NATO

[Big Abraham]

Should be entirely disbanded.

But then again, according to half this forum, I'm just a tankie/Russian bot, so what do I know?

[Big Abraham]

Should be entirely disbanded.

But then again, according to half this forum, I'm just a tankie/Russian bot, so what do I know?

Actually I'd like to ask you what should happen there, because certain problems we're having now aren't going to dissapear.

What should happen... where? On the Russian border? Within NATO member states?

Should be entirely disbanded.

why?

Even on the terms proscribed by the architects of American imperialism, the usefulness of NATO ceased to exist after 1991. NATO's supposed original purpose, to deter the West from a Warsaw Pact invasion, had been fulfilled. Since then, NATO has become nothing more than the military arm of American regime change in the far-flung corners of the world, and in Europe it has served only to resuscitate the very issue it claimed victory over: Russian aggression.

[Big Abraham]

Even on the terms proscribed by the architects of American imperialism, the usefulness of NATO ceased to exist after 1991. NATO's supposed original purpose, to deter the West from a Warsaw Pact invasion, had been fulfilled. Since then, NATO has become nothing more than the military arm of American regime change in the far-flung corners of the world, and in Europe it has served only to resuscitate the very issue it claimed victory over: Russian aggression.

wait wait wait...are you really suggesting Russia wouldn't have invaded Georgia and Ukraine if NATO was NOT around?  You know that's goofy right?  I'm guessing you'd be ok with Russia in control of the Baltics again too.  Well I wouldn't be, the people it Latvia wouldn't be and I know Kal ain't ok with that either.  The Soviet Union was not properly defeated.  They reorganized, turned a few ideological nobs a little and then returned to being what they were before, with a slightly lighter load by letting the PRC take the lead in giving buckets of money and weapons to corrupt douchenozzles in the third world.  It's better in a lot of ways for them, their corrupt leaders can more freely flaunt their wealth in front of the plebs now.  It was rather embarrassing when they did that in 1979.

Russia had mostly cordial relations with Ukraine prior to about 2008. Relations have only significantly deteriorated since then, when American officials proposed bringing the Ukraine into the fold of the NATO member states, which of course Russia adamantly opposes. Do you not think that NATO expansion has done a great deal to exacerbate tensions with Russia? Do you not think that Putin is more apt to describe himself as feeling cornered and isolated as a result of American policy towards the Russians?

[Big Abraham]

Russia had mostly cordial relations with Ukraine prior to about 2008.  Relations have only significantly deteriorated since then,

that will happen when Russia gets caught rigging your elections, right?  That should significantly deteriorate relations I would think.  Do you disagree?  'cause that would be a weird argument to have.

There is absolutely no evidence for that. Thousands of international observers monitored the 2010 election and found no evidence of rigging or electoral fraud, and the OSCE called the election transparent and honest. At any rate, the deterioration of relations occurred before Yanukovych was elected.

when American officials proposed bringing the Ukraine into the fold of the NATO member states,

too bad we didn't.  Ukraine would still be whole if we had.  Same with Georgia.  Which is why I favor expansion.

You're willing to risk an all-out war with Russia just so you can augment your holy military alliance? That's pretty foolish.

Also, Georgia is still "whole". Sure, the ethnic Georgians were expelled from South Ossetia, and Russian military bases were established there, but neither South Ossetia nor Abkhazia were formally annexed by Russia in the same way that the Crimea was.

which of course Russia adamantly opposes.

of course they do, the bully always hates getting resistance

The lack of self-awareness is astounding.

Do you not think that NATO expansion has done a great deal to exacerbate tensions with Russia?

it's not helped, but that doesn't mean Russia would have been content had it been shut down.  There is zero evidence of that.

Like I said, relations had been more or less cordial before the contentious issue of NATO expansion, which, as I've pointed out elsewhere, goes against an assurance made by the United States that NATO would not move eastward.

Do you not think that Putin is more apt to describe himself as feeling cornered and isolated as a result of American policy towards the Russians?

probably, but again, I don't care if bullies feel cornered and isolated.  In fact, I think they should be cornered, isolated and then put down like dogs if they don't play ball.

I hear rhetoric like this all the time coming from hawks like yourself in the media and the political sphere, and they're usually the same people who have the audacity to turn around and criticise Russia for deteriorating relations with the West. If you're advocating for Russia being "cornered, isolated, and then put down like dogs", don't be surprised when the Russians push back.

[Big Abraham]

indeed, which is why I was referring to 2004

Are you kidding me? Daniel Fried, an official in the U.S. State Department, rushed to Ukraine following the "Orange Revolution" in 2004 and, in no uncertain terms, emphasised unambiguous American support or Ukraine’s NATO and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and then you want to turn around and talk about "Russian rigging", for which there is no evidence? And despite whatever Daniel Fried or Yuschenko wanted, NATO was extremely unpopular with the Ukrainian population.

Russia is going to start a war it can't possibly win because they got surrounded by liberal democracies?  That's a million times more foolish.

This has nothing to do with being "surrounded by liberal democracies"; this is about bringing American red-lines to the Russian border. It's no different than if the Warsaw Pact had expanded up to American borders, despite Russian assurances to the contrary, only to then hear the Russians talking about how the Americans just need to learn to accept their fate.

did that spinning make you dizzy?  "Just because we've taken over part of your country, ethnically cleansed it, administrate it, won't let you come here, we haven't actually announced it publicly yet, so that makes it totally yours!"  That's crazy man.

Georgia is not being administered by Russia; after 2008 Russia withdrew its troops from there, including the South Ossetian and Abkhazian buffer zones, and handed over its oversight to the EU. It is, therefore, decidedly different than the situation in the Crimean Peninsula, which Putin saw fit to carve two Russian federal subjects out of and doesn't even pretend like it's Ukrainian territory.

non-expansion of NATO was talked about, it was never part of any deal.  They lost, they were not in a very good position to make deals, they should be thankful we let them keep as much control as we did.  If the shoes were switched I wouldn't imagine their leaders would have been as understanding.

It depends on how you define "deal". There were never any binding treaties, but it's misinformed at best to portray NATO expansion as anything other than a broken promise on the part of the United States. The Secretary of State at the time, on three separate occasions, assured that NATO would "not move an inch towards the east" and that NATO expansion would also be unacceptable even for the United States, with the "end result" (in his own words) not expanding the jurisdiction of NATO in exchange for the re-unification of Germany. Keep in mind this was a central point in the negotiations regarding Germany at this time. In fact, one of the things that caused Gorbachev to agree to German re-unification was the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance at a NATO summit, which maintained that, though NATO forces could be present in West Germany, they would not move beyond this.

all they have to do is stop being douche bags, it's not hard.

Once again, your lack of self-awareness is astounding.

[Big Abraham]

Unless one thinks Russia is going to unilaterally pick a fight with NATO, there is no reasonable reason to believe locking in more free nations behind collective defense would increase the chance of world war.

The worsening of relations between Russia and the West brought about as a result of NATO expansion certainly doesn't increase the likelihood of peace; and all history and evidence (and, quite frankly, common sense) indicates that, the more and more that two hostile powers increase their hostility towards one another, the likelihood of world war increases.

To hit the 'but NATO said they wouldn't move East' thing - first of all, this was a 'promise' made by an individual policymaker who left office in 1992, not by 'the United States'. Second, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, not to a Russian leader and certainly not to 'Russia'.

That "individual policymaker" was the Secretary of State, who in his official capacity represented the position of U.S. foreign policy during international talks and negotiations, which is exactly what this was an example of. And yeah, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, who also represented the position of Soviet foreign policy during international talks and negotiations. And since Russia is pretty clearly the successor state to the USSR (hence why they inherited their permanent seat on the UNSC), it really seems like you're grasping at straws here.

There's a reason public support for NATO accession was so high in Eastern European countries in the early 2000s.

It wasn't. As a pointed out in my response to dead0man, NATO was decidedly unpopular among Ukrainians, according to a 2008 poll which showed an abysmal 21% of the population favouring NATO membership, compared with 53% who were opposed. And this was after the deterioration of relations between the pro-Western Ukrainian government and Russia.

[Big Abraham]

Unless one thinks Russia is going to unilaterally pick a fight with NATO, there is no reasonable reason to believe locking in more free nations behind collective defense would increase the chance of world war.

The worsening of relations between Russia and the West brought about as a result of NATO expansion certainly doesn't increase the likelihood of peace; and all history and evidence (and, quite frankly, common sense) indicates that, the more and more that two hostile powers increase their hostility towards one another, the likelihood of world war increases.

To hit the 'but NATO said they wouldn't move East' thing - first of all, this was a 'promise' made by an individual policymaker who left office in 1992, not by 'the United States'. Second, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, not to a Russian leader and certainly not to 'Russia'.

That "individual policymaker" was the Secretary of State, who in his official capacity represented the position of U.S. foreign policy during international talks and negotiations, which is exactly what this was an example of. And yeah, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, who also represented the position of Soviet foreign policy during international talks and negotiations. And since Russia is pretty clearly the successor state to the USSR (hence why they inherited their permanent seat on the UNSC), it really seems like you're grasping at straws here.

There's a reason public support for NATO accession was so high in Eastern European countries in the early 2000s.

It wasn't. As a pointed out in my response to dead0man, NATO was decidedly unpopular among Ukrainians, according to a 2008 poll which showed an abysmal 21% of the population favouring NATO membership, compared with 53% who were opposed. And this was after the deterioration of relations between the pro-Western Ukrainian government and Russia.

1. This is why we have training for foreign policy experts instead of relying on 'common sense'. 'All history and evidence', most significantly the contrasting history of the Second World War and Cold War, as well as the Obama 'reset', show that appeasement fails to prevent conflict, while deterrence succeeds. I would also ask you to read the last paragraph of my previous post and stop claiming that Russian aggression is the 'result' of NATO expansion, given it is empirically false.

2. What individuals say, especially term-limited individuals, does not have legal or really even ethical force, especially when there is as significant an institutional break as there was in 1991. For the record, when states make 'promises', they sign documents. Since we're discussing the grounds on which Russia can be considered "the" successor state to the Soviet Union, here's a good example.

3. Must have missed Ukraine being admitted to NATO in 2008. Would have nice, because a seventh of the country wouldn't be under hostile occupation today had they been.

1. Even Kissinger, Shultz, and Perry no longer care for deterrence theory, which should go to show how thoroughly repudiated it has become. The least violent parts of the Cold War were during détente; when tensions escalate over states, or when you try to pursue a "containment" strategy, you have the Cuban missile crisis, proxy wars in Vietnam and Korea, etc. And since Russia and America are both nuclear powers, any chance of war is therefore also a chance of nuclear war.

2. States can make promises when they sign documents, but also when they make verbal agreements. Both in national jurisdiction and international politics, verbal promises can also acquire legal validity, and even legally non-binding agreements are regarded as essential instruments in international politics, as was especially the case during the Cold War. And regarding the point on Russia being the successor state of the Soviet Union (which seems fairly self-evident; look at the START I Treaty, for instance), it still doesn't diminish the fact, one way or another, that the United States went against its assurance not to move eastward, and so I'm sure you can understand why the Russians would regard this as a slight.

3. The poll was on the hypothetical question of NATO membership, a policy which the Ukrainian government was then attempting to pursue.

[Big Abraham]

2. States can make promises when they sign documents, but also when they make verbal agreements. Both in national jurisdiction and international politics, verbal promises can also acquire legal validity, and even legally non-binding agreements are regarded as essential instruments in international politics, as was especially the case during the Cold War. And regarding the point on Russia being the successor state of the Soviet Union (which seems fairly self-evident; look at the START I Treaty, for instance), it still doesn't diminish the fact, one way or another, that the United States went against its assurance not to move eastward, and so I'm sure you can understand why the Russians would regard this as a slight.

Which led the to committ even greater breach of the international commitments by invading a sovereign country and annexing part of its territory, despite being a part to the Budapest Memorandum, among other things.

The United States breached the Budapest Memorandum by meddling in the affairs there during the 2013 uprising by sponsoring and defending with American money the coup which overthrew Yanukovych.

[Big Abraham]

1. I think you are confusing nuclear deterrence with deterrence through collective balancing. I actually posted a thread about the former recently, which I'd be interested to hear your take on given it didn't get much attention. Re: your second sentence, I don't think you're completely thinking through the causal mechanism on where the great power war is going to come from. I think it's fairly clear that the odds of Korea or Vietnam escalating to nuclear war between the superpowers was quite low, because neither side valued victory enough to escalate it to such an extent. Where the threat of war arises is where there is a miscalculation of these priorities, as in Cuba: Soviet leaders did not believe the Americans were willing to go to war over it, when in fact they were (this is exactly the same causal mechanism which led to WWI, by the way). This is exactly why collective defense is so important to prevent wars: it formalizes these 'red lines' and makes such a miscalculation less likely. For this same reason, introducing doubt into collective defense, as the current administration has, greatly increases the chance of such a miscalculation. The only scenario in which weakening collective defense would decrease the chance of war is if one believes a country like Russia will attack an ally even with the certainty that the alliance will hold, in which case the better option would be to strengthen the alliance to change these calculations. Fortunately for everyone, I think it's clear that Russia is neither powerful enough nor aggressive enough to do so.

Nuclear deterrence and "deterrence through collective balancing" are based on one and the same premise; namely, that by virtue of their armed forces, a nation can deter an adversarial force by threat of attack or invasion. Whether the fighting is done with nuclear or conventional weapons is only incidental. The mere notion of any "collective balancing" arrangement being conducted by the United States is absurd, considering that Russia has so greatly diminished in power and international influence following the collapse of the Soviet Union that America has since remained the sole undisputed superpower. If there is anything to be balanced in the global balance of power, it is American military hegemony.

The poll in Political Debate I never had the chance to look at when it was first posted, unfortunately. I would post a more in-depth response here but I don't want to de-rail this thread too much, but suffice it to say I am of the belief that the existence of nuclear weapons makes the entire world less safe and that total nuclear disarmament worldwide should be a priority for the near future. At the very least, steps must be taken to reduce nuclear stockpiles, and the possibility of them ever being used in a military engagement.

2. It remains that the 'United States' did not make any assurances to 'Russia'. It's clear that Russian policymakers claim to see it that way, but given that Russia has obviously not been an advocate for the formalization of verbal assurances in the past, this is no reason to take what they say at face value nor to particularly care about it.

What else would you call the leader of United States foreign policy three times declaring there would be no expansion? What else would you call the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance? And I can assure you informal verbal agreements were used many times during the Cold War, being frequently employed in the policy of negotiations between both countries.

3. But they didn't? I'm not sure what you mean to get at here.

I know, I wrote that in response to your "must have missed Ukraine being admitted to NATO in 2008". I was just trying to clarify what the poll was about.

Start watching less RT before you embarrass yourself again yet again like this. I really don't mind discussing these issues with people who disagree with me, because I find them interesting, but I would appreciate it if you are going to continue engaging on them that you make at least a minimum effort to separate fact from blatant and transparent propaganda lines.

My position is not the same as that of the Russian government. The Kremlin maintains that the Euromaidan was almost entirely an external force; something engendered solely by the U.S. and NATO-backed forces to prop up an anti-Russian regime in Kiev. My position, one well within the mainstream of international journalism, is that the 2013 uprising was mostly an internal force that nevertheless had strong Western backing and interference. We know, for example, that the United States had been involved in the Ukrainian crisis by funding pro-Western organisations and by investing billions of dollars in the region, and furthering to economically intervene in the country and integrate it closer with the West. By having such a heavy-handed play in the Ukrainian transfer of power, Ukraine's sovereignty was certainly undermined. Not that this, of course, absolves Russia of blame for the Crimean annexation; all it serves to do is shine some light on the matter.

[Big Abraham]

I don't see how you can possibly argue this. The fundamental problem with nuclear deterrence is not that it doesn't usually work, it's that if you screw it up, everyone dies.

It is correct that American power is significantly stronger than Russian power. Do you not see the different ways those powers use their influence and what it results in, especially in Europe? That is, do you understand why states like Estonia and Ukraine are more interested in balancing against Russia than against the United States? If you don't, I really cannot help you.

Of course I do; that's what the Cold War was. And new a newer, albeit more moderate one has emerged in Europe between Russia and the West, with its primary catalyst being NATO expansion. I can full well understand why Estonia and Ukraine are more interesting in tipping the scales towards the United States; America has poured a large sum of money into both those countries, and maintains a large military presence there, so no doubt the Baltics will show their gratitude.

Yeah, I'm not denying that leaders talk to each other in the course of negotiations. But such statements do not constitute a bindable assurance, particularly when the state which the recipient represented ceased to exist. Again - not denying that Russian leaders use this as an excuse to play the victim, just saying that there's no reason to care.

As for that document, I honestly do not know what you think it says or means.

That document was a crucial and decisive one in persuading Gorbachev to allow the dissolution of the GDR and the re-unification of Germany with NATO membership. But, I see your confusion. I actually had that document confused with another one, which was the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, which was signed in Moscow in 1990. Article 5 of the treaty maintains that, though German forces assigned to NATO could be stationed on the territory of the East, there would be no foreign forces east of West Germany.

At any rate, what does matter is that there was an explicit message from the leaders the United States that they would not be moving into Eastern Europe, and even you have not contested this. They clearly have not lived up to this message, which, I would hope, you can understand why many in Russia would view as a betrayal.

Excellent backtrack, but not quite far enough. Funding for civil society does not constitute "sponsoring and defending a coup", especially when  there was no coup.

I also think the fact that you consider investment and Western integration as some sort of hostile move 'shines some light' on the direction you are coming from. What this constitutes, to repeat, is increased freedom of expression, stronger civil society, greater rule of law, and broader economic liberties. Again, if you prioritize the self-defined geopolitical influence of autocratic regimes over a country's chance to achieve this, you should not be surprised that your position is unpopular.

It wasn't a backtrack; you can compare my previous two posts side by side and find they in no way disagree with each other. My position, as I mentioned months ago on that Ukrainian Support Act thread, is that the West bears a lot of responsibility for meddling in the affairs of the Ukraine by funnelling money to them, instigating a propaganda campaign, and helping to further the 2014 Ukrainian uprisings. This is a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. That's not to say the Russians haven't done anything there either; I'm sure they have. Let's not just continue to adhere to the silly "we're the good guys, they're the bad guys" mentality that you seem to have in the NATO/Russia debate.

At any rate Karpatsky, I do also want to say that I appreciate your time in responding to my posts; our relations may not always be the most cordial, but I always appreciate having an interesting discussion.

[Big Abraham]

Yeah, the only reason the Baltics like us more than Russia is that we've poured large sums of money at them and have a "large military presence" (it's got nothing at all to do with how Russians treated them for the last 300+ years) and what the west has done (give money, "propoganda") in Ukraine is totally comparable to what the Russians have done (invaded, murdered, shot passenger planes out of the sky, give money, "propoganda", Holodomor).  

I did not say that was the only reason. There are without a doubt others factors at play. However, it's pretty hard to deny that America has a vested interest in keeping the Baltic republics and Ukraine non-neutral and aligned towards NATO, and thus the United States has taken steps to ensure this.

I've been very critical of the U.S. foreign policy for long time. I've opposed the Iraqi War from day one and participated in numerous demonstrations. I opposed the intervention in Libya. But I'm consistent enough to see which side is the aggressor in this conflict, and which side poses bigger threat.

You can't play a staunch anti-imperialist if this means making apologies for Russia here. Otherwise it's just plain hypocrisy, and that attitude is no diffrent from the attitude of American neocons, just a diffrent master. Invoking "Russia's sphere of influence, NATO expansion in the east" is no diffrent than the U.S. invoking the Monroe Doctrine.

I think you mistake for apologism what I see plainly as trying to understand the root of the matter. It's very common in U.S. media and in the political discourse to portray Russia as the aggressor because "they're evil", "they just want power", "Putin is a dictator", whatever. And sure, many Americans will admit that America has at times been the aggressor, but whenever we were, we had a reason, a just cause. Not the Russians, they're simply evil.

Except the Russians too have a cause, and I think it rests on a very good point, a point which is often overlooked. I'm trying to draw attention to that point, show that there are things the U.S. is doing to persuade Putin to act the way that he does by making the situation in Eastern Europe a more dangerous political chessboard, and am calling on the U.S. and NATO to turn their eyes away from this region to keep it neutral and not fan the flames of conflict. This is of course based on the precondition that Russia, for better or for worse, sees these countries at their border (the Baltics, Ukraine) as being a part of their sphere of influence and sees the campaign to peel them away from Moscow and towards the West as a provocation. And sure, Russia maybe shouldn't feel that way about those countries, just like the U.S. shouldn't feel that way about Latin America. But they both do. That's geopolitics. And if there's a war, the residents of both regions at the end of the day aren't going to care about the Russia/NATO debate, because they just want to survive.

I have condemned Russian acts of aggression, nor am I a fan of Putin. I have called the Russian annexation of Crimea a crime under international law. I'm not trying to make excuses for Russia everywhere and always. But, the reason I have much more of a focus on attacking American imperialism than I do on Russian imperialism is because I consider the former a much more serious global threat, and the evidence bears that out.

Let's not just continue to adhere to the silly "we're the good guys, they're the bad guys" mentality that you seem to have in the NATO/Russia debate.

At any rate Karpatsky, I do also want to say that I appreciate your time in responding to my posts; our relations may not always be the most cordial, but I always appreciate having an interesting discussion.

Since dead0 and Kalwejt have already responded to your post, I want to focus on this in particular because I think it is at the core of the issue, and if it can't be overcome there is little value to be had in further discussion. "Good guys-bad guys" is clearly an oversimplification. Like Kalwejt, I am not an unquestioning supporter of US foreign policy. I do not hold that US foreign policy makers always make good decisions, nor even that they never make unethical decisions. However, broadly speaking, and especially clearly when talking about NATO and Russia, it is true. Whether it is truly 'benevolent' or not is irrelevant and not really answerable (there are both internationalists and primalists in the US foreign policy establishment) - empirically, US influence advances human rights, rule of law, democracy, and anti-corruption.

Russian influence, by contrast, advances corruption, patronage, repression, and hyper-capitalist oligarchy. Again, whether it is 'malevolent' is an irrelevant and ideological question - Russian foreign policy makers tend to be nationalists or Eurasianists, neither of which consider any of these things particularly important. This is not at all to claim that there is no corruption, patronage, repression, hypercapitalism, or oligarchy in the United States or its allies, but it is not at all comparable to the situation in Russia and its allies.

That is more or less taking a "good guys bad guys" approach. Sure, it's more fine-tuned than that, but you've stated in no uncertain terms that you see U.S. global influence is for the benefit of all parties because of "spreading democracy and human rights" and you see Russian influence as to the detriment of world development.

This is, far and away, the single biggest dividing factor in our worldview, because I cannot agree to your sanguine portrayal of American foreign policy. I can outline a few reasons why — the most important is that the U.S. cannot tolerate operating anyone outside of the American-managed system (which includes the entire globe, not just the countries located near its shores), hence interventions in Guatemala, Laos, Nicaragua, and Grenada, countries that posed no military threat to the United States. Channelling what I said in my above response to Kalwejt, the motives must be understood. It's not enough to portray the Cold War, for example, as an ideological standoff between the two superpowers. The reasons why America and Russia acted the way that they did was the the goals of the domestic elites in each country. Russia saw it as a war against their satellites; America saw it as a war against the Third World, and it had a functional utility for both (which is why it lasted so long).

I agree that the fact that the American citizens enjoy so many civil liberties, relative to other countries, is a good thing. However, I have not seen the expansion of these liberties borne out when America takes to the world stage, probably because the highest rungs of the managerial class in the U.S., who largely direct foreign policy, aren't interested in it. Nor are they interested in it in Moscow, for that matter.

In saying this, I am not relying on anything which could be called 'western propaganda' by any stretch. I have lived for years in Ukraine. I had the misfortune to live for a few years in Russia. I have met democrats and nationalists from both countries. I have relatives and friends who have participated in events like Euromaidan, and who have fought and died in the Donbass. I have heard at length the financial consequences for ordinary people of the war in Ukraine and of sanctions in Russia. I have been to grocery stores with no milk and thirty-dollar apples. I have met and listened to talks by American, Russian, and Ukrainian policymakers. I have nearly been run over by sports cars and limousines with blue sirens on top of them. I have paid bribes to policemen. I have seen protesters beaten and arrested. And I have for years on end listened to people like you in America or on the internet tell me that they know better what is right for these people.

I am not saying this to tell you you should just shut up and listen to me, but to put in perspective on what grounds I believe what you seem to see as naivety. To be honest, I do simply ignore most people who have the views you do, because to draw a moral equivalence between these two systems requires deep ignorance and misinformation about empirical reality. I understand that this is a difficult thing to discern from afar, because on top of the US media being extremely uninterested in foreign policy in general, the Russian government has gone to great lengths to spread misinformation, and it is clear from the tropes you use to discuss these issues that you are a victim of these efforts. This is neither surprising nor your fault - these efforts have unfortunately been quite successful in left-wing circles because of the preexistence of rightful criticism of US policy in other areas. I myself was banned from /r/LSC, on which I used to be an active participant, for pushing back on disinformation lines regarding a Ukrainian political event which I had been to. I'm not going to tell you for obvious reasons that you should go spend a few years in Russia and Ukraine, although that would be an extremely effective way to rid you of your current opinion. Instead, I would just ask you to take a step back from your ideological sources and shortcuts, even if you think they are reliable in other cases, and take a new view at what is happening and what outcome you actually think is best.

I don't see you as particularly naive, and it's one of the reasons I enjoy having these kinds of discussions with you. However, I really do not think you have given much thought to the motives of the directors of American foreign state policy. The people in the State Department and executive branch see the undeveloped and unaligned parts of the globe as free to open up and exploit it, as they did in the Third World. They see Eastern Europe no differently. It has little, if anything to do with "human rights and freedom". America has been willing to tolerate social reform only when the labour is kept in a weakened position and a climate favourable to foreign investment is preserved. We have consistently opposed democracy if its results can't be controlled.

[Big Abraham]

I don't see you as particularly naive, and it's one of the reasons I enjoy having these kinds of discussions with you. However, I really do not think you have given much thought to the motives of the directors of American foreign state policy. The people in the State Department and executive branch see the undeveloped and unaligned parts of the globe as free to open up and exploit it, as they did in the Third World. They see Eastern Europe no differently. It has little, if anything to do with "human rights and freedom". America has been willing to tolerate social reform only when the labour is kept in a weakened position and a climate favourable to foreign investment is preserved. We have consistently opposed democracy if its results can't be controlled.

OK, now we are getting somewhere, though I find dubious your claim to know the hidden motives of people in the State Department. I'd be extremely interested to know where you get your insider information. Fortunately, as I said, what they think isn't relevant to come to a conclusion. Let's start with this: do you think ordinary people have a better chance of achieving a good outcome in a liberal democracy such as Latvia, or in a plutocracy such as Belarus?

The motives of the American leaders aren't secretive. I mean, on occasion they are recorded only in classified documents, which then become leaked to the public through Wikileaks or something similar, but more often than not the directors of imperial policy directly and plainly state their intentions while framing them in the context of "national security" and "preservation of our freedoms". Take the war in Kuwait, for example. The State Department made it no secret that the potential loss of oilfields was a major catalyst in the decision to go to war, because this meant that Wall Street and their allies would no longer be in control of oil prices. The State Department is on record as saying that Near Eastern oil is a "stupendous source of strategic power" and "one of the greatest prizes in world history". So naturally America should have control over it, right?

I do think that ordinary people have a better chance of achieving a good outcome in Latvia than in Belarus, and I'd much rather live in Western than in Eastern Europe. This much I have never disputed. I don't necessarily object to the form of government these countries have, nor do I wish to have their independence threatened by an external force. What I believe, which is quite dissimilar to the pragmatism which you seem to adhere to, is a commitment to the principle of self-determination and non-provocation towards other states. I do not believe it is incumbent upon America or NATO to "protect" anyone from plutocracy, and attempting to do so will objectively lead to a worse standard of living for these people, which is what we see happening in the Donbass.

[Big Abraham]

That American foreign policymakers don't ignore strategic considerations doesn't mean they don't care about moralistic ones. This is the very next paragraph in the cable you quote:

It seems to us to be important that this area, because of its resources and geographical position athwart the sea and air routes between East and West, should be in the hands of a people following the paths of democratic civilization rather than those of Eastern dictatorships. The British publicly and officially admit that they are no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without our help. We are inclined to believe that a policy of inactivity or “drift” on our part will result in a progressive deterioration of the influence of democratic civilization in the Near East.

Even in the previous post I had said that U.S. strategic concerns are often clothed in phrases like "spreading democracy", "national defense", etc. So of course they employ moralistic arguments. It does the United States quite a bit of good to frame the conflict as an "us versus them", "freedom versus tyranny" to rally the public behind their support; and no doubt the Russians do the same within their own territory. I mean, after all, who'd wanna side with tyranny over democracy?

But let's not try and pretend like there weren't greater interests the architects of these wars were preoccupied with. It doesn't take a mind reader to know that the Bush administration's personal opinion of Saddam Hussein really didn't play much of a role in the decision to invade Iraq; all the evidence points in the direction of economic and strategic interests being the outsized factor. It's no different than their dealings with Eastern Europe and Russia.

Well, to start off with, dictatorships by definition are not 'self-determining', but more importantly, yet again, why do you prioritize what you call 'non-provocation' of aggressive powers (when, yet again, there is no reason to believe their aggression is the result of Western 'provocation') over the self-determination of democratic states?

Because the non-proliferation of military hostilities is always going to be of more concern to me than subjecting foreign policy positions to a public vote. If a majority of Americans said they wanted to bomb the Middle East, I'd be against that too.

These states and their people evidently want to be part of NATO, and with good reason. Re: Donbass, this case exactly contradicts the rest of your position. NATO is exactly the reason there is no Donbass in Latvia. Had Ukraine been part of NATO, there would not be a war in Donbass.

That really is debatable. The Donbass is solidly pro-Russia and anti-NATO, both in terms of leadership there and in terms of sentiment among the general population. Had Ukraine become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance it would have been contrary to the wishes of eastern Ukraine and this could well have caused large-scale unrest in the region. That is mostly an incidental point, but still, an important one.

[Big Abraham]

You suspect this, but have no way of knowing it. And regardless, as I said two posts ago, this is totally irrelevant to the empirical impact of American influence on positive outcomes. You are advocating for denying ordinary people the opportunity of a better life for the dubious benefit of spiting the US foreign policy establishment.

No. American foreign policy initiatives do not, on average, lead to positive outcomes or opportunities for a better life for the vast majority of people. What I had said was that a liberal democratic form of government was probably better for the average Lithuanian or Estonian than becoming subjects of a Russian occupation, which is quite a different claim.

You misunderstood me - why should we prioritize not 'provoking' Russia (when, again, collective security decreases, not increases, the chance of conflict) over the self-determined desire of democratic nations to engage in collective security?

For one, NATO is much more than a collective defense mechanism. It's a global operations programme that has violated the sovereignty of nations, toppled legitimate governments, and completely fails to abide by the principle of "the self-determined desire of democratic nations" in the first place. For second, like I've said, the enlargement of NATO violates an American agreement and continues to grow American dominion over Eastern Europe. After all, NATO was never designed to protect the Ukraine or other Soviet republics; it was meant to protect the Western powers, which are not under threat. If you want to talk about "collective balancing", it won't be found in the form of Russia being expected to capitulate to whatever the United States wants, which will probably embitter them further.

Before the question of NATO membership of the Ukraine was raised, there was relative peace in the region, and good relations with both Russia and the West maintain. It has only been since there was a political campaign to speed up NATO or European Community membership that there has been widespread violence in the area. It seems pretty plain that, had the question of NATO membership not been raised, the violence which has proceeded as a result would have been avoided.

It really isn't. The Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia, just for example, is not significantly less hostile to NATO or friendly to the Russian government than that in Ukraine, and in all cases in all cases this hostility and friendship is heavily overstated by Russophiles. The war in Donbass is a Russian invasion, not a homegrown revolt.

I wasn't talking about Estonia. I was speaking of Ukraine, which does have solid pro-Russian majorities in the east. And the instability in the Donbass began before the Russian invasion. From the beginning of 2014, pro-Russian protests took place in Donetsk and Luhansk which eventually escalated into an armed conflict between the separatist forces of these provinces and the Ukrainian government.

[Big Abraham]

The fact that the Lithuania and Estonia remain liberal democracies is the direct result of their membership in NATO.

The fact that Lithuania and Estonia are liberal democracies is the direct result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even absent NATO, there would have no incentive for Russia to annex these territories. Conquering the Baltic states is a losing proposition for the Russians no matter how one looks at it.

You can ask the Georgians and Moldovans what they think of your 'relative peace'. Not to mention, again and again and again, you are acting as if America went and brainwashed all the Estonians and Ukrainians to want anticorruption and rule of law. Why is it so hard to believe, given you have admitted that life is better in Western than Eastern Europe, that Ukrainians genuinely do not want to live under Russian domination?

You really seem to be fundamentally misunderstanding my point. I am not, nor have I ever been, of the belief that the Ukrainians would prefer to live under "Russian domination", nor am I looking for Russian domination in the region. The rule of law, and relative democracy, can and will remain in place without Washington's anti-Russian rhetoric and NATO operations in the East. Russia has no genuine interest in trying to recapture her "lost territories", much like how Britain isn't out there trying to reclaim India or the vast swaths of colonial land in Africa. This is even more true when you consider the amount of money they would have to invest into rebuilding after a war.

Estonia and Latvia also have Russian-majority regions.

True, but the ethnic divisions in those countries aren't nearly as noticeable as they are in the Donbass.

Let me ask you this: you seem to give the Russian government an immense benefit of the doubt on these issues, especially compared to the bitter cynicism . What is it that you actually want to happen in Eastern Europe? Do you want NATO to completely cease to exist, without a replacement? What do you imagine would be the result of that?

Yes, I would like NATO to completely cease to exist without a replacement, and if certain states in Central or Eastern Europe do have the desire to form a military alliance, they should do so without relying on American support. The result would be warmer relations with Russia; the North Atlantic military alliance has hitherto only been interested in deepening the crisis in the relations with Russia, and now it is the only argument that underlines the so-called importance and usefulness of NATO for the Western world.

And for the love of god, stop writing 'the Ukraine'. You have no excuse for this anymore, given I and others have explained it to you at length.

It's really just a force of habit at this point. I do not intend for any offense.

[Big Abraham]

You suspect this, but have no way of knowing it. And regardless, as I said two posts ago, this is totally irrelevant to the empirical impact of American influence on positive outcomes. You are advocating for denying ordinary people the opportunity of a better life for the dubious benefit of spiting the US foreign policy establishment.

No. American foreign policy initiatives do not, on average, lead to positive outcomes or opportunities for a better life for the vast majority of people. What I had said was that a liberal democratic form of government was probably better for the average Lithuanian or Estonian than becoming subjects of a Russian occupation, which is quite a different claim.

You misunderstood me - why should we prioritize not 'provoking' Russia (when, again, collective security decreases, not increases, the chance of conflict) over the self-determined desire of democratic nations to engage in collective security?

For one, NATO is much more than a collective defense mechanism. It's a global operations programme that has violated the sovereignty of nations, toppled legitimate governments, and completely fails to abide by the principle of "the self-determined desire of democratic nations" in the first place. For second, like I've said, the enlargement of NATO violates an American agreement and continues to grow American dominion over Eastern Europe. After all, NATO was never designed to protect the Ukraine or other Soviet republics; it was meant to protect the Western powers, which are not under threat. If you want to talk about "collective balancing", it won't be found in the form of Russia being expected to capitulate to whatever the United States wants, which will probably embitter them further.

Can you please provide a link to the actual agreement in question?

I've seen this same claim about an agreement mentioned a lot over the years, but I can never seem to find which agreement it is, much less a copy of it.

This entire article has a lot of interesting links and citations regarding the negotiations conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union about NATO expansion during the end of the Cold War. A transcript of the verbal agreement reached by Secretary of State James Baker and Gorbachev in 1990, which guarantees that "not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction", can be found here.

"Post hoc ergo propter hoc is an informal fallacy that states "Since event Y followed event X, event Y must have been caused by event X.  Post hoc is a particularly tempting error because correlation appears to suggest causality. The fallacy lies in a conclusion based solely on the order of events, rather than taking into account other factors potentially responsible for the result that might rule out the connection."

This is only an informal fallacy when the two things in question are correlated but there is otherwise no evidence for causation. This isn't true of the situation in Russia, since we know that NATO expansion has proved to be a major thorn in the side of Putin. This is not to say it is the only factor, but to deny that it is a factor at all is significantly more foolish.

[Big Abraham]

Russian decision makers, whether they be nationalists or Eurasianists, near-universally consider the fall of the Soviet Union to be a geopolitical tragedy (in Putin's words), and advocate for a reassertion of Russian domination over these territories.

There is some degree of Soviet nostalgia among both the Russian population and her statesmen. But your second assertion is non sequitur; there is no evidence that, absent NATO, Russia would have had rounded up the tanks and marched into Reval. Even had the Baltic republics never been members of the North Atlantic Alliance, the United States and most of the Western world would not have accepted an invasion of Estonia, nor does it make much tactical or strategic sense from a Russian viewpoint. Also, unlike in the Crimea, there is widespread anti-Russian sentiment among the Baltic population, which would make an annexation even more difficult to pull off.

There are dozens of reasons why it would simply not have made any sense for Russia to carry out an invasion of her neighbouring states, and you haven't provided any evidence other than pointing to the 2014 annexation of Crimea, which (1) did not occur in the Baltics, and (2) was after NATO had already expanded to Russian borders. Do you have any documentation or anything that Putin or Medvedev were planning on carrying out an invasion of Estonia prior to NATO membership?

Perhaps because the political facet of those ethnic divisions are hugely exacerbated by the near-monopoly of Russian state media on Russian-language broadcasts, which is strategically used to open opportunities for aggression - that do not exist in the Baltic States due to their membership in a certain collective defense organization.

There is little doubt that Putin sees a greater significance in Ukraine than in the Baltics, and for good reason. It's a huge expanse of flat land that France and Germany all crossed to strike at Russia herself. No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance the sworn enemy of Moscow moving into that region, nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West.

1. Why should Central or Eastern European states not be allowed to associate with the United States?

2. You are technically correct that ignoring and enabling Russian imperialism would result in warmer relations with Russia, at least in the short run. This, however, is not a desirable situation for anyone involved except for Russian autocrats and pro-Russian oligarchs in other countries.

1. I did not say that Central or Eastern European states, or indeed any state, should not be allowed to associate with America. I'm fine with the United States and any other country maintaining diplomatic relations and being on friendly terms with another sovereign state. I am, however, opposed to any kind of military alliance as a matter of principle.

2. Demonstrably false. Warmer relations with Russia would likely bring about an end to the sanctions which have had a negative impact on Russian trade, a corollary of which includes the well-being of ordinary citizens, as well as serving to make Eastern Europe less of a powder-keg which also improves the well-being of ordinary citizens.

[Big Abraham]

What does 'not accepting an invasion of Estonia' even mean if not defending them against that invasion, especially given you argue against sanctions below? In your view, is sternly-written words the only acceptable way for democratic nations to protect each other against aggression?

It means precisely that. To be clear, I'm not saying what America or Russia should or should not do in this particular instance; I'm merely describing how such an invasion would be received by the leaders of American foreign policy.

Sure, except for the part where they have repeatedly, so maybe you don't know the inner workings of the minds of Russian decision makers as well as you think you do. I have mentioned at length examples of Russian aggression in the post-Soviet sphere starting in 1992, so if you want you can go back and read those again. Besides this, it is ridiculous to demand that states have documented evidence of impending invasion of them themselves before making an attempt to secure themselves.

Pointing to invasions that took place during the imperial or Soviet era is not a good tactic, given that the economic, and political, conditions have changed considerably since then. Regarding your last point, I really don't know how you could be so obstinate: why should proper evidence and documentation not be considered the reasonable standard for a nation to launch a first-strike war? Otherwise such war would be seen as a preventative war which has been barred by the United Nations and is contrary to the principles of international law.

Wow, now who's playing 'good guys-bad guys'? So now the Russian government has the right to dominate its neighbors because it feared actual, unironic invasion by the Western democracies? Are you listening to yourself?

I'm not telling you who the bad guys or the good guys are. I'm just telling you what the Russian leaders would and would not accept.

Let me just quote you here, because it is hugely more appropriate in this case: Do you have any documentation or anything that France or Germany were planning a land invasion of a nuclear power at any point?

I was referring to the French invasion during the Napoleonic wars and the German invasion during the Second World War. Both of those were prior to the development of nuclear weapons.

So hold on for a second, earlier you dodged the peacekeeping results of collective defense by saying "NATO is much more than a collective defense mechanism". Are you now arguing against the concept of collective defense as a whole as morally unacceptable?

It's not a question of morality, but I am personally opposed to the existence of standing armies so naturally I am against military alliances as a matter of principle. At any rate, military alliances tend to lead to rather poor outcomes, including two world wars and the long-term threat of global nuclear warfare, so pardon me if I'm not too keen on the concept.

Well, to start off with, empirically the Russian population is much worse affected by Russian sanctions on the EU and the internal corruption and repression inherent to their oligarchic system of government than the mostly targeted sanctions imposed by the West, but besides this, I'm really interested in your theory that creating zero consequences for international aggression will somehow decrease the chance of bad outcomes in the future. Again, are you listening to yourself?

I cannot agree to the terms of the second part of this paragraph, insofar that the question, without the variable of NATO military presence in Eastern Europe, is meaningless. If you adhere to the principle of enacting consequences for international aggression, why do you oppose Russian sanctions on America or the European Union?