Tróis Rivieres Conference (1900) (Final Text)

[Lumine]

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Tróis Rivieres
1900, Empire of Québec

Her Imperial Majesty was beaming. Though moving slowly with great difficulty due to her advanced pregnancy, she had insisted on opening the inaugural session of the historic Conference, which would afterwards be left to the diplomatic delegation presided by the Foreign Minister, and to the Prince Consort for formal events. After warmly greeting Chairman Fitzgerald and several other delegates, the Empress gave a brief speech quoting from survivors of chemical weaponry, even citing among these the events of the North American War. Stressing the need to find international agreement, she encouraged delegates to spare no effort in finding a joint solution.

In a final, perhaps awkward comment, she noted that, should present diplomatic troubles in North America put the status of Québec as host into question, she'd be pleased to recommend Chairman Fitzgerald to preside instead upon request by the delegates.

[Lumine]

In order to ensure an orderly process of debate, the Québecois delegation presented a draft of a possible treaty. It was noted, however, that it was merely an extremely early draft proposal, with delegates encouraged to present their own drafts, amend the present one as needed be, or discard it if need be.

DRAFT PROPOSAL,
TREATY OF TROIS-RIVIERES

ARTICLE 1
Any form of biological warfare, as well as all forms of chemical warfare with the sole exception of non-lethal tear inducing irritants for emergency domestic situations; are hereby considered to be ungentlemanly forms of warfare.

ARTICLE 2
The previously mentioned forms of ungentlemanly warfare are hereby banned within the territory of the signatures for domestic use, and for international use in terms of pre-emptive or first-use, starting on January 1st, 1901.

ARTICLE 3
The stockpiling of agents for biological and chemical warfare is hereby prohibited. All current stockpiles of such agents must be disposed of entirely once Article 6 comes into effect.

ARTICLE 4
Research on chemical and biological warfare will only be allowed for the purposes of finding countermeasures, antidotes or for purely scientific purposes. Incentives and support will be provided for experts in such fields to switch to non-lethal research. Signatures must share their findings with the Ungentlemanly Warfare Commission in order to prevent and/or deter the start of a new arms race.

ARTICLE 5
The sale of agents for chemical and biological warfare will be made illegal starting on January 1st, 1901. Companies that held a role or stake in such fields until January 1st, 1900, and who may encounter financial losses as the result of this protocol, will be reasonably compensated by their respective nation.

ARTICLE 6
The signatories will further formally renounce the right to non-first usage of chemical and biological weapons in self-defence for all time after January 1st, 1902. To enforce this renunciation, all signatories will agree to enact immediate and full economic sanctions, including an economic embargo, against any nation that engages in ungentlemanly warfare after the aforementioned date. Signatories must also pass legislation or enact decrees that ensure compliance with Article 6.

ARTICLE 7
An Ungentlemanly Warfare Commission will be established in a city belonging to a neutral power, with participants from all signatories. Delegations from the Commission will be provided full access to signatory countries to ensure compliance with the previous articles. Suspicion of non-compliance must be brought to the Commission, who will issue a report – by majority vote – within 90 days outlining whether Article 6 ought to be invoked.

[Lumine]

Félix-Gabriel Marchand, Foreign Minister of the Empire, rose from his chair. Presiding in the absence of Her Majesty and the Prince Consort, he briefly addressed the concerns and proposals put forward by the Scandinavian and New Englander delegations and thanked them for their suggestions. He addressed the following points:

Regarding Article 5, what will be the source of the compensation for financial losses suffered by private actors be? Are these funds to come out of the state fisc? If not, where will these funds be raised?

The New England delegation concurs with the Scandinavian concern regarding Articles V. New England believes that the clause requiring that each nation compensate companies affected by this Treaty should be eliminated, or made optional, to allow each nation to decide independently how compensation to corporations involved in the relevant industries are compensated.

It is the view of Québec that, should there be compensation, the burden should be shouldered by the nations who have invested more heavily on these industries (and not by those who have failed or chosen not to develop these weapons), and thus come out of their own national budgets.

Ultimately, the latter part Article V is something that can indeed be handled by individual states. Should it prove agreeable, it could be amended in based on the New Englander suggestion, so that states MAY issue compensation to their national chemical weaponry industry if they desire, and chose the method that best suits them.

Regarding Article 7, His Majesty wishes to raise concerns that Commission Delegations having access to signatory countries may represent an undue infringement on state sovereignty, particularly if members of the Commission Delegation are comprised of national representatives of the signatory countries. To what extent will access by Commission Delegations by limited to ensure that the principle of state sovereignty is not infringed?

Regarding Article VII, New England concurs with Scandinavian concerns, requesting that the meaning of 'full access' be clarified.

It is agreed with Stockholm and Boston that the Article lends itself to problematic interpretations. For the Empire, the important matter is that there be some kind of supervision, but we are open to any possible redaction that accomplishes this without an infringement on state sovereignty. Should Stockholm or Boston be prepared to offer an alternative write-up, we'd be most grateful.

3. Finally, His Majesty wishes to propose an additional article. He is concerned over this treaty becoming binding on certain states prior to becoming binding on other states. Such a situation will encourage bad faith actors to delay ratification of this treaty. As such, His Majesty proposes an additional article to read: "Article 8: This treaty shall enter into force when 3/4 of recognized and fully sovereign states ratify the treaty."

Regarding the proposed Article VIII, New England is amenable - however, Chairman Fitzgerald notes that no bad faith actors have yet emerged and that the passage of Article VIII could delay general implementation of the treaty.

We understand where Scandinavia points towards with this concern, which is indeed meaningful. However, the strength of the treaty must come from the willingness of participants to take action against those who would still wield these monstrous weapons, and there's a question to be asked about the basis for recognition for states that will be included in the count to 3/4s.

If there is another workable criteria for the treaty to enter into effect we are prepared to consider it, but it would be ideal to leave the conference with a treaty signed by the participants and put in place at the earliest possible convenience.

[Lumine]

THIRD DRAFT PROPOSAL,
TREATY OF TROIS-RIVIERES

ARTICLE 1
Any form of biological warfare, as well as all forms of chemical warfare with the sole exception of non-lethal tear inducing irritants for emergency domestic situations; are hereby considered to be ungentlemanly forms of warfare.

ARTICLE 2
The previously mentioned forms of ungentlemanly warfare are hereby banned within the territory of the signatures for domestic use, and for international use in terms of pre-emptive or first-use, starting on January 1st, 1901.

ARTICLE 3
The stockpiling of agents for biological and chemical warfare is hereby prohibited. All current stockpiles of such agents must be disposed of entirely once Article 6 comes into effect.

ARTICLE 4
Research on chemical and biological warfare will only be allowed for the purposes of finding countermeasures, antidotes or for purely scientific purposes. Incentives and support will be provided for experts in such fields to switch to non-lethal research. Signatures must share their findings with the Ungentlemanly Warfare Commission in order to prevent and/or deter the start of a new arms race.

ARTICLE 5
The sale of agents for chemical and biological warfare will be made illegal starting on January 1st, 1901. Companies that held a role or stake in such fields until January 1st, 1900, and who may encounter financial losses as the result of this protocol, will may be reasonably compensated by their respective nation if they so decide, under their preferred mechanism.

ARTICLE 6
The signatories will further formally renounce the right to non-first usage of chemical and biological weapons in self-defence for all time after January 1st, 1902. To enforce this renunciation, all signatories will agree to enact immediate and full economic sanctions, including an economic embargo, against any nation that engages in ungentlemanly warfare after the aforementioned date. Signatories must also pass legislation or enact decrees that ensure compliance with Article 6.

ARTICLE 7
An Ungentlemanly Warfare Commission will be established in a city belonging to a neutral power, with participants from all signatories. Delegations from the Commission will be provided reasonably access to signatory countries to ensure compliance with the previous articles.

The Commission must ensure that the make up of delegations to specific countries places emphasis on neutral, non-aligned, or non-rival nations to the one to be inspected. Information thus collected will remain the private, exclusive property of of the Commission, which must enact regulations with harsh penalties for any actors who illegally access or divulge any of its contents.

In addition to this, the Scandinavian delegation would look favorably upon the inclusion of safeguards regarding both the national make up of the delegations sent for national inspections as well as the future propriety of the information they will collect to ensure that this information does not fall into the hands of state actors.

Suspicion of non-compliance must be brought to the Commission, who will issue a report – by majority vote – within 90 days outlining whether Article 6 ought to be invoked.

We have two proposals for an Article VIII regarding the treaty's entry into force:

-Scandinavian, mandating 3/4's of states with capability to create chemical and biological weapons. Their capability will be determined by an expert committee with members designated by the conference.

-Colombian, mandating more than one-half of recognized and fully sovereign states.

We would encourage participans to either vote or express their preference - and/or other proposals - to clarify where the consensus may be found.

[Lumine]

The Empire of Québec is highly supportive of an immediate prohibition of ungentlemanly warfare, the postponement of which relates more to initial expectations of what might be achievable.

Are there objections from the delegations regarding a changing of all dates (Jan 1. 1901 and 1902) to the treaty's entrance into force?

[Lumine]

THIRD DRAFT PROPOSAL,
TREATY OF TROIS-RIVIERES

ARTICLE 1
Any form of biological warfare, as well as all forms of chemical warfare with the sole exception of non-lethal tear inducing irritants for emergency domestic situations; are hereby considered to be ungentlemanly forms of warfare.

ARTICLE 2
The previously mentioned forms of ungentlemanly warfare are hereby banned within the territory of the signatures for domestic use, and for international use in terms of pre-emptive or first-use, starting on January 1st, 1901 once the treaty enters into force.

ARTICLE 3
The stockpiling of agents for biological and chemical warfare is hereby prohibited. All current stockpiles of such agents must be disposed of entirely once Article 6 comes into effect.

ARTICLE 4
Research on chemical and biological warfare will only be allowed for the purposes of finding countermeasures, antidotes or for purely scientific purposes. Incentives and support will be provided for experts in such fields to switch to non-lethal research. Signatures must share their findings with the Ungentlemanly Warfare Commission in order to prevent and/or deter the start of a new arms race.

ARTICLE 5
The sale of agents for chemical and biological warfare will be made illegal starting on January 1st, 1901 once the treaty enters into force.. Companies that held a role or stake in such fields until January 1st, 1900, and who may encounter financial losses as the result of this protocol, may be reasonably compensated by their respective nation if they so decide, under their preferred mechanism.

ARTICLE 6
The signatories will further formally renounce the right to non-first usage of chemical and biological weapons in self-defence for all time after January 1st, 1902 the treaty enters into force.. To enforce this renunciation, all signatories will agree to enact immediate and full economic sanctions, including an economic embargo, against any nation that engages in ungentlemanly warfare after the aforementioned date. Signatories must also pass legislation or enact decrees that ensure compliance with Article 6.

ARTICLE 7
An Ungentlemanly Warfare Commission will be established in a city belonging to a neutral power, with participants from all signatories. Delegations from the Commission will be provided reasonably access to signatory countries to ensure compliance with the previous articles.

The Commission must ensure that the make up of delegations to specific countries places emphasis on neutral, non-aligned, or non-rival nations to the one to be inspected. Information thus collected will remain the private, exclusive property of of the Commission, which must enact regulations with harsh penalties for any actors who illegally access or divulge any of its contents.

In addition to this, the Scandinavian delegation would look favorably upon the inclusion of safeguards regarding both the national make up of the delegations sent for national inspections as well as the future propriety of the information they will collect to ensure that this information does not fall into the hands of state actors.

Suspicion of non-compliance must be brought to the Commission, who will issue a report – by majority vote – within 90 days outlining whether Article 6 ought to be invoked.

ARTICLE 8
This treaty shall enter into force when 3/4 of states with the capability to create chemical and biological weapons ratify the treaty. The determination of which states are capable of creating chemical and biological weapons will be made by an expert committee with members designated by this conference.

Previously discussed options have been added, including the Scandinavian proposal after garnering a larger consensus.

We shall leave this draft open for debate - OOC: perhaps until tomorrow? - to see if there are further comments or proposals. If not, we could well be in a position to start signing.

[Lumine]

The Québecois delegation concurs that Switzerland would be a most acceptable arbiter and best location for the eventual commission. We would appreciate hearing from more powers.

Delegates, we have reached a crucial threshold. We agree on the basics, but face a final impasse regarding three key issues. It is our belief that an immediate declaration of war would make the treaty an ultimately unrealistic position. Not only that, it could leave a future power prone to being framed, and it is beyond important that this treaty be not abused in any manner in the future conflicts that, perhaps regrettably, some or many of us may face.

Gentlemen, we submit these three issues to you, so we can determine what is the consensus here:

-Should the penalties for violation be embargo, or war?

-Should the treaty have inspections as currently outlined?

-Finally, should the treaty enter into force immediately or after the Scandinavian threshold is put into place?

(To these, the Québec delegation says "embargo", "yes", and "Scandinavian threshold".)

[Lumine]

Upon careful consideration and review of arguments, the Québecois delegation switches its vote to "immediately", understanding, nonetheless, that the Scandinavian threshold is nonetheless still a reasonable alternative.

[Lumine]

Monsieurs,

For the past few weeks and months, we have debated an issue of vital importance to the whole world, with our decisions here likely to have an impact on the lives of millions of human beings. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the fate of dignity on the battlefield is in our hands. With the recent vote and the withdrawal of the Scandinavian amendment, we have a consensus text.

There is a temptation to let the process further extend itself into another year, but we feel, and we have been approached by other delegations in this sense, that there is too much of a danger in delaying things further. With the rise of diplomatic tensions in Europe, in Asia, in the Americas, the risk of war is altogether too high. And without a functioning agreement in place, we may well find it impossible to reach the necessary consensus should war begin and we prove unable to stop it.

As host, we believe we have reached the crucial point. We submit the final text that results from this conference and will be inviting nations - participant or not - to sign.

FINAL TEXT, TREATY OF TROIS-RIVIERES

ARTICLE 1
Any form of biological warfare, as well as all forms of chemical warfare with the sole exception of non-lethal tear inducing irritants for emergency domestic situations; are hereby considered to be ungentlemanly forms of warfare.

ARTICLE 2
The previously mentioned forms of ungentlemanly warfare are hereby banned within the territory of the signatures for domestic use, and for international use in terms of pre-emptive or first-use.

ARTICLE 3
The stockpiling of agents for biological and chemical warfare is hereby prohibited. All current stockpiles of such agents must be disposed of.

ARTICLE 4
Research on chemical and biological warfare will only be allowed for the purposes of finding countermeasures, antidotes or for purely scientific purposes. Incentives and support will be provided for experts in such fields to switch to non-lethal research. Signatures must share their findings with the Ungentlemanly Warfare Commission in order to prevent and/or deter the start of a new arms race.

ARTICLE 5
The sale of agents for chemical and biological warfare will be made illegal. Companies that held a role or stake in such fields until January 1st, 1900, and who may encounter financial losses as the result of this protocol, may be reasonably compensated by their respective nation if they so decide, under their preferred mechanism.

ARTICLE 6
The signatories will further formally renounce the right to non-first usage of chemical and biological weapons in self-defence for all time. To enforce this renunciation, all signatories will agree to enact immediate and full economic sanctions, including an economic embargo, against any nation that engages in ungentlemanly warfare after the aforementioned date. Signatories must also pass legislation or enact decrees that ensure compliance with Article 6.

ARTICLE 7
An Ungentlemanly Warfare Commission will be established in a city belonging to the Swiss Republic or any such other neutral and non-aligned nation, with participants from all signatories. Delegations from the Commission will be provided reasonably access to signatory countries to ensure compliance with the previous articles.

The Commission must ensure that the make up of delegations to specific countries places emphasis on neutral, non-aligned, or non-rival nations to the one to be inspected. Information thus collected will remain the private, exclusive property of of the Commission, which must enact regulations with harsh penalties for any actors who illegally access or divulge any of its contents.

Suspicion of non-compliance must be brought to the Commission, who will issue a report – by majority vote – within 90 days outlining whether Article 6 ought to be invoked.