red-green coalition's social and economic reforms are responsible for Germany's relative economic stability. The voters' perception, however, is different.

As long as this doesn't change - i.e, as long as the crisis in Europe persists, which will be for a very long time - the Conservative reign over Germany will continue. That's even more true for Bavaria, traditionally more conservative than Germany in general.

[ERvND]

From a purely tactical point of view, a black-green coalition (CDU/CSU-Greens) would be ideal for the SPD. Many Green Party members were politically socialised in the 80s and 90s, in strong opposition to the Kohl government, and are still staunchly anti-conservative. In case of a black-green coalition, they would most likely move to the SPD, already beginning during the coalition agreement talks. The Greens being forced to compromise with the CDU would alienate their base even more.

The leaders of the Greens know this as well, of course, which is why it won't happen.

[ERvND]

To be perfectly fair, however, we'll have to admit that it was not Steinbrück's fault. Like, he had a real chance, messed it up, and in consequence, Merkel will win again. Instead, it was the other way round: The media and the general public desired a Merkel victory right from the beginning. Therefore, they needed (to make up) reasons why Steinbrück couldn't win.

That's why his recent "scandals" were blown up in a ridicolous way. For example, the fact that he is rich and got fees for his speeches could (and should) have been a sidenote. Instead, the media orchestrated a month-long campaign, even though he'd done nothing illegal.

Or, take the last "scandal" for another example: When he said that the chancellor's salary is too low, it was interpreted as a sign of greed. Had he uttered the exact opposite ("The chancellor's salary is too high."), I bet the headline would have been: "Envious Steinbrück is jealous of poor Merkel's salary!"

[ERvND]

Any predictions for the Niedersachsen state elections? Here's mine:

CDU: 41%
Their potential is even higher, but they'll lose a bunch of tactical voters to the FDP.

SPD: 27%
The SPD share will collapse, perhaps to even lower levels than 27%. Polls generally tend to overestimate SPD support; moreover, the media climate for them is toxic right now. In the end, a great number of SPD voters will stay at home.

Greens: 15%
They will benefit from disgruntled SPD voters, but not enough to make up for the SPD's losses.

FDP: 8%
The "big surprise" of the evening, but not for me. The hardcore FDP supporters alone would have sufficed to put them over the 5% threshold. Now, they'll get a big number of additional votes from tactical CDU-voters.

The Left: 4%
Will profit a bit from SPD supporters who don't like Steinbrück, but not enough to make it to 5%.

Others: 5%
Pirates won't play a role in this one.

Conclusion:
Easy win for black-yellow, already foreshadowing the Bundestag results in September. Things could only get interesting if the Left somehow managed to reach over 5%. But even in this case, CDU-FDP should have a stable majority.

[ERvND]

Some interesting results here, and I stand corrected on my overall prediction. At least I got "inflated FDP" tendentially right.

Talking about McAllister's very bad, not good, horrible day: His seemingly ingenious idea - give CDU voters a hint to vote FDP - backfired terribly. Not only did it not work; due to his shenanigans, his much celebrated and favoured CDU lost over 6% and 14 seats. Somehow I feel that his political future will lie outside of Lower Saxony.

For me, the real surprise of the evening was not the FDP's strong showing, but the all right result for the SPD. I had really expected for their vote to collapse, given the media climate right now. Instead they held their own, which I attribute to Stephan Weil, who was obviously perceived as a decent, competent candidate.

By the way: This is not over yet. One seat is a very thin majority, and red-green could have a hard time electing their PM, or hanging on for the full term.

[ERvND]

You have to help me here.  Why would we view the results as McAllister's idea has backfired?  It seems to me if some CDU voters voted for FDP, that did not diminish the CDU/FDP total vote.  It seems the defeat was really a function of CDU+FDP votes numbered less than SPD+Green voters by a slim margin.  It seems if McAllister did not do what he did and FDP falls below 5%, that would just mean a larger SPD+Green majority as all FDP votes would have been wasted.  He merely came up with the only strategy that gave him a chance for him to keep his position.  The fact it did not work merely means that the votes were not there for him ever to win in this election, not that the idea is a bad one.

As outsiders, we tend to perceive "black-yellow" as one homogenous voting bloc. The 14 CDU MPs who lost their jobs yesterday would beg to differ. The same is true for Merkel and the national CDU, who get a lot of negative media attention right now, thanks to McAllister's poor results. The best sign that his strategy was a failure is the fact that hordes of CDU/CSU politicians are condemning it right now.

Moreover, and this is my main point, McAllister's strategy of secretly endorsing the FDP was not even necessary. FDP core support is at 3%, i.e. they'll get that, no matter what. Now, given the polls right before the election, it was always clear there would be enough CDU voters to put them over the threshold. McAllisters stealthy FDP campaign amplified this effect to exaggerated levels. Most people on this board - even the ones not familiar with Lower Saxony politics - were able to predict this. McAllister, an experienced career politician, was not. Instead, he shot himself in the foot. He might have lost anyway, but at least he could have blamed it on the FDP.  

[ERvND]

O.k., as nobody else has volunteered, I have prepared an evaluation of our Lower Saxony predictions.

Nice. A weak performance for me, but in this case, I'm not really upset about it.

Quite an accomplishment indeed of having absolutely no political values, beliefs, agenda or anything... It's deeply pathetic if you ask me.

LOL. You're talking about Merkel now, right?

[ERvND]

Given the last state election results, it should be clear by now that the FDP will easily get 5% of the vote - and more. Instead of CDU 42, FDP 4, I'd rather predict CDU 38, FDP 8.

I wonder why the pollster don't adjust their data accordingly.

[ERvND]

Its not up to a polling company to arbitrarily decide that based on what happened in Lower Saxony - from now on in every poll we should subtract 4 points from the CDU and give it to the FDP.

It might be controversial, but it's standard practice for (German) pollsters to "adjust" their data according to secret formulas. So, what you get from German polling companies (regardless of the time of the poll), will always be that "weighted" numbers, not what people actually said.

Under this premise, I still wonder why they haven't adjusted their formulas yet. It's not about Lower Saxony alone, but about the last four state elections: In each case, the FDP was predicted to get less than 5% of the vote, and ended up with more than 8%. I see a clear pattern here (loan votes from CDU supporters), and I think it's time to include this observation into the weighted polls.    

[ERvND]

Why is the CDU so strong in Sachsen relative to the rest of the former GDR?

...

Your explanation is comprehensible. The CDU's strenght - and, even more so, the SPD's weakness - in Saxony is still remarkable.

Looking at the history of Saxony, the state has always been the stronghold of Socialist, Social Democratic and, later on, Communist parties. In the 19th century, there were times when almost half of the SPD's total FPTP seats were won in Saxony. After 1918, the state was a stronghold of the Communist party, while the SPD was still very powerful there. This trend seemed to continue after 1949, when most members of the Communist political elite were Saxons.

So, in 1990 almost everyone was convinced the SPD would continue to dominate a democratic Saxony. This didn't happen, however. You named some of the reasons, and of course, political changes and major shifts happen. Nevertheless, I'm baffled by the extent of this shift. In Saxony, the SPD is not only weak, but close to extinction. They hardly hang on to 10% of the vote, making it their worst state by far, even worse than Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. In regions like the Erzgebirge, where the SPD enjoyed 66%+ majorities pre 1933, they have completely vanished today. Of course the Linke (originally PDS) took some of this vote, but in general, this region is overwhelmingly Conservative and CDU-dominated by now. Still a bit of a mystery to me.  

[ERvND]

[Saxony]

That's a lot of interesting information. Thank you.

[ERvND]

This scandal will have no consequences. Schavan is going to sue the university, effectively burying the issue until the court decides - which will be after the elections.

Maybe, if there are signs she will lose her case (which is likely), she might retire "for health reasons" after the federal election.

[ERvND]

CDU/CSU not extremely far from absolute majority (43-46).

I'm still absolutely convinced that there will be no absolute majority in these elections. In the end, CDU/CSU will inevitably lose votes to the FDP, even if there is no "Zweitstimmen-Kampagne". At the end of the day, the result will look more like CDU/CSU 39%, FDP 8%.

[ERvND]

The good message is that this decision is being put on the state's political agenda by the SPD.

While the reform itself might be reasonable, I think it's not a clever decision to campaign for it. The dissolution or merger of local administrative units is never popular. If the state SPD supports this reform, their local officials will be in deep trouble.

[ERvND]

So far, the media fallout over this "scandal" is relatively moderate.

Maybe we are at a point where Steinbrück's image is so utterly ruined that one gaffe more or less simply doesn't matter. I mean, what will be next? He eats cute babies for breakfast? Yawn.

[ERvND]

4 years in politics are eternity. CDU/CSU can find a good heir for Merkel, Greens can get stronger, FDP make a comeback.

Right now, Merkel is at a 75% approval rate. You can't get much higher in a democratic system.

That's why it is very likely that Merkel (or her successor) will be less popular in four years. For the SPD, this means to sit out this election with a weak Steinbrück and save their better candidates (especially Kraft) for 2017.

[ERvND]

GMS, 06.03.2013, Bavaria State Election:

CSU: 48%
SPD: 21%
Grüne: 12%
FW: 8%

FDP: 3%
Linke: 3%
Piraten: 2%

Easy CSU absolute majority (48-41).

These numbers sound about right. Actually, Bavaria is one of the few states where I see the FDP below 5%. The party is traditionally weak there, and with the CSU covering virtually every issue and taking every position from left to right, FDP voters can as well vote CSU.

It's possible, however, that we see lower FW numbers on election day. As the survey quoted by Franknburger shows, their core support (in non-communal elections) is not very big, and as the CSU has regained its strenght, the FW appeal as "a better CSU" might vanish.

[ERvND]

I tend to interprete the data the other way round: 48-49% appears to be the 'high water mark' for the CSU (bye, bye 50+X). Even if the FW's appeal as 'a better CSU' might vanish (which is anything but apparent, looking at the state elections poll), most of FW voters are not coming 'home' to the CSU, but disperse in various directions.

It's true, 48-49% seems to be the new "high water mark" for the CSU. That's more than enough for them, however. Even with 43%, they missed an absolute majority by only two seats, if I remember correctly. So it has always been clear that something around 45% would suffice for a renewed absolute majority. In the current political climate, that's absolutely given.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

The referendum is cancelled, as the FDP backed down and agreed to abolish the fees trough a parliamentary decision.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

I don't think this will be a major issue. If it turns out to be one, Seehofer will clear it away in time, as he's done with every controversial issue.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Remember that the election will take place in six months, and the Bavarian economy is still very stable today. For a substantial shift during this time, the economic collapse would have to be of epic proportions. And even in this case, Bavaria would still be better off than most other states, which is, after all, the CSU's main argument for everything.

@ palandio: Sure, the CSU was overestimated the last times, but that was largely due to the underestimation of FW and, to a lesser extent, FDP. The newer polls include a substantial support for the FW (8% is not nothing, after all), and in consequence, the CSU is relatively weak, at 48%. As I wrote above, however, that's still more than enough for them.

[ERvND]

46% Black/Yellow
46% Red/Green/Dark-Red

The roof, the roof, the roof is on fire ...

I've said it in 2009, and I say it now: Black-yellow will be reelected.

The following backlash, however, is also already in the books. Black-yellow had no real common "project" from the beginning (it became apparent in the coalition agreement talks), and they have no "project" now. They have no majority in the Bundesrat. Moreover, government fatigue will set in after so many years with Merkel. If everything plays out as expected, the SPD's Kraft can already hope for a good opportunity in 2017.

[ERvND]

It would say that this year the CDU might stand a good chance:
Petra Sitte (LINKE) will start from her 33.7% in 2009, get some incumbent bonus (say 3-6%), lose some points (4-10%) because the LINKE is not in a very good shape at the moment, so altogether 27%-35%

The CDU will start from 30.9% in 2009 and will likely get back some FDP voters, so altogether say
30%-36%.

The SPD will start from 16.3%. In 2005 their proportional vote performance was 33.6%, but probably this time they will get way below 30%. Additionally they don't have the incumbent bonus anymore.

So it's LINKE against CDU, with CDU slightly favored.

Actually, this math applies to many seats in the east.

I think it's possible that outside of their stronghold Brandenburg, the SPD will win no single seat in former GDR territory.

Edit: I just realized this was already the case in 2009. Well, it won't change this year.

[ERvND]

Protip for all undecideds: Your decision won't matter anyway. Merkel and black-yellow will win handily. Only 2017 matters.

[ERvND]

A propos right-wing party: How many votes do you think will the AfD get? I hope they won't get over the 5%-threshold and likely they won't but who knows...

After the Pirates' demise, the AfD certainly has the potential to become the next big protest party.

For the next elections however, they come a bit too late. Studies show that the result of an election is mostly settled ca. 3 months before election day. For now, this means around June. A party only to be founded in April comes too late for that. They'd be relevant if the FDP was close to 5%, syphoning away crucial FDP votes. But since the FDP is really much stronger (I see them around 8-9%), this won't be important, also.

So, while the AfD won't be relevant this time, they could easily become after the election, especially if the black-yellow coalition talks don't go so well (as last time). In this case, the outrage of disappointed center-right voters might foster the AfD.